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Abstract 
Social health . lnsurance in developed countries , lS facing 
problems concerning cost control. In developing countries, 
problems are of low coverage, the provision of care to include 
access to the private sector, equity in access to services, as 
well as cost control. In Thailand, the recently introduced 
social insurance scheme requires the insured or their employer 
to select a main contractor to provide care a general 
hospital with >100 beds - which is paid on a capitation basis. 
In response the private sector is developing provider networks 
to ensure health services to be more accessible and to attract 
insured workers to enroll with the network. The primary 
concern of the research is to evaluate MEDSEC, the biggest 
private network in terms of the number of facilities and 
insured covered. Nopparat, the biggest publicly-organized 
network, was selected for comparison with MEDSEC. The aim is 
to identify policy recommendations regarding networks and 
their internal payment mechanisms. The obj ecti ves are to 
examine: how MEDSEC is organized and how it has grown over 
time; the health seeking behaviour of the insured of MEDSEC; 
and the utilization rate, payment system, and quality of care 
of MEDSEC. Four substudies were done: the MEDSEC operating 
and financial system; the health seeking behaviour of the 
insured, their utilization rate, knowledge, and satisfaction; 
the providers' knowledge and attitudes; and evaluation of 
quality of care concerning four aspects: infrastructure, 
patient satisfaction, outpatient drug treatment, and inpatient 
care. The study identifies policy implications concerning the 
functions of a good network office, the monitoring of a 
network's quality of care, the payment system of networks, and 
improving the knowledge of the insured concerning the 
regulation on access to care. 
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1.1 Background 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Social, compulsory insurance, is operated in >83 countries in the world (US 
Department of Health and Human Services 1986). Countries have developed 
social insurance systems suited to their traditional values, health 
services, and favourite social beliefs. Many options for health care 
provision and financing have been chosen for implementation in social 
insurance. Provision of services can either be through the direct or the 
indirect method. For the direct method, health insurance institutions such 
as the Social Security Fund (SSF) builds its own physical facilities for 
both hospital and ambulatory care for insured persons. For the indirect 
method, facilities do not belong to the health insurance institute and the 
medical care is purchased from existing public or private facilities and 
practitioners (Zschock, 1982). The direct method is an option when there 
is adequate volume of beneficiaries in a geographical area. The indirect 
method is applied where there is small volume (Ron et al, 1990) and a 
substantial infrastructure of services exists (Mills, 1983). 
A common trend of social insurance is comprehensive coverage, and equity 
in access to services. The historical experience in social insurance in 
developed countries has shown that universal coverage with efficiency and 
equity in health care is the ultimate aim. Developed countries are facing 
problems concerning cost control. Both single-payers as in Canada and 
multiple-sponsors as in the US are confronted with the problem of cost 
escalating faster than the growth of GDP. Countries have experienced 
increasing health care costs that have strained their payroll taxes, 
government budgets, and premiums. The causes of cost-inflation are: 
payment systems that encourage cost inflation, general level of inflation 
in prices and wages, extra price increases charged by providers, larger 
demand due to the growth and aging of populations, greater 
utilization/capita, the greater intensity of services/contact, and high and 
costly technology used. Measure have been taken to counteract these 
problems such as managed care approaches in the USA. In managed care 
approaches, a sponsor is introduced to structure and adjust the market for 
competing between health plans, establishing equitable rules, managing the 
enrolment process, creating price-elastic demand to ensure competition, and 
avoiding uncompensated risk selection (Enthoven, 1993). The success of 
managed care approaches is based on the achievement and capability of a 
number of high quality, cost effective services, and presence of well 
organized systems of care (Enthoven, 1988, 1993). 
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Social insurance in developing countries is typically under reported. In 
Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East there are few reference documents 
available. In Latin American countries where social insurance has been in 
operation for 50 years, it is relatively well documented (Ron et al. 1990). 
At the same period, similar schemes developed elsewhere such as in Egypt, 
The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and Turkey. Before 1950, in Latin America 
there was basically no tradition of voluntary health insurance. Social 
insurance legislation and institutions took shape in developing countries 
and reflected the social policies which had gained acceptance in Europe. 
The coverage was limited according to criteria such as geographical area, 
size of population covered, and category of dependant. Employees in urban 
areas working in large enterprises were first covered, then gradually the 
type of persons protected expanded, to include more categories of 
employees, their dependants and eventually also groups of self employed 
(Leal de Araujo 1973). In Latin American countries as in Chile (100%) and 
Costa Rica (82%), the coverage of social insurance is better than 
developing countries in other continents (Roemer 1987). In Argentina where 
social insurance covers 75% of the population, private providers exist only 
for those of high income (Tollman, et aI, 1990). However in some countries 
of Latin America like Columbia and Ecuador, the coverage is low (Ron, et 
aI, 1990). In Ecuador social insurance covers only 10% of the population 
and dependants of beneficiaries receive inadequate protection. In 
Columbia, the private sector has been well established to cover about 15% 
of the population. Alongside it is an inefficient and costly public sector 
comprising an urban-based Social Security Institute, and a highly 
inefficient ministry of health. Since 1940, the health care delivery 
system of Latin American countries, except Chile, has followed the direct 
method (Roemer, 1987; Tollman et aI, 1990). The facilities and personnel 
are under the social security organization. The emerging trends of social 
insurance systems in Latin America are: to include the private sector in 
the provision of services for the insured; to assign the state a subsidiary 
role as demonstrated by the experience of changing the health system and 
financing in Chile (Viveros-Long, 1986); and to expand coverage and to 
widen the scope of services (Roemer, 1987). 
In Thailand, the Social Security Act (SSA) was enacted in September 1990 
after efforts lasting 26 years. The insured are obliged to contribute 1.5% 
of their salary to the SSF, while employers and the government both 
contribute the same amount to SSF. The capitation payment method has been 
chosen to pay the hospitals to avoid welfare losses from a fee-for-service 
(FFS) payment basis and because of the limited income contribution from the 
responsible parties. During the first 3 years of implementation, working 
establishments with >19 employees were covered and after that working 
establishments with >9 employees have been covered by this scheme. The 
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scheme allows them to use public and private facilities which sign a 
contract with the SSF. The Fund allocated 700 Baht/capita/year to the main 
contractor for each registered worker. In 1993, about 3 million workers 
(5.2% of the total population) were covered by the SSF and a budget of 
about 2,100 million Baht was allocated. The main contractor is a hospital, 
with ~100 beds, which has facilities according to Social Security Office 
(SSO) regulations. The SSO is a department under the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Welfare. Its other role is to coordinate and regulate for 
workers and providers to participate with each other, to operate the 
enrolment process and management, to collect contributions from the insured 
and employers, to manage the payment system to providers, and to develop 
mechanisms to improve services to the insured. 
Apart from capitation payment, the SSO also pays some money to providers 
for some diseases which have high cost. The items, rules, and subsidized 
rates change at least once a year so it is difficult for some providers to 
get used to it. For the insured, of whom the majority are poorly educated 
workers, it is more difficult to understand the regulations. This leads 
to misunderstanding for the providers and the insured and may initiate some 
conflict between them. 
In case of emergencies and accidents there is a regulation allowing the 
insured to receive care from any facilities within 72 hours after getting 
ill and then they can be reimbursed some money from the SSO. After 72 
hours the insured have to receive care from their main contractors. The 
reimbursement rate and rules change at least once a year. Moreover there 
are 15 diseases/conditions which are not covered by the scheme. These also 
lead to misunderstanding for both the insured and the providers. 
Since under SSA, the only provider who may offer services is the selected 
main contractor, there are a lot of problems about access to care. To 
satisfy the insured by increasing accessibility to facilities, some main 
contractors have established groups of facilities to provide care. These 
groups of facilities are called provider networks. In 1991, the first year 
of the programme, there were no provider networks. In 1992, there was 1 
network under the MOPH (671 facilities) and 1 private network (69 
facilities) . Unfortunately it is difficult to classify the number of 
networks during 1992-1995 since a lot of facilities were connected to >1 
network. However the number of network facilities are increasing every 
year in both public and private sectors. The total number of facilities 
in networks has increased by 153.6% (table 1.1) The number of networked 
facilities in the public sector increased by 87.3% but in the private 
sector increased by 798.6% during 1992-1995. The total number of main 
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contractors involved in social insurance increased by 30.3%, those In the 
public sector increased by only 6.8% while those in the private sector 
increased by 133.3% during 1992-1995. 
Table 1.1 Number of main contractors involved in social insurance and 
facilities in networks by private/public sectors, 1992-1995 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Increase(%) 
1992-1995 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Main contractor 137 145 156 177 189 30.3 
-Public 119 118 119 122 126 6.8 
-Private 18 27 37 55 63 133.3 
2. Facilities in networks 740 760 1,320 1,877 153.6 
-Public 671 674 1,035 1,257 87.3 
-Private 69 86 285 620 798.6 
======================================================================= 
NOTE: * By 1 January 1995 
The trend of increasing numbers of private main contractors and the number 
of the facilities in private networks presumably influenced the market 
share of private sector to increase more than the public sector. Since 
1991, the first year of implementing social insurance, the balance of the 
public and private market share has been changing over time, as shown in 
table 1.2. The market share of the private sector has increased >3 times 
during these first 4 years. In 1991 the private sector shared only 16 % 
while in 1992, 1993 and 1994 it shared 41%, 53%, and 59% respectively. 
Table 1.2 
insurance 
Market share of public/private provision concerning social 
Hospital 
category 
MOPH 
University 
Private 
Others 
Dec 1991 
No* 
1.2 
0.4 
0.4 
0.5 
% 
48 
17 
16 
19 
Mar 1992 
No* 
0.8 
0.3 
1.0 
0.3 
% 
33 
13 
41 
13 
Aug 1993 
No* 
0.9 
0.3 
1.6 
0.2 
% 
30 
10 
53 
7 
Jul 1994 
No* 
0.9 
0.3 
2.0 
0.2 
% 
26 
9 
59 
6 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2.5 100 2.4 100 3.0 100 3.4 100 
========================================================================== 
Note: -* = Number of workers in million. 
-MOPH, 1992, 1993, 1994 
The first private network was the Medical Social Security Centre (MEDSEC) 
Network. In 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 there were 70,000, 110,000, 
150,000, and 280,000 workers respectively included in this network. It is 
considered the biggest private provider network in terms of coverage of the 
insured and facilities involved. It is now (1995) composed of 3 main 
contractors: Pattaya Memorial, Parkket, and Veteran hospitals, which are 
~100 bed hospitals. Pattaya Memorial hospital is located at Pattaya. 
Veteran hospital is in Bangkok, and Parkket hospital is in Pathumthani 
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province which is a suburb of Bangkok. Besides these 3 main contractors 
there are >10 small hospitals, 70 clinics and polyclinics which act as 
subcontractors, and 10 general and specialized hospitals which act as 
supracontractors. Legally all subcontractors and supracontractors have to 
sign a contract with the main contractors. The main contractors also have 
to sign a contract with MEDSEC. 
In 1992 the MOPH initiated provider networks. They were not working well 
because the facilities were confined to MOPH facilities. Since 1994 the 
policy about networks of the MOPH was changed to include private clinics 
and private hospitals in MOPH networks. This changed the structure of 
public networks and the number of the insured selecting public provider 
networks. Since then, the publicly organised networks are composed of both 
public and private providers but are managed by public main contractors. 
In 1995 the biggest publicly organised network in terms of number of the 
insured covered (80,005) and number of facilities involved (50) is Nopparat 
network followed by Lertsin, Samutsakorn, Sawanpracharak, and Ayuttaya 
networks (table 1.3). Nopparat network has been established since May 
1993. In 1993 there were only 35 facilities involved and 39,690 workers 
selecting the network. 
Table 1.3 Number of the insured and facilities in MOPH provider network, 
February l.995 
Number of Number of facilities 
the insured Public Private Private Total 
clinic hospital 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Nopparat 80,000 10 39 1 50 
Lertsin 51,000 9 26 1 36 
Samutsakorn 36,000 4 27 0 31 
Sawanpracharak 11,000 12 16 3 31 
Ayuttaya 6,400 15 5 0 20 
=========================================================== 
The organization of provider networks in social insurance in Thailand is 
very similar to the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) that were 
originally developed in USA. This is because they share some similar 
characteristics: prepayment, method of selecting HMOs or network, 
capitation based payment, group of providers to provide care, and operation 
in a competitive environment. 
There are advantages and disadvantages in a capitation payment system. The 
provider-patient relationship is likely to be maintained due to the 
financial incentive and services less abused through overtreatment. The 
advantages for the sponsor is that administration is simple and easy to 
handle. However the most serious disadvantage is the risk of poor quality 
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services rendered by some providers due to too few laboratory 
investigations, undertreatment, and overused deputising services (Ron et 
al 1990). There is possibly a shorter medical consultation time because 
main contractors have an incentive to cut their costs and no additional 
incentives to provide treatment. Experience from the past found that HMOs 
which use the same payment system tend to minimize hospitalizations 
(Wyszewianski 1988). 
The illness rate of all age groups of Thai people from the morbidity and 
mortality differential survey in 1988 was 2.1 episodes/person/year (Mahidol 
University 1988). The rate varied by age group. The rate for the age-
group of the insured, 15-60 years old, was 2.2 episodes. 
Tangcharoensathien et ale (1993) found that the illness rate of insured 
workers in Samutprakarn in 1992 was 2.88 episodes/person/year. The 
proportion of insured workers when ill using outpatient (OP) services at 
registered hospitals was 0.22 with a 0.78 probability of seeking care from 
other facilities. The utilization rate for outpatients was 
0.63/worker/year (2.88 x 0.22). There was a 0.64 probability of using 
inpatient (IP) care at registered hospitals, and a 0.36 probability of 
using other facilities. In this situation, hospitals could make quite 
remarkable profits out of the 700 baht/capita/year. Tangcharoensathien et 
ale (1993) also stated that the utilization rate by the insured under the 
SSA was very low due to the method of choosing 1 main contractor or due to 
the method of choosing registered hospitals by the employer on behalf of 
the employees which leads to the problem of inaccessibility if care can 
only be sought from 1 facility. Nitayarumpong (MOPH 1992) stated that 
provider networks for the insured need to be created and expanded to 
provide higher quality and more efficient care. The Director of SSO (MOPH 
1992) also stated that networks should be initiated amongst both public and 
private providers, because there would be more facilities for the insured 
to seek care when they are ill. It is likely that the health seeking 
behaviour of the insured belonging to a network provider would be different 
when compared to other providers without a network especially the 
proportion of insured workers when ill using outpatient services at 
registered hospitals. Since 1992 networks have been established, but the 
network itself is not officially recognized by the SSO as a provider or 
purchaser due to lack of information to initiate an appropriate rule and 
due to questions about quality of care of small hospitals and clinics in 
the networks. The unrecognized network also causes problems of how to 
monitor and control the provider networks for effective care of the 
insured. 
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1.2 Study aims and objectives 
The method of choosing 1 main contractor and the trend of increasing 
provider networks generates questions concerning how to organize the 
provision of care under the SSA, and the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of providing care for the insured through a private network 
versus a publicly-organised network. 
On the issue of capitation payment and services offered by clinics and 
small hospitals in the networks, there are questions to be investigated: 
what is the quality of care offered by networks, do private or publicly 
organised networks provide a more effective quality of care, is the quality 
of care of the insured (paid by capitation) less effective than the quality 
of care of the non insured (paid by FFS) . 
To address the problem of low utilization rate due to few facilities 
providing care, poor understanding of SSO regulations, and lower 
satisfaction with medical care; it is necessary to study the knowledge, 
health seeking behaviour, utilization rate, and satisfaction of the insured 
using a network. 
The aim of this study is thus to identify health policy recommendations 
regarding health care provider networks which would improve the physical 
accessibility of the insured, patient's satisfaction, quality of care, and 
the payment mechanism within a network. This is to accelerate the welfare 
gain from proper management of provision of social insurance. In order to 
develop policy recommendations, a tracer provider network operating with 
a high level of satisfaction as suggested by the increasing number of 
facilities and number of the insured should be selected to be evaluated. 
As MEDSEC is the biggest network and has grown over time in terms of the 
number of the insured covered and the number of facilities in the network, 
selecting the MEDSEC network as a tracer network to evaluate, to draw on 
its experience for the policy recommendations is valuable. Moreover to 
develop more policy implications from evaluating the MEDSEC network, a 
comparison group is needed. There are no other networks with 
characteristics like the MEDSEC network. The Nopparat network was selected 
as a comparison group because it is the biggest publicly organised network 
in terms of number of providers and the insured covered, and because both 
networks face the same payment system (capitation based) and the same types 
of facilities (clinics and small hospitals) . 
The main, general objective of this study is to evaluate the MEDSEC network 
in terms of organization, payment system, quality of care, behaviour and 
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utilization rate of the insured, and to compare selected aspects with the 
Nopparat network. The specific objectives are: 
To describe how MEDSEC was set up and how it has grown over time 
i.e. historical development, contractual relationships, people and 
groups involved, and marketing system of MEDSEC 
To examine the utilization rate of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks 
To examine the health seeking behaviour of the insured of MEDSEC 
To evaluate satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the services of 
the insured of MEDSEC 
To investigate the payment system to MEDSEC providers 
To evaluate the quality of care in 4 aspects: 
- the infrastructure of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks 
- inpatient satisfaction with the MEDSEC/Nopparat networks 
outpatient prescriptions of the insured/noninsured of the 
MEDSEC network 
- inpatient medical records of the insured/noninsured of the 
MEDSEC network. 
1.3 Content of thesis 
This thesis contains 8 chapters. Chapter 2 reviews literature in 2 parts: 
provision of health services under social insurance and payment systems 
between SSF and providers. This chapter extensively reviews theoretical 
and practical explanations of HMOs and related topics, and payment systems 
and associated issues which provide experiences from which policy 
recommendations can be developed concerning provision of care and payment 
systems. 
Chapter 3 describes how this study was done. There were 4 main substudies: 
the operating and financial system of MEDSEC and utilization rate of 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks; MEDSEC provider's knowledge and attitude; health 
seeking behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and satisfaction of the 
insured of MEDSEC network; and evaluation of quality of MEDSEC/Nopparat 
networks' care concerning 4 aspects: infrastructure of MEDSEC/Nopparat 
networks, patient satisfaction of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks, outpatient drug 
treatment of the insured/noninsured of MEDSEC network, and inpatient care 
of the insured/noninsured of MEDSEC network. The main focus is on the 
evaluation of the MEDSEC network. The methodologies used were varied: 
secondary data collection, prescription and medical records collection, 
postal questionnaire, structured questionnaire interview, and in depth 
interview. 
The results of this study are presented in 3 chapters. Chapter 4 presents 
the payment mechanism and charge rates of MEDSEC network, and the 
utilization rates for MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. This chapter looks at the 
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effect of the payment mechanism on the charge rate and utilization. 
Chapter 5 presents the knowledge, health seeking behaviour, utilization 
rate, and satisfaction of insured workers with MEDSEC facilities. This 
chapter addresses the lack of knowledge of the insured and the crucial need 
to educate them. Chapter 6 presents the evaluation of quality of care 
concerning 4 aspects: structure of MEDSEC/Nopparat facilities, satisfaction 
of inpatients using MEDSEC/Nopparat facilities, prescribing analysis of the 
insured/non insured of the MEDSEC network, and inpatient medical treatments 
of the insured/noninsured of the MEDSEC network. The results from this 
chapter leads to policy recommendations in terms of organization of 
networks and payment mechanisms. 
Chapter 7 discusses the methodology and draws together all main findings 
from the previous 3 chapters and then presents the policy recommendations. 
The policy implications identified involve the function of good network 
offices, monitoring of a network's quality of care, the payment system of 
networks, and improving the knowledge of the insured concerning the 
regulations on access to care. 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions and further research needed. This 
chapter confirms that the main objective of evaluating the MEDSEC network 
in terms of organization, payment system, quality of care, and behaviour 
and utilization rate of the insured was achieved. Furthermore 
generalization of the results, and further research, are discussed. 
22 
Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Common concerns about social insurance funding in developing countries are 
over mechanisms to control overall expenditure (Ron et aI, 1990): 
organising a suitable pattern of provision to deliver better care at less 
cost and to meet the equity objectives of countries (Mills, 1983). In 
Thailand, where the capitation payment is applied and networks are 
established, the problem of cost-control is diminished but the difficulty 
of how to initiate an appropriate, cost effective, and equitable provider 
network organisation remains. Hence the interesting issues to be explored 
are: what is the best way of providing access to care in social insurance, 
how should providers be paid, what is the proper network provider 
organization, what is the suitable payment system within the network, and 
what are the incentives relating to quality of care of facilities of 
networks. To study these topics, 2 issues concerning provision of health 
services and the effects of the payment system under social insurance are 
reviewed and presented in this chapter. 
2.1 Provision of health service under social insurance 
2.1.1 Organization pattern 
Medical care under social insurance is usually described by either the 
direct or the indirect pattern. In the direct pattern, the health 
insurance organization builds its own physical facilities; in the indirect 
pattern medical care is purchased from existing public or private providers 
(Roemer, 1969; Zschock, 1982). The indirect pattern usually developed in 
the older industrialised countries where private facilities already 
existed, and when social insurance was first established as in Belgium and 
Germany. The direct pattern is more usual in developing countries where 
the basic medical resources are relatively scarce, and where centrally 
planned political structures have existed as in Tunisia and in India. 
These 2 patterns of care are not only applied to general practitioners 
(GPs) but also to specialist care, hospitalisation, drug, dental care, and 
other segments of health care (Roemer, 1969). 
Since a country's option of health care provision pattern explicitly 
depends on the existing pattern of services, their ownership, and payment 
systems, 2 main factors that should be considered are: the presence of 
actual private systems and the sufficiency of public health care (Mills, 
1983) . However, coordination among the maj or existing institutional 
providers of medical care in developing countries could be promoted to 
improve efficiency and accomplish equity in allocation of medical resources 
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(Zschock, 1982). Some coordination has occurred in Chile where HMOs and 
privatization of health services have been implemented (Scarpaci, 1987), 
and in Costa Rica and Panama where public and social security medical 
services have been integrated (Zschock, 1982). Although the integration 
between institutes has been promoted, if the referral mechanisms are poor, 
high cost and inefficient utilisation of health services remains. To 
increase the efficiency in provision of care, primary health care (PHC) 
ideas have been proposed in social insurance schemes. These involve 
greater emphasis on ambulatory service, greater restriction on the 
construction of new hospitals, expansion of coverage to wider groups of 
population, and more services in disease prevention. Often, in many social 
insurance situations, the charges to patients have been increased and 
attempts made to reduce excessive utilization of services. To decrease the 
cost of medical care of the individual and promote necessary accessibility 
to care, financing through third-party channels is suitable (Zschock, 
1982) . 
2.1.2 Health Maintenance Organizations 
HMOs are 1 possibility for the provision of health care in the context of 
social insurance. Although in the USA, HMOs are part of private insurance, 
their experience can be applied to the context of social insurance because 
they combine the insurance and provision functions and hold the best 
purchaser characteristics compared to other health insurers. As in Chile, 
consumers could decide which HMOs they want to enrol with; then the SSF 
pays the HMO. HMOs combine a prepaid risk-sharing role with health service 
provision, have shown their capability to lower costs and improve 
efficiency in the USA, and have been suggested as a means of delivering 
health services in developing countries (Tollman et ale 1990, Abel-Smith 
1988, Akin et ale 1987). 
In 1929, the Community Hospital Association of Elk City, Oklahoma became 
the first prepaid medical scheme. After that the term 'HMOs' was initiated 
in the USA in 1970 and legislation was enacted to promote their development 
in 1973. Marrison and Luft (1990) note that HMOs initially developed as 
staff or group model HMOs (pre-1975), followed by the speedy development 
of independent practice associations (IPAs, 1975-1985), and most recently 
by the even faster development of Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) 
and 'hybrid' HMOs which combine various models and offer consumers choices 
amongst them. 
Definitions and models of HMOs 
Though HMOs may vary in detail, there are some elements that are typical. 
These are prepayment, capitation fees and risk-bearing by providers. Other 
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components are more varied such as: the type of provider structure (staff 
prototype, group practice paradigm, independent provider organization) ; the 
definition of the enroled population (group/individual enrolments); 
operation in a competi ti ve environment; the pat tern of HMO coverage 
(copayments, deductibles, maximum limits); and operating in a referral 
system. However, Tollman et al. (1990) mentions 5 comprehensive 
characteristics of HMOs: a defined range of health services provided by a 
contractor, provision of services to a specified population, voluntary 
enrolment of subscribers, fixed and regular payment by enrollees, and an 
assumption of financial risk in the provision of services. 
The major models of HMOs consist of prepaid group practices (PPGPs) and 
IPAs. Functionally, HMOs are defined in 2 panels: closed panel and open 
panel. In a closed panel, the PPGP renders services to enrollees through 
a limited group of medical practitioners whose principal practice activity 
commonly includes the provision of care to HMO members. This model of HMOs 
is health centre based and can be categorised as either a 'staff model', 
meaning that the doctors are personally employed by the HMO; or as a 'group 
practice model', meaning that the HMOs contracts with a medical group to 
render services to its members. In an open panel plan, an HMO contracts 
with an IPA to provide services to the HMO's members through arrangements 
with medical practitioners engaged in private practice throughout the 
community. The IPAs generally have no actual facilities of their own, and 
survive only as financial entities which acquire prepayments from 
subscribers and then reimburse independent medical practitioners and 
hospitals on a fee basis. 
Recently, other 'hybrid types' of HMOs and prepaid plans have evolved. 
Such plans include Competitive Medical Plans (CMPs), Gatekeeper Plans, and 
PPOs. In Medicare's HMOs/CPMs option in USA, Medicare contracts with HMOs, 
and the government pays HMOs. In this option, the largest system of risk 
rating is operated (Enthoven 1988). This system, risk rating, identifies 
persons or groups by certain characteristics such as by age, sex, and area 
of residence; by welfare, institutional, and disability status; and by 
presence of end stage renal disease. Participating HMOs/CMPs must charge 
all the beneficiaries under FFS system the same price for the same 
benefits. This risk rating system was established to protect the 
government from adverse risk selection, and to give health plans an 
incentive to help older and sicker beneficiaries. 
Managed competition and HMOs 
The ultimate aim of managed competition is to accomplish equity and 
efficiency. It has had mixed results in improving access to care, assuring 
the quality of services, and saving money (US GOA 1993a). The existence 
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of cost-conscious consumer choice is necessary to create incentives for 
health plans to develop and demonstrate less costly alternative ways of 
organizing care of acceptable quality (Enthoven 1988) . 
Risk rating is a tool for managed competition. Managed competition is a 
concept that has been developed >20 years of research and refinement 
(Enthoven 1993). It is defined as a purchasing approach to acquire maximum 
benefit for consumers and employers, using regulations for competition 
originated from microeconomic principles. A sponsor is either an employer, 
a governmental entity, or a purchasing cooperative. It is performing on 
behalf of a large group of subscribers, and formulates and regulates the 
market to overcome attempts by insurers to avoid price competition. The 
sponsor initiates rules of equity, selects participating plans, manages the 
enrolment process, creates price-elastic demand, and manages risk 
selection. Managed competition is based on comprehensive service 
organizations that combine financing and delivery systems. Prospects for 
its achievement are based on the accomplishment and potential of a number 
of high-quality, cost-effective, and successfully organized systems of 
service such as PPGPs in the USA (Enthoven 1993) . 
In managed competition, it is important to consider 3 groups: consumers, 
health plans, and sponsors (Enthoven 1988). In a free market, health plans 
are considered as the supply side and individuals the demand side. Without 
carefully drawn rules and active management by sponsors, health plans would 
be free to pursue profits or survival that would destroy efficiency and 
equity. Individual consumers would be powerless to counteract this. 
In successful models of managed competition, sponsors are active collective 
agents on the demand side who contract with competing health plans and 
continuously structure and adjust the market to overcome its tendency 
toward failure and inequity (Enthoven 1988). The sponsor assures each 
eligible beneficiary of financial coverage of health expenses at a 
reasonable price. In a competitive model the sponsor serves as the broker 
who structures the coverage, contracts with beneficiaries and health plans 
regarding the rules of participation, manages the enrolment process, 
collects premium contributions from beneficiaries, pays the premium to 
health plans, and administers cross-subsidies among beneficiaries and 
subsidies available to the whole group. Other tools used for managed 
competition to counteract market failure are: standardized benefit 
packages, annual enrolment process, continuity of coverage, surveillance 
by sponsors in terms of performance of health plans and risk-selecting 
behaviour, quality assurance, procompeti ti ve action by sponsors, and 
sponsor management of subsidies. 
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It is too complicated for either the public or the private health care 
sectors to carry out this managed competition on their own. Sponsor and 
purchaser agencies are needed. To manage competition effectively, a 
suitably motivated sponsor should attempt to combine many best aspects of 
prospective experiences such as payment systems, Medicare's HMO/CPM option, 
California's Public Employees' retirement System, the Federal Employees' 
Health Benefits Programme, and practices of some of the best private 
employers (Enthoven 1988). 
HMOs plans have had managed care aims, especially a high priority to 
control hospital costs. Sheils et al. (1993) studied group-model HMOs in 
the USA to estimate the lowest-cost plan. They found that there was 
attainable saving. Managed competition enhances incentives to contain 
costs even for HMOs by increasing consumers' price sensitivity and managing 
risk selection as a means of maximizing insurer profits. In the group-
model HMOs, consumers select from among various approved health plans. 
Insurers are required to propose a uniform benefit package covering a 
standard category of care, with uniform patient cost-sharing conditions. 
For cost-sharing, $10 copayment/outpatient visit with no deductible is 
required for a low cost-sharing scenario, and a $250 deductible/person 
($250 deductible/family) with coinsurance is applied to high cost-sharing 
scenario. This cost-sharing reduces the problems of facing the high costs 
of high risk patients to some degree. Insurers are also requested to admit 
all applicants and are not allowed to vary contributions with health 
status. This market restricts insurers' capability to target healthier 
people through medical underwriting and benefit plan. With risk selection 
operations nearly abolished, insurers are pushing to compete for market 
share absolutely on the principle of price, provider network, and quality 
of care given. 
In the private sector where purchasers are employers, there is an obstacle 
concerning selectivity bias in managed competition. There was tendency of 
HMO plans to attract more the healthiest members of an employee group. 
This is aggravated by price competition between HMOs and indemnity plans 
(Kane, 1995). In HMO plans, all employee groups in the geographic 
community are charged the equivalent of an average price. But in indemnity 
plans, the charged price varies according to the actual costs or experience 
of the enrollee. Consequently employers with multiple plans usually pay 
more than they should for the healthier people and lose their opportunity 
to pool the healthier worker in the same pool with the iller people. This 
shows that the employers pay above the average costs in indemnity plans. 
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Empirical studies concerning the advantages of HMOs 
Issues such as quality, cost, and access to health care are crucial to 
consumers; the managed care business provides care at a significantly more 
affordable cost than traditional FFS care. Luft (1978) demonstrated that 
total costs for HMOs members were 10-40% lower for PPGP members as compared 
to other health insurance schemes. Manning et ale (1984) showed that HMO 
care cost 25% less than FFS care for comparable groups. Ware et ale (1986) 
found that there were better health outcomes in HMOs compared with FFS for 
both high and low income groups. 
Luft (1.987) demonstrated that HMO patients have lower hospitalization rates 
than patients in traditional insurance programmes, although much less is 
known about differences in resource use in hospitalized patients. Studies 
of Medicare financed HMOs found the same general result (Langwell et ale 
1987, Langwell 1990). Compared to traditional insurance programmes, IPAs 
demonstrated less ability to control hospital admissions than group or 
staff model HMOs, but more ability to control length of stay (LOS) for 
their inpatients (Luft 1987). Bradbury et ale (1991) showed that IPA 
patients had shorter stays than traditional insurance patients in a study 
of the 1.0 most frequently occurring medical service Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs) for patients aged >65. Bradbury et ale (1993) examined the 
effect of IPA-HMO membership on hospital total charges, ancillary charges 
and LOS for surgical patients. IPA patients exhibited adjusted total 
charges that were 6% lower than traditional insurance, ancillary charges 
that were 4.3% lower, and LOS that was 10% shorter. 
Johnson et ale (1989) stated that approximately 50% of the yearly increase 
in hospital costs comes from increased resource use/admission. Network HMO 
patients in several diagnostic categories used significantly fewer 
resources, once hospitalized, than patients in either IPAs or FFS plans. 
This difference gives network HMOs a competitive advantage in the market 
for health plans. 
Morrisey (1.993) stated that cost shifting was approximately $21.5 billion 
in 1.991.. Hospitals set different prices for different payers. The 
evidence on hospitals' ability to raise prices to 1 payer to make up for 
unsponsored care or lower payments by other payers is mixed at best. Cost 
shifting is not as easy as it may have been in the past because the nature 
of hospital and insurer competition has changed radically in the last 
decade. While hospital quality, services, and amenities still matter, some 
buyers are increasingly concerned about the price they pay. Evidence from 
studies of PPO and HMO negotiations with hospitals suggests that hospitals I 
market power is being disintegrated, at least in some areas. In a 
competitive market, a hospital that traditionally cared for the uninsured 
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by spending some of its profits on them is not able to do so, at least to 
the same extent as it did in the past. Increased competition in health care 
without consideration of the uninsured will decrease the uninsured's access 
to care. 
Moore et al. (1992) reported that treatment outcome in mental health was 
rated as "very satisfactory" or "satisfactory" in 82% of the cases. They 
illustrated that a hospital provider and its managed care system can 
provide satisfactory care, but also revealed the need to constantly review 
treatment programmes to reduce treatment barriers. 
Callahan and Bertakis (1993) and Hastings (1973) showed that there was 
significantly more patient information provided, more preventive services, 
greater disease prevention, more treatment planning, and more choice of 
medical supplies used for the HMO patients than for those of FFS group. 
Fox et al. (1993) found that HMOs offer several advantages over traditional 
FFS plans for disabled children who have special health needs such as: 
ancillary therapies, home care, outpatient mental health care, and medical 
case management. 
Romano (1993) stated that HMO members are extremely satisfied with the 
level of service and care they receive, and that managed care organizations 
still strive to demonstrate their commitment to quality. 
One of the reasons why HMOs can improve efficiency of health care provided 
is because of their decentralised characteristics of organization. It has 
been accepted that the delegation of authority to the local levels of the 
organization will enhance ability to respond to local needs, and improve 
cost containment. Gross et al. (1993) showed that in an attempt to 
provide high quality medical care, despite limited resources, health care 
providers in various countries have introduced decentralization into their 
services. They also present a conceptual framework for analyzing possible 
consequences of decentralization on dimensions of quality of PHC. A 
framework is defined for decentralization programmes in terms of their key 
modules, and these frameworks are employed to analyze a specific 
decentralization programme being implemented in Israel's largest HMOs. 
Disadvantages of HMOs 
HMOs might reduce cost by lowering the quality of care they provide and by 
cutting back the number of hospital admissions or the LOS, which in the 
long run may result in poorer outcomes (Culyer et al. 1988a, 1988b). The 
other way of reducing costs is by "skimming" off the lower risk groups of 
young and able. This is inequitable though HMOs may be efficient in 
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narrower technical and cost-effectiveness senses. HMOs in the USA tend to 
enrol relative young and healthy groups. There are many means in which 
discrimination has been done against the elderly or patients from chronic 
high cost diseases and in favour of younger groups (Tollman, 1990). This 
selection bias may become inequitable since it may leave the expensive high 
risk cases without health care cover, or with cover available only at high 
cost. 
In HMOs, consumers are usually able to select their own physicians and 
hospitals and so have a wide degree of choice to seek care once enroled in 
the plan. Consequently this may lead one to expect that individuals who 
had relative high risks of services would prefer to join HMOs. The HMOs 
themselves, by contrast, will face competitive pressure to risk 
discriminate, although their members are committed to community rating and 
community doctoring. Newhouse et al. (1985) stated that although HMO costs 
are lower than FFS sectors, the rate of increase in costs is not 
discernibly different between the 2 sectors. Moving over completely to HMO 
provision may therefore not be so cost-effective in the long run and may 
also bring serious problems of adequacy of coverage for high-risk groups. 
HMOs might develop local monopolies, thereby reducing consumer choice and, 
in consequence, increasing the chance of inefficiency. In rural areas 
where there are limited providers, consumer choice is affected. In urban 
areas, HMOs might seek to combine, thereby producing larger monopolies with 
greater economic power for the providers. Feldman and Dowd (1986) applied 
2 different techniques to estimate the price elasticity of demand in the 
urban markets for HMO patients. First, a pricing rule was developed from 
which hospital-specific price elasticities might be inferred. Second, the 
distribution of each payer's admissions at specific hospitals was examined 
to determine if low-priced hospitals attracted more patients. Data form 
31 hospitals in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area showed that 
hospitals could over-charge HMOs. The price sensitivity was totally 
lacking for the HMO patients and the market for hospital services was not 
competi ti ve. However interventions have been proposed. Such interventions 
are increased cost-sharing in commercial 
aggressive negotiations between health 
insurance, promoting PPOs, and 
plans and hospitals. These 
interventions may have increased the level of price competition and then 
the market may be reaching the competitive model in which price equals 
marginal cost (Feldman and Dowd, 1986). 
Some HMOs are predominately serving the middle classes and hence operating 
in the wealthy areas of the USA. They do not pretend to be generous and 
seem to have little enthusiasm for enroling Medicaid patients because the 
state intends only to partially reimburse them for the cost of caring for 
such patients. 
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Von-Korff and Marshall (1992) mentioned that patients treated for 12 
chronic conditions accounted for almost 66.7% of total costs. Enrollees 
treated for >1 of these 12 conditions accounted for 61% of the high cost 
enrollees and 63% of total costs. At present, HMOs typically rely on 
individual providers to manage on a case by case basis, rather than 
organizing clinic and HMO wide systems of care which are more cost 
effective (Richards 1986). 
Competition and satisfaction for the insured in HMOs 
Conflicting evidence examined by McLaughlin (1988) showed the evidence 
about the competi ti ve response to the growing presence of HMOs in the 
health care marketplace. Providers are responding not with classical 
cost-containing price competition but, instead, with cost-increasing 
nonprice competition, characterized by increased expenditures to promote 
actual or perceived product differentiation. However a market where 
providers become price takers is less tolerant of differentiating product 
strategies (Hilsenrath 1991). Many technologies may not be sufficiently 
valued in the more price-sensitive marketplace and their costs cannot be 
passed on. Instead providers will either absorb these costs or drop the 
use of technologies that cannot be financially justified. He also stated 
that innovation must increasingly address efficiency and more effort can 
be expected in the development of cost-saving technologies. 
Hiramatsu (1990) showed that comprehensiveness of coverage of HMOs in the 
USA was the most important factor in selection of a health plan; cost 
ranked second. Factors related to health-plan satisfaction included 
quality and quantity of plan physicians, access to specialists, and scope 
of benefits. Enrollees of HMOs were significantly more satisfied with 
their health plan overall than were members of PPOs or indemnity "health 
plans. He also concluded that member satisfaction was related to the 
number of physicians available and the ease of access to a preferred 
physician. Physician quality appeared to be the prime determinant of 
member satisfaction. 
HMOs in developing countries 
Tollman et ale (1990) stated that published papers on HMOs outside the USA 
are scarce. Only some descriptive information in South America is 
available. Brazil is said to have the largest HMO in the world: 10 million 
enrollees in 1982 (Akin 1987). Group practice HMOs and IPAs are 
predominant. Enrollees are from middle and upper income groups. In 
Argentina social insurance covers two-thirds of the population, a private 
sector existing only for high income groups. Even though a few HMOs exist 
for those of middle income group, the majority are concentrated in the high 
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income class along with PPOs and traditional indemnity plans (Tollman, 
1990). In Uruguay social insurance/HMOs cover 44% of the popUlation. They 
are heavily regulated and supervised to provide a comprehensive set of 
standardized benefits. Because benefits expire following 6 months of 
unemployment and because of the rising of the premium, individuals 
disenrolment has occurred with a tendency instead towards group enrolment 
(Tollman, 1990). 
The experience of Chile demonstrates that health care delivery options in 
private HMOs creates the strength to cover nearly 1 in 5 Chileans (Miranda, 
et aI, 1995). Institutors de Salud Provisional (ISAPREs), HMOs, introduced 
after the coup of 1973, were based on the exclusive medical programmes 
provided to employees in pri va te firms and to the upper middle income group 
of the public bureaucracy. HMOs were an optional source of care with other 
sources such as private medical centres and private insurance. In 1982, 
>2% of all Chileans belonged to HMOs (Scarpaci, 1987). To improve the 
problem of low coverage of HMOs, many legal changes in the health care 
framework have been implemented. The most importance is the increase of 
compulsory health care withholdings for all nonindigent Chileans in 1986. 
This change encouraged middle- and upper-income workers to join HMOs. The 
other actions are: creating a subsidy for low-income workers who wish to 
join HMOs, allowing them the chance to join HMOs; allowing pensioners to 
join HMOs; and greater regulatory control and consumer feedback for the HMO 
market. These actions remarkably increased the coverage to about 22% in 
1992 (Miranda, et aI, 1995). The experience of Chile shows that well 
organized and planned actions are needed to accomplish a good outcome for 
HMOs. 
Tollman (1990) suggested that factors informing decision makers whether 
HMOs should be implemented in a particular country or not are: (1) what is 
the presence of a defined population? (2) is there any relevance of 
management control? (3) is there any possibility of developing cost-
accounting systems? (4) what is the potential for diminished capital 
outlay? 
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2.2. Payment systems between Social Security Fund and providers 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Incentives for suppliers of goods and services can be introduced by the 
payment mechanism. Social insurance interferes with the market mechanism 
by eliminating price as a system of controlling how much the clients want 
to purchase, and eliminating competition if the insurer provides services 
itself or uses only 1 provider. However there can still be competition 
even if the insurer pays all the providers the same prices, as long as they 
are able to compete for patients or contracts. 
The insurer wants to be satisfied that services rendered give value for 
money (Ron et aI, 1990). The services must be acceptable in terms of 
accessibility, luxury and courtesy, and good technical quality but at the 
lowest and predictable cost. This low and predictable cost is inevitably 
at variance with the concerns of both hospitals and doctors. The 
broadening of the market with the introduction of social insurance should 
enable patients to be serviced with the same overhead costs. The fees for 
the insured should be below those previously charged in the private market 
because the SSF is a bulk purchaser. Ron et al. (1990) also argued that 
the provider clearly wants a system which will enable him to recapture some 
of the losses due to lower fees by giving each insured person extra 
services while the SSF wants a system which will contain costs and not lead 
to unreasonable services. Different levels of FFS charged present problems 
and the insurer usually wants to standardise them. However standard 
charges have posed problems for tertiary hospitals particularly teaching 
hospitals where teaching criteria impose higher costs. 
The German health care system represents an attempt to achieve a universal 
distribution of health care and control over total health care expenditures 
without a complete takeover of the health system by the government 
(Reinhardt 1993). It is considered as a good experience for countries in 
terms of health care financing management, especially its payment system. 
The German payment system will therefore be discussed later in this 
chapter. In addition the advantages and disadvantages of each payment 
system are also discussed from the point of view of patient, the provider, 
and the SSF. 
2.2.2 Payment methods by SSF 
Capitation, FFS, global budget, and DRGs are 4 payment prototypes used by 
the SSF. A fifth approach, salary payment, is only used in the direct 
method. In some countries a combination of payment systems has been used. 
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The common hybrid systems are capitation for GPs and FFS for hospitals, and 
FFS or capitation for GPs and global budget for hospitals. 
Capitation 
Capitation is a method of paying by the number of persons "on a list" 
whether a service is actually done and regardless of the number of units 
of service rendered. This method is commonly applied to GPs in many 
countries such as the UK, Denmark, Netherlands, and Italy (Abel-Smith 
1984). In Thailand the capitation method is applied for social insurance. 
In the USA, it operates under some HMOs and Medicaid Managed Care 
Programmes in many states such as Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
and Oregon. 
In the UK about 45% of the income of GPs is derived from capitation (Culyer 
et al. 1988a). Doctors have been paid by the capitation method since 1948. 
In Denmark the health insurance schemes paid GPs mainly by capitation. In 
general the rate of payment is modified twice yearly according to the 
retail price index. At the present time, GPs receive payment in 2 ways: 
capitation for the insured and FFS for private patients. 
Capitation can be flat rate or risk-related. In the UK, GP capitation is 
age-related. In the USA Medicaid programme, a risk-related rate is usually 
dispersed into age, sex, geographical area, and programme rate categories 
(US GAO 1993a). The USA Medicaid managed care programme is not a single 
health delivery plan, but rather a continuum of models that share a common 
approach. At 1 end of the continuum are prepaid or capitated models that 
pay organizations a per capita/month to provide or arrange for all covered 
services. At the other end are primary care case management (PCCM) models, 
which are similar to traditional FFS arrangements except that providers 
receive a per capita management fee to coordinate a patient's care in 
addition to reimbursement for the services they provide. 
Arizona's Medicaid programme, a fully capitated programme, has been 
operating since 1982 as a demonstration project (US GAO 1993a). Risk-
related capitation based on eligibility criteria is applied. All health 
plans are paid a monthly/capita capitation fee. For each service category 
in a risk pool, health plans accumulate encounter data to calculate the 
utilization rates, the cost/unit, and copayments. Using these data, the 
plans determine a gross capitation rate. This rate is subsequently 
adjusted for items such as reinsurance and deferred liability payments. 
The main advantages for the clients are free choice of doctor (up to the 
limits imposed on doctors' list sizes) and continuity of care. Cost is 
predictable and controllable. Doctors are motivated to practise in a way 
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to encourage more patients to join their list. The doctor-patient 
relationship is maintained due to the financial incentive to have a person 
remain on the list. The income of GPs and hospitals is regular and 
guaranteed. Services are less abused through overtreatment and are more 
flexible. Ron et ale (1990) stated that there is some incentive for GPs 
to encourage preventive activities where they think it will lighten their 
work load in the long run. 
The advantages from the insurer's point of view is that administration is 
simple and easy to handle. There need be little supervision except of some 
serious complaints such as breaking the rule about cost shifting from a 
fund to another which pays more such to a third party payment fund of 
automobile insurance. 
The disadvantages for the patient are that there may be a shorter 
consultation time because doctors have an incentive to cut their financial 
and personnel costs, changing doctor is difficult, and there are no 
additional incentives to provide treatment. Dentists in capitation carried 
out fewer fillings, fewer extractions, took fewer radiographs and saw their 
patients less frequently than their FFS colleagues (Holloway et al.1990). 
Moral hazard may be induced by the patient if there is zero copayment. 
There is no evidence of the effects of competition for patients to join 
lists in terms of services provided, or the outcomes of such services, or 
the characteristics which patients look for in a general practice or GPs 
(Culyer et al 1988a). 
The SSF may be concerned about the quality of service rendered by some GPs. 
There are questions of poor-quality services due to too few diagnostic 
tests and overused deputising services. In some countries such as the UK, 
capitation has been modified to answer some of the disadvantages eg. paying 
the salary of 2 supporting staff at a rate of 70%. Participation in 
continuing education is subsidised and extra allowances are paid to GPs 
when they are older. Financial incentives for GPs to work in some remote 
areas are provided. However the combination of general practice and 
hospital practice, particularly surgical practice, is rare because GP 
capitation leads to a strong dividing line between hospital work and 
general practice. 
In Denmark, the capitation payment for GPs services leads to a low level 
of provision by GPs and a high level of referrals (Groenewegen, 1991). 
Increasing the FFS component in the payment of GPs is seen as the remedy. 
A mixed system of FFS and capitation already exists in Denmark. The FFS 
part produces administrative data. These data were evaluated at province 
level to find out whether a greater number of services by GPs in a province 
corresponds with a lower level of hospital and specialist care. He showed 
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that in provinces with a greater number of services by GPs, the number of 
ambulatory hospital visits was smaller. 
Another additional innovative payment in capitation system is special 
payments for 'good practice'. In the UK, for example, GPs would receive 
a combination of capitation fees, fees for items of service and some 
allowances (Culyer et al.1988a) . Additional payments would be given for 
'good practice', for example achieving high coverage of preventive 
services. 
Fee-for-service 
This is a payment for each unit of medical procedure, or on a piece of 
work basis. FFS has dominated the system of payment especially in 
countries with free market oriented economies like the USA, Switzerland, 
Japan and Korea. In Germany, the FFS method is the only method used for 
paying doctors and specialists out of hospital. In Canada, most doctors 
are paid on FFS basis. Formerly, there was a practice of over- or extra-
billing which permitted the doctor to charge the patient over and above the 
negotiated fee schedule. Today, a doctor's source of income is ·almost 
exclusively FFS payments from the provincial public insurer. The patient 
is not required to pay a fee or make any other financial contribution 
(Evans 1.989). 
Paying the doctor under the Australian Medicare scheme is similar to Canada 
and Germany for there is no copayment from the patients if the doctor 
selects to bulk-bill (Logan et ale 1989). GPs can choose between bulk-
billing and charging the patient according to the full official fees. The 
official fees are in the Medical Benefit Schedule attached to the Health 
Insurance Acts which are used to define the Medicare rebate of 85% of the 
price of the private rate for services performed outside hospital. Most 
doctors in Australia select to bulk-bill because it simplifies the paper 
work and eradicates the risk of bad debts. 
The advantages for patients are that the doctor has an incentive to render 
the services he provides acceptable by attractive premises, no excess 
referrals, no under investigation, high courtesy and prompt service, and 
well organized and equipped surgeries. There is also less abuse of care 
by overuse by the patient, if there is free choice to visit a doctor, and 
morale is good if fees are adequate. The advantages for the GPs are high 
autonomy and clinical freedom, and higher income for more work done by the 
doctor (Ron et aI, 1990; Singkaew, 1991). 
The advantage from the insurer's point of view is the high level of 
satisfaction. Doctors have no incentive to under provide and some 
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incentive to keep up to date, particularly an incentive to specialise (Ron 
et aI, 1.990). 
Shirnmura (1988) emphasised that the effects of capitation and FFS methods 
on general medical practice should be cautiously compared by using factual 
information, especially numerical data. A FFS system encourages more 
consul tations, more diagnostic tests, higher cost drugs used, higher 
surgical rates and higher costs than a capitation method. On the other 
hand, a capitation method may lead doctors to hastier and less courteous 
care than a FFS system. The geographical distribution of GPs may be more 
even, and continuity of care may be better maintained, under a capitation 
system; but there may be excessive referrals from GPs to specialists under 
this method. There is no evidence for the contention that a capitation 
system encourages preventive medicine, but the financial coverage for 
preventive procedures may encourage them. 
The disadvantages of FFS for the community as a whole are that there may 
be supplier-induced demand of health care by the doctor, unpredictable 
cost, poor geographical distribution of medical services, and high drug use 
(Donaldson and Gerard 1.993, Culyer et ale 1.988a). The 'information gap' 
between physicians and their patients may allow doctors to induce demand 
for their services. This leads to the potential for physicians to increase 
the supply of services when they stand to gain financially from doing so, 
as is the case in the FFS system (Broomberg and Price 1990). There is 
extensive international confirmation, at both national and micro levels, 
of the connection between increased utilisation and the FFS payment system. 
In Germany about 66.7% of the visits in a hospital (where a doctor has a 
right to admit to hospital and there are financial incentives to do so) are 
doctor-induced compared with 33.3% in the UK (where capitation payment and 
global budgeting is used in the British National Health Service, Ron et 
al., 1.990). This is also in contrast with the pattern noted in the salary 
system, used in some HMOs in the USA. The 'practice setting' in which 
physicians operate also affects patterns of practice. In the FFS method, 
'third-party payment' means that both physicians and patients have little 
cost-consciousness of the direct costs of services. In some systems, such 
as HMOs, there is a strong cost consciousness on the part of doctors. 
These differences in practice affect the different patterns of utilisation 
in these systems. The FFS system, as it is structured in South Africa, 
leads to extreme inefficiency, and the development of al ternati ves is 
becoming an urgent necessity (Broomberg and Price 1990) . 
The disadvantages for the patients are that there is delay in seeking care 
because patients have to collect a large sum of money to pay the doctor if 
they have not insured, there is no integration of services which provide 
mainly curative care, there is a lack of continuity of care, and a short 
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consultation time because rapid work leads to a higher income of the 
doctor. The disadvantages for doctors are that there is little continuing 
education and holiday for the doctor, and high administrative costs. 
The disadvantages from the insurer's point of view are high administrative 
cost in processing claims, high, rising and unpredictable costs, a~d high 
cost of diagnostic tests. Even for a very straight forward case, the 
doctor can encourage a patient to make repeat visits and consultations. 
In specialist out patient care of hospitals in Ireland where such a FFS 
system applies, the outpatient visiting rate is 11% /year compared with 
4.5% in the UK (Ron et ale 1990). Abel-Smith (1984) stated that the high 
use of diagnostic tests has been identified as a problem in Belgium. 
Global budget 
Global budget is commonly applied to hospitals. Under global budgeting the 
hospital receives a block sum of money, normally in advance, for some set 
period (usually yearly) (Glaser, 1987). Hospital and payer agree on the 
total foreseen budget. The payer then sends the money in instalments, 
monthly or once every 2 weeks. In some global budgeting sys terns no 
variations occur in the granters' regular payments if the volume of work 
is higher or lower than estimated. This method is used to cover the whole 
cost of administering and financing services falling within the compass of 
the hospital. This method is always used when a government earmarks the 
budgets of either private or governmental hospitals. It reflects a high 
degree of commitment of the state to provide health care facilities to its 
people. It varies from nearly full support from the government to 
hospitals, to support only for the capital costs of the hospital. This is 
a reliable approximation to the funding mechanism for Canadian hospitals 
and NHS hospitals in the UK. 
It is normally associated with direct systems in health insurance, as in 
India and many countries in Latin America (Ron et ale 1990). It is also 
being applied to non-profit-making organisations as in Canada. This method 
has more recently been applied to hospitals in Belgium, France, and the 
Netherlands. Glaser (1987) stated that during the 1980s France adopted 
global budgeting systems of payment in order to control expenditure; at the 
same time, it improved the internal management of hospitals and, 
sequentially, the reporting of information about procedures and costs in 
each hospital. 
The advantage is that there is a built in incentive for hospitals to 
restrain cost. It can enforce a fair distribution of funding to hospitals 
and make it more equitable. From the insurer's point of view, it is an 
accurate and predictable budget. Glaser (1987) stated that the system 
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should make everyone in the hospital more cost-conscious, since the 
organization must perform all its work within the prospective budget. It 
is also administratively simple for both hospital and payer. 
The disadvantages are that good reporting and information systems are 
needed and there is a lack of information on individual patient and 
procedural costs. Administrative and financial statistics on health care 
are usually generated from bills. Hence, the drawback of simple payment 
systems is the loss of information. Hospitals have an incentive to under 
service, and there is no incentive for individual doctors. There are 2 
ways of countering this (Ron et al.1990). One is to negotiate a formula 
which gives extra payment for productivity improvements or, alternatively, 
any improvement in productivity can be rewarded in the negotiations for the 
following year. 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) 
DRGs is a method of paying the hospital by a prospective payment system 
(PPS) according to the diagnosis of the patient at the time of discharge 
from a general hospital. Firstly, the amount or rate of payment is 
established in advance for the coming year and secondly, hospitals are paid 
these amounts or rates regardless of the costs they actually incur (Dowling 
1979). The payment clearly shifts some of the risk of costs for the third-
party payer to hospitals, in contrast to the retrospective method, where 
payers assume the risk for whatever a hospital spends. PPS in the USA make 
particular use of DRG information to categorise inpatient activity and set 
the price/case (Culyer et al. 1988a). 
It is constructed from statistical and clinical inputs and cost information 
extracted from the individual patient's medical record (Jenkins et al 
1990). DRG reimbursement rates are set at average cost (Culyer and Brazier 
1988). The system has been used in the USA, since 1983, to pay for all 
Medicare inpatients, covering about 40% of hospital patients. Beginning 
in early 1975, 317 DRGs were identified and tested for several years for 
effectiveness in managing a hospital. DRGs are the groups designed to 
reflect a similar pattern of resource usage (Bardsley et al. 1987). When 
a patient is discharged, the records of his clinical and financial 
information are examined and assigned a computerized code appropriate to 
a particular diagnostic group. 
DRG system may be unsuitable for most developing countries because it is 
complex to develop and difficult to police (Ron et al 1990). But the 
general idea can and has been adapted in certain specific areas. For 
example, rates may be agreed in advance per deli very or for certain 
specific operations leaving other cases to be paid for on an inclusive day 
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basis. Or the inclusive day payment may be supplemented by negotiated 
lump-sum payments for operations classified as major, minor and 
intermediate. Both of these systems of payment are used in Indonesia (Ron 
et al, 1990). Research on DRGs has spread to some countries such as 
France, Belgium, the UK, Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, 
Australia (Rodrigues 1987). 
In this method, minimising hospital costs/case in order to maximise 
hospital net income is encouraged (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). It may be 
expected, therefore, that DRGs encourage hospital efficiency by keeping 
costs as close as possible to, or below, average costs. Minimising costs 
could, however, be achieved through several routes: shorter LOS, 
substitution of less expensive inputs for costlier ones, reduction in the 
quality of hospital care or a combination of all 3. 
The advantage for the providers is that there is closer collaboration 
between managers and doctors. Hospital waste is encouraged to reduce. The 
DRG system also encourages the hospital to minimize resources used, for 
example using fewer personnel, fewer tests, shorter stays, and abandoning 
care of certain conditions that other hospitals can treat more cheaply. 
The disadvantage from the provider point of view is that there is 
underreimbursement. Munoz et al. (1988a, b, c) suggest that federal, 
state, and private payers may be underreimbursing in the DRG prospective 
hospital payment scheme. More severely ill patients may be under 
compensated for the service provided (McMahon et al. 1992) . There is 
inadequate reflection of different disease severity (MacKenzie et al. 
1991), inadequate payment for the patients who die (Munoz et al. 1991), 
inadequately reflected disease complication differences (Munoz et al. 
1989a), inadequate payment for the elderly patient (Munoz et al. 1989b), 
and inequitable payment to the hospital between black and white Americans 
(Munoz et al. 1989c). 
The disadvantages from the patient point of view are that discharge may 
occur too early particularly when there have been complications or the 
patient is elderly and needs a longer period to recover (Ron et al. 1990). 
Hospitals tend to discharge and later readmit the same patient in order to 
collect 2 DRG payments for the same case (Munoz et al. 1990). Some 
hospitals have denied admission to very serious and high cost patients. 
The hospital is encouraged to identify the patient as a complex case and 
may offer surgical procedures to the patient because they result in higher 
reimbursement. From the insurer point of view, it is necessary to have 
procedures to detect this manipulation and to monitor quality of care. 
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2.2.3 Payment system in Germany 
In Germany, there are about 1,100 autonomous sickness funds which act as 
payers (OEeD 1993). Sickness funds pay providers by a combination of 
global budgets and FFS payments. At the federal level, provider and payer 
groups bargain over yearly expenditure constraints and how they should 
apply to differing sectors. They also argue overchanges in policies 
planned to control failures in cost control and ensure equity in financing. 
State associations of providers and payers explain these goals in their 
areas and oversee their regional constituents as they implement the 
policies. Regional negotiations are where most sickness funds negotiate 
actual yearly budgets with local provider groups. 
Paying the doctor in Germany 
Office-based doctors are obliged to belong to a regional Association of 
Sickness Fund Physicians if they want to treat the 88% of the population 
insured through the statutory sickness funds. The Associations of Sickness 
Fund Physicians have 2 main functions: to negotiate annually with Sickness 
Funds over the total amount of payment, and to act as reimbursement 
intermediaries between Sickness Funds and physicians. They receive 
quarterly lump-sum payments from the funds based on the negotiated budgets, 
and pay member doctors. 
Paying the doctor is based on quarterly vouchers (Eichhon 1984). Sickness 
funds provide these vouchers to their members, who hand them over to 
physicians in exchange for treatment. The patients are supplied with >1 
voucher to enable them to see >1 doctor at a time, or to self-refer to 
specialists. Payment is by FFS according to an aggregated value of points. 
They itemize the services rendered on each voucher, then submit the 
collected vouchers to the respective sickness funds. Services are 
specified in point values set at the federal level and based on the 
relative time, skill, and resources involved. Doctors may not balance 
bills or charge sickness fund members extra beyond fund reimbursement (Knox 
1993). Private insurers pay doctors nearly twice as much as statutory 
sickness funds, leading to the extensive belief that private patients enjoy 
such courtesies as fixed appointment times and greater attention. 
Due to the federally decided yearly expenditure cap on ambulatory doctor 
services, physicians are financially at risk. If they bill for more 
services than were allowed for in the yearly budget negotiations, the value 
of each point will be reduced so the overall expenditure cap for that 
region will not be exceeded. Specific services are exempt from the cap 
such as: cancer screening, well child visits, and other preventive care. 
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Paying the hospital in Germany 
Payment to the hospitals in Germany is made on a dual basis, with operating 
costs corning mainly from the sickness funds and private insurers (OEeD 
1993). The investment expenditure, even in private hospitals, is corning 
mainly from state governments. Sickness funds are obliged by law to meet 
hospitals' historical operating costs. Since 1986, payments for operating 
costs have been governed mainly by prospective global budgets negotiated 
locally by the representatives of the sickness funds and individual 
hospitals. The hospital and third-party payers' relationship is regional, 
but hospital associations do not play a direct role in determining 
reimbursement levels, budgets, or actual payment. The local sickness funds 
usually take the lead in the negotiations with the hospitals because they 
claim the most members and thus contribute the largest share of hospitals' 
operating revenues. The key budget-setting variables are the historically 
projected number of patient days, physicians' salaries, and depreciation. 
Private insurers reimburse more than sickness funds, but their payments are 
also based on an average daily rate. Knox (1993) described factors 
estimated in negotiating the budget: staff ratios and compensation, routine 
depreciation, occupancy, utilization trends, and other inputs. If actual 
bed days exceed expected bed days during the year, hospitals receive only 
25% of the daily rate for extra bed days (Altenstetter 1987). If the 
actual bed days fall short of expected bed days, the hospital still 
receives 75% of the daily rate for the missing bed days. 
In 1993 the German government began to introduce impressive urgent global 
budget limits on spending in the physician, hospital, dental services, and 
prescription drug sectors of its health care system (US GAO 1993b). This 
imposition deviated from previous methods in 2 ways. First, for the next 
3 years, the global budgets for doctors and hospitals are established in 
law instead of by negotiation among nonprofit associations and the sickness 
funds. Second, the German reforms establish global budgets for 
pharmaceutical and dental services for the first time. 
2.2.4 Payment System in HMOs 
There are 3 prototypes of payment system in HMOs: salary, capitation, and 
FFS. Salary is applied to staff and PPGP models. Risk adj usted capitation 
is used to pay providers in IPAs and networks. FFS is added to pay for 
some activities in IPAs and networks. However some extra payments are also 
added to physicians in staff and PPGP models to act as financial 
incentives. 
The physician financial incentive compensation programme used in HMOs in 
the USA continues to develop since 1989 (Lipsitz et al., 1993) This 
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financial incentive program has met with overall physician approval with 
regard to fairness. Furthermore, HMOs are developing measurements of 
quality that will become an integral part of acceptable agreements for 
financial incentives in the future. Provider incomes are now stratified 
by years of continued service, and the practical productive activities and 
measurable units of cost-effective medical service activities. Payment 
compensation as a merit bonus is based on outcome of services which meets 
the agreed objective, and utilization criteria classified by patient's 
casemix or types of patient visits. For example, patient contact 
scheduling by physicians could be moderated to meet peak patient needs and 
not be fixed by weekly institutional requirements as long as total yearly 
patient-contact expectations according to the agreed objective are met. 
In addition, decreasing of some unnecessary laboratory and x-ray tests 
could benefit the HMOs, the medical provider, and the patients. This is 
because cost-effectiveness is promoted. It is also claimed that this 
financial incentive programme emphasizes the quality of care rather than 
economic considerations. 
Burkett (1982) described the capitation payment system in the HMO of 
Pennsylvania which was founded in 1976. In 1979 it was an IPA type of HMOs 
with 30,000 members, 130 primary care physicians in 62 medical offices, and 
some extensive panels of specialist physicians. The HMO enrolment in the 
medical offices ranged from <100 subscribers in 9 offices to >1,000 in 10 
offices. IPA physicians continued to see FFS patients, as well as HMO 
patients. Each of the primary physician offices received a monthly 
capi tation fee as reimbursement for services rended. The rate was 
determined by actuarial projections of utilization of PHC by subscribers 
in various age brackets. The amount of the payment did not vary with the 
extent of services rendered by physicians. HMO members were also 
responsible for a $2.00 copayment for each primary care visit. Charges for 
specialist physician services, hospital, and certain other nonprimary care 
physician services were paid directly on a FFS basis by the HMOs when the 
subscriber was referred by the primary physicians. Twenty % of total 
capitation was kept by the IPA in a special account against higher-than-
projected utilization of specialists' services. In the event of a surplus 
in this fund, the balance was to be distributed to the IPA physicians on 
an office-by-office basis. In the event that it was necessary to draw on 
this fund to pay specialists, the capitation for all primary physicians was 
to be reduced up to the 20% that was kept. Another account, equal to 20% 
of capitation, was set aside by the HMO against higher-than-projected 
hospitalization experience. Any surplus from this account was to be shared 
between the HMOs and the IPA primary physicians. The structure of this 
system is shown in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 IPA primary physician payment system in the HMO of Pennsylvania 
in 1979. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
In Thailand, the establishment of provider networks and their 
organizational characteristics have some similar features to HMOs such as 
providing care to a specific group by contracting providers, using fixed 
regular prepayments, having choice of provider, and providing care with 
financial risk. In contrast, some characteristics of networks that are 
different from HMOs are: enrolment of the insured is compulsory, and there 
are no risk-rating mechanisms, no copayment, and no scope for consumers to 
choose plans on the basis of price. However the main issues arising from 
this review are the organizational pattern, competition and managed care 
in HMOs. 
Lessons from international experiences show that to establish an harmonious 
organization pattern of provider networks, one should consider the existing 
private facilities and the sufficiency of public health care in a 
particular area, the current ownership and payment system, and possibility 
of coordination among the major existing institutional providers of care. 
Moreover to increase the efficiency, provision of care should be done 
through a good referral system and PHC concepts which include emphasis on 
ambulatory services, restriction on new hospital construction, expansion 
of coverage, functioning preventive acti vi ties, a third party financing and 
administrative body, a managed care principle, and competitive environment. 
The experience of HMOs in Chile shows that well planned actions to deal 
with the low coverage are necessary, especially actions to include more 
groups in the scheme. The experiences of expansion of coverage are 
relevant for Thailand which could include more groups to the network such 
as including indigent populations especially in urban areas where there are 
limited primary care facilities, or civil servant groups who consume high 
health care expenditure through FFS payment basis. 
Using the experience from successful models of managed care and HMOs, 
functions of good network offices can be clarified. The main functions of 
a successful network office in Thailand that should be considered are: 
contact with the insured and SSO concerning the rules of interaction and 
responsibilities, paying the medical fee to facilities, managing subsidies 
available to the insured and facilities, standardizing quality of care of 
facilities in the network, surveillance of the performance of facilities, 
initiating risk funds, controlling risk-selecting behaviour of providers, 
managing quality assurance, and promoting procompetitive actions. 
The empirical issues reviewed relevant for evaluating quality of care of 
provider networks are: the access to health care in a provider network is 
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likely to be better than without provider network; the insured of the 
network probably receive satisfactory care; and the insured patients are 
possibly provided with more information and preventive care than the 
noninsured. However there are some important dangers: the quality of care 
of the network might be decreased by cutting hospitals LOS which will 
affect the outcome of treatment; and a monopoly network is likely to exist 
in rural areas where there are only 1-2 main contractors. 
The methods of payment can significantly influence access and quality of 
care, and also influence the allocation of resources for medical services. 
Mixed systems of paying doctors and hospitals are chosen in many countries. 
These combinations may be the best solution for paying for medical care. 
A developing country will want to choose a simple payment system. The 
capitation method is used in social insurance in Thailand; in the MEDSEC 
network, a capitation with bonus payment mechanism is applied to pay 
clinics/polyclinics and small hospitals, and FFS with standard minimum-
maximum charges is used to pay general and specialized hospitals. The 
relevant payment system for Thailand derived from the review are capitation 
and FFS payment systems. 
In the capitation payment system, the main issue arising is the question 
of poor quality of care in social insurance and in networks using a 
capitation payment method. This is because in capitation payment methods, 
facilities tend to use fewer diagnostic tests, the patients have shorter 
consultation times, and higher levels of referrals. In the MEDSEC network, 
FFS within a total budget is applied to hospitals. This FFS payment system 
is similar to the payment system in Germany. However, some experiences of 
advantages and disadvantages of general FFS are relevant for the evaluation 
of quality of care and for the study of the payment system of networks. 
The main points are that in general FFS payment systems, the insured 
perceive a high level of satisfactory care but the technical quality of 
care especially in terms of cost effectiveness is doubtful. This is 
because perhaps there is supplier-induced demand for care by the doctor, 
high cost drugs used, little cost-consciousness, high cost of diagnostic 
tests, and repeat visits and consultations. In contrast, some advantages 
in FFS that should be considered in this study are: acceptable attractive 
premises, no excess referrals, no under investigation, high courtesy and 
prompt service, and well organized and equipped surgeries. 
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2.4 Summary 
Provision of care under social insurance is characterised by either the 
direct or indirect pattern. To organise provision of care, coordination 
among the major existing institutional providers, and presence of actual 
private sector and the sufficiency of public health care should be 
considered. Increasing the efficiency in provision of care can be done 
through third party financing, well organized referral systems and PHC 
principles. In Thailand, the provision of health care pattern follows the 
indirect pattern with a system of networks and some organizational 
characteristics similar to HMOs. 
Managed competition, strongly promoted in the USA, enhances financial 
incentives to control costs even for HMOs. As considering HMO 
characteristics, HMO plans have had managed competition aims, especially 
a high priority to control hospital costs. The ultimate aim of managed 
competition is to accomplish equity and efficiency in health care financing 
and delivery. The experience from successful models of managed care and 
HMOs in terms of functions of sponsor/purchaser can be considered for 
adaptation in Thailand to improve effective functioning of the network 
offices. 
HMOs in the USA have been growing quickly over time since 1970. 
Traditional insurance programmes 
implementing utilization review 
are responding to HMO competition by 
efforts and introducing financial 
incentives to reward provider efficiency, especially regarding hospital 
services. However HMOs have shown their ability to lower cost and increase 
better health outcomes than FFS care. HMO patients have lower 
hospitalization rates than patients in traditional insurance programmes. 
Inpatients of HMO networks use significantly fewer resources than 
inpatients in either IPA or FFS plans. This difference gives network HMOs 
a competi ti ve advantage in the market. Other advantages of HMOs are higher 
patient satisfaction, more patient information provided, more preventive 
care, greater disease prevention, more treatment planning, and more choice 
of medical supplies used for the patients. 
From the experience of HMOs in developing countries especially in Chile, 
well organized and planned actions in terms of legal changes in health care 
framework can improve low coverage of the scheme. This experience can be 
adapted for other developing countries to expand the social insurance 
coverage. 
In the payment system, 4 standard payment prototypes have been used to pay 
providers: capitation, FFS, global budget, and DRGs. Mixed systems of 
payment are selected in many countries to suit their environments. The 
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relevant experiences from the review of payment systems are capitation and 
FFS method. 
In capitation payment systems, the main advantages are continuity of care, 
maintaining of the doctor-patient relationship, less abuse of 
overtreatment, and the administration is uncomplicated to handle. There 
are some dangers: critical complaints such as cost shifting from SSF to a 
third party payment fund of automobile insurance which pays more, shorter 
consultation time, no additional incentives to provide treatment, moral 
hazard induced by the patient in case of zero copayment, questions of poor-
quality services due to too few diagnostic tests and overused deputising 
services, and high level of referrals. Some interventions proposed to 
diminish these obstacles are capitation system with special payments for 
'good practice' as in the UK, and including some FFS component in the 
capitation payment as in Denmark. However the main concern over using 
capitation payment in Thailand is the question about poor quality of care. 
Payment to hospitals in the MEDSEC network is FFS wi thin a total budget set 
by capitation. In general the FFS system offers advantages: doctor's 
incenti ve to provide the services, acceptable attractive premises, no 
excess referrals, no under investigation, high courtesy and prompt service, 
well organized and equipped surgeries, good morale due to adequate fees, 
high autonomy and clinical freedom, and high level of satisfaction of the 
insured. The dangers of FFS are supplier-induced demand by the doctor, 
unpredictable cost, poor geographical distribution of care, high cost drugs 
used, little cost-consciousness of the direct costs of services on both 
patients' and doctors' sides, no integration of services, lack of 
continuity of care, little continuing education and holiday for the doctor, 
high administrative costs, high/rising and unpredictable costs, high cost 
of diagnostic tests, and repeat visits and consultations. However, some 
of these experiences are applicable for the evaluation of quality of care 
and for the investigation of payment system of networks. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
The overall aim of the study is to present health policy recommendations 
about health care provider networks in social insurance in Thailand which 
would improve the accessibility to care of the insured, their satisfaction, 
quali ty of care, and the payment system wi thin the network. To achieve the 
recommendations an appropriate tracer network, the MEDSEC network, was 
examined. And to derive policy recommendations, a relevant comparison 
group, Nopparat network, is selected. The main objective of this study is 
to evaluate the MEDSEC network in terms of organization, payment system, 
quality of care, behaviour and utilization rate of the insured, and to 
compare selected aspects with the Nopparat network. The specific 
objectives are to examine: 
-how MEDSEC network was set up and how it has grown over time 
-payment system to MEDSEC providers 
-the utilization rate of MEDSEC/Nopparat facilities 
-the health seeking behaviour of the insured of MEDSEC network 
-satisfaction with the services of the insured of MEDSEC network 
-quality of care by comparing the infrastructure and 
satisfaction between MEDSEC/Nopparat networks, and 
inpatient 
analyzing 
outpatient prescriptions and inpatient medical records between the 
insured/noninsured in MEDSEC facilities. 
3.1 Background 
Apart from the capitation payment, the SSO also pays some amount of money 
to subsidize the high cost of treating certain diseases, and in case of 
emergencies and accidents there is a 
insured to seek care from any facility. 
the issue of regulating quality of care 
reimbursement mechanism for the 
Moreover, as the SSA has brought 
into focus, an additional quality 
promoting payment mechanism has been proposed to control and encourage 
quality of care. This additional payment is paid by SSF in 2 ways: 
Payment for complete report to SSO The SSO will pay 30 
Baht/worker /year to any main contractor that has completed the 
service activities monthly report requested by SSO for >7 
months/year. This report is for calculating the utilization rate of 
individual main contractors and for assessment of the scheme. 
_ Payment for more services The SSO will pay some amount of money 
to encourage the main contractor to provide adequate care such as 
paying 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, and 70 Baht/worker/year to the main 
contractor that provides services to the worker at the percentile of 
utilization rate of 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80, 91-90, and 
91-100 respectively. 
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Main contractors are contracted by the SSO to provide care for the insured. 
In 1990, the first year of introducing social insurance, the registered 
hospital, the main contractor, was selected by employers on behalf of their 
employees. This has probably contributed to the problem of low utilization 
rate of the insured. To solve this problem, the method of selecting main 
contractors has been changed to allow the insured to select their main 
contractors individually, starting from 1992. In 1992 there was only 1 
province out of 72 using this method, which increased to 19, 44 and 60 in 
1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively. After changing this method, the number 
of workers selecting main contractors increased from 56,446 (2.0% of the 
insured) in 1992 to 1.3 million (36.7% of the insured) in 1995. 
3.2 Conceptual framework of the study 
Figure 3.1 shows that the insured, employers and employees, are the 
consumers. The SSF collects contributions from government taxes, and 
employees and employers. The SSF shares some similar characteristics with 
the 'sponsor' in successful models of managed competition (Enthoven 1988). 
It can be viewed as a broker which structures the coverage, contracts with 
the consumers and providers regarding the rules of participation, manages 
the enrolment process, collects contributions from the insured, pays a 
premium to providers, and organizes the risk sharing fund. After employers 
or employees choose a main contractor, the sponsor contracts with the main 
contractor, who is paid by capitation. There are 2 forms of subcontracts 
between main contractors and providers: direct and indirect subcontracts. 
Relationship between main contractor and providers is indirect where the 
main contractor contracts with a network and then the network subcontracts 
with providers. Some networks are operated as indirect subcontracts such 
as MEDSEC, Mahachai, and Krungthep networks. The biggest is MEDSEC 
network. In 1995, the main contractors of MEDSEC network were Pattaya 
Memorial, Parkket, and Veteran hospitals. MEDSEC who executes a network, 
can be viewed as a purchaser because the SSO pays main contractors who pass 
it to MEDSEC, and then MEDSEC manages this budget and contracts with 
subcontractors. In the MEDSEC network, providers are made up of first 
level care (clinics/polyclinics), second level care (small hospitals), and 
third level care (general and/or specialized hospitals). Patients are 
referred from the first to the second and then to the third level if they 
need higher level care. In the direct subcontract the main contractor acts 
as a provider as well as a purchaser. The first and second level providers 
act the same as in the MEDSEC network but there is no third level care 
because the main contractor acts as the third level provider itself. There 
is choice of provider for first and second level care in both direct and 
indirect subcontracts. 
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Figure 3.1 the conceptual framework 
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Contracts 
with providers 
In this study, MEDSEC is selected as a tracer network and Nopparat is 
selected as a comparative network. They were chosen for comparison because 
of the differences in the inherent nature of being public/private. The 
nature of the private sector is to gain their highest profit from the 
business. But in the public sector, the mandate is to render their 
services with acceptable quality to all groups of the population. In 
MEDSEC, there is the characteristic of the profit incentive. To acquire 
more profit, the networks have to control cost, and ensure quality of 
products - services - to satisfy and attract more insured to the network. 
Therefore MEDSEC is likely to operate more cost-consciously to save their 
business profit than Nopparat network. In Nopparat, the general capital 
and man-power costs are mainly paid by annual global budget. The 
capitation budget paid from the SSF to public facilities is considered as 
running cost while in the private sector there are no other budgets to pay 
., .. 
for the capital and man-power cost. These cause a difference in their 
available resources such as general premises, wards, operating theatre, 
laboratory equipment, and professional personnel. Moreover they are 
different in their management by being direct or indirect models of 
subcontracting, and the payment system within the network. The comparison 
between these 2 networks is carried out to explore which may be the more 
effective network in terms of quality of care. 
In addition, in the evaluation of outpatient and inpatient treatment, the 
noninsured in the same selected private network facility were compared with 
the insured. This was to assess the effects of capitation payment method 
of the insured which is different from the non insured (FFS basis). The 
difference in payment systems may result in differences of quality of care. 
Moreover as in the MEDSEC network, the providers have profit motives, the 
comparison between the insured/noninsured is of concern to assess the 
effect of capitation payment to a private provider. 
In terms of the conceptual framework, this study looked at the networks 
from consumer, provider, and purchaser perspectives. And to meet the 
objectives of this study, 4 substudies were carried out (table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 Summary of substudies by sample size, comparison groups, means of data collection, and study duration 
Substudy 
1 Operating & financial system, 
and charge rate of MEDSECi and 
Utilization rate of MEDSECI 
Nopparat networks 
2 Provider's knowledge & 
attitude 
3 The insured: health seeking 
behaviour, utilization rate, 
knowledge, and satisfaction 
4 Service quality evaluation 
4.1 infrastructure analysis of 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks 
4.2 inpatient satisfaction of 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks 
4.3 prescription analysis of 
the insured/non insured of 
MEDSEC network 
4.4 medical record analysis of 
the insured/non insured of 
MEDSEC network 
Sample size 
4 clinics, 
4 small & 
1 general 
hospitals* 
750 workers 
61 MEDSEC 
facilities, 31 
Nopparat 
facilities 
271* inpatients of 
MEDSEC, 128 of 
Nopparat hospitals 
1,000 of the 
insured, 1,000 of 
the non insured 
800 records from 
4** MEDSEC small 
hospitals 
Comparison groups 
-between MEDSEcl 
Nopparat networks 
(only for 
utilization rate) 
-between MEDSEC/ 
Nopparat network 
-between MEDSEC/ 
Nopparat network 
-between the insured 
/noninsured of 
MEDSEC facilities 
-between the insured 
/noninsured of 
MEDSEC facilities 
Means of data 
collection 
in depth interview 
with MEDSEC manager 
Istaff, data 
collection by 
trained interviewers 
in depth interview 
with manager of 
MEDSEC facilities by 
a medical doctor 
structured 
questionnaire 
interview by trained 
interviewers 
study 
duration 
Nov 1994 
Mar 1994 
Dec 1994 to 
Feb 1995 
postal questionnaire Jan-Mar 
1995 
structural 
questionnaire 
interview by trained 
nurses 
collected from 4** 
hospitals by trained 
nurses 
collected from 4** 
hospitals by trained 
nurses, 
Jan-Feb 
1995 
Jan-Jun 
1994 
Aug-Oct 
1994 
Note: * Parkket, Rama-Suksawat, Ram-Intra, Wicharn-Yut, and Wipawadi-Rangsit hospital 
** Rama-Suksawat, Ram-Intra, Wicharn-Yut, and Wipawadi-Rangsit hospital 
3.3 Choice of sample within networks 
3.3.1 MEDSEC network The network is divided into 2 areas, the Eastern 
Group (EG) and the Greater Bangkok Group (GBG). For GBG, it is divided 
into 4 subnetworks namely: Ram-Inthra Group (RIG), Rama-Suksawat Group 
(RSG), Eastern Bangkok Group (EBG) , and Central Bangkok Group (CBG). In 
a subnetwork, there are clinics/polyclinics and small hospitals. There is 
a difference in the number of clinics/polyclinics and small hospitals 
within the subnetworks. Geographically, the consumers have unequal choices 
of services from different numbers of facilities in the subnetworks. There 
are also likely to be differences in quality of care and prices charged 
between subnetworks. Therefore, for MEDSEC network, subnetworks were 
considered as a sample group. Simple random selection was applied to 
select a sample hospital from each subnetwork. The selected sample 
hospitals were Rama-Suksawat, Ram-Intra, Wicharn-Yut, and Wipawadi-Rangsit 
hospitals. 
3.3.2 Nopparat network There is no subnetwork in the network. 
Consequently, for the Nopparat network, no sample group was classified. 
3.4 Rating scale in questionnaire 
Since many attitude questions were asked in substudies, the 5 points scale 
questionnaire was applied. This is because it is the most frequently used, 
the easiest to understand, and is generally sufficient for most purposes 
(Hoinville et al., 1989). The rating scale is not an absolute measure of 
attitudes but is a way of placing people in a relative position on a 
dimension. 
3.5 Substudy 1; the operating system, financial management, and charge rate 
for medical care of MEDSEC; and the utilization rate of MEDSEC/Nopparat 
networks 
The objective of this substudy was to identify how the MEDSEC network was 
set up and how it has grown over time, and the payment system to providers 
of MEDSEC; and to examine the utilization rate of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. 
To collect data for the study, in-depth interviews by trained interviewers 
with MEDSEC staff and secondary data collection by using a guideline (form 
No.1, annex 1) from the MEDSEC office were carried out in November 1994 
concerning the historical development of the MEDSEC network, current 
contractual relationships within the network, marketing and propaganda 
system, quality control mechanisms, incentive payment system to employers 
and doctors, recent details of the payment system, relationship between 
facilities, mechanisms to cope with unexpectedly high reimbursement for 
some diseases, referral system and management system within the network, 
54 
price competition of inpatient services between hospitals, reason of the 
insured to select care from a particular facility, charge rate, and bonus 
system. For the utilization rate, data were collected from MEDSEC and 
Nopparat records and then the result was compared to the utilization rate 
of studies concerning social insurance services in Samutprakarn (no 
provider network) by Tangcharoensathien et al. (1993) and Kamolrattanakul 
et al. (1993). 
3.6 Substudy 2; the knowledge and attitude of the MEDSEC facility's 
managers 
The objective of this substudy was to identify from the provider 
perspective how the MEDSEC network was set up and how it has grown over 
time, and the payment system to MEDSEC providers. 
3.6.1 Sample group and sampling technique Quota technique was applied to 
propose 9 facility managers to be interviewed. As the MEDSEC network has 
been classified to be 4 subnetworks, 4 clinics/polyclinics (1 from each 
subnetwork) and 4 small hospitals (1 from each subnetwork) were selected 
by mul tistage cluster random sampling technique. One general hospital was 
selected by simple random sampling technique to represent general hospitals 
of the network. 
3.6.2 Research design In this substudy the research design is a cross-
sectional descriptive study. In-depth interviews was carried out by a 
researcher (medical doctor) with the managers of selected providers by 
using a guideline (Form no.2, annex 1) in March 1995. The collected data 
were analyzed and discussed according to the tropics in a guideline (annex 
2) . 
3.7 Substudy 3; knowledge, health seeking behaviour, utilization rate, and 
satisfaction of the insured of MEDSEC network 
There are factors influencing the low utilization rate such as limited 
facilities, 1 main contractor only available for workers to seek care, 
employer choosing registered hospitals on behalf of the employees, poor 
understanding of SSO regulations, and low satisfaction with medical care. 
Therefore it is necessary to examine the knowledge, health seeking 
behaviour, utilization rate, and satisfaction of the insured for the MEDSEC 
network. As it is the biggest network, operated in the extended coverage 
area in Bangkok, and held the positive characteristics of profit 
incentives; it was worthwhile to study the utilization rate of the insured 
of MEDSEC network. 
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3.7.1 Conceptual framework 
Factors affecting the health seeking behaviour of the insured can be 
classified into 3 groups: general characteristics of the insured, knowledge 
and attitude of the insured about SSA, and other factors (figure 3.2). 
These factors also affect the satisfaction of the insured namely: 
accessibility, hospital's first point reception, waiting time, friendliness 
of staff, doctor-patient interaction, cleanliness, and medical care 
quality. 
The hypotheses of this substudy are that the accessibility of care for the 
insured of a private network is better than without a network, and the 
patient's satisfaction with the services of a private network is better 
than with a public contractor (no network facilities). The main objective 
of this substudy is to identify the health-seeking behaviour of the insured 
of the MEDSEC network, the utilization rate (based on data from interviews 
with workers), the insured's knowledge about social insurance, and the 
satisfaction of the insured with the MEDSEC network compared with their 
previous experience with public contractors (no network facilities). The 
factors which are investigated are factors concerning knowledge/attitude 
about social insurance, and accessibility of the insured. For the 
characteristics of MEDSEC providers, they are identified in an other 
substudy. The utilization rate of the insured is compared with data from 
MEDSEC/Nopparat network records, and a study of nonnetwork providers in 
Samutprakarn by Tangcharoensathien et ale (l993). 
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Figure 3.2 conceptual framework of consumer substudy 
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Note: Adapted from Tangcharoensathien et al. (1993). 
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3.7.2 Sample size, sample group and sampling technique 
In the absence of better information, the sample size for this substudy was 
calculated by using the proportion of insured workers when ill using 
outpatient services at registered hospitals (from the study in 
Samutprakarn, Tangcharoensathien et al., 1993) which 1S a relevant 
proportion (0.22) because the sample groups of the MEDSEC network and of 
the study in Samutprakarn share almost the same occupational status. This 
study is designed to estimate it within + 0.05. Applying the formula 
(adapted from Armitage and Berry, 1987): 
When 
Therefore 
Sample s';ze > (Z + z ) 2 
... X B X P(l-P) 
(tol) 2 
Zx = Z-score at the sensitivity 95% = 1.96 
ZB = Z-score at the specificity 80% = 1.28 
P = Expected proportion from this study = 0.22 
tol = Accepted tolerance error in proportion = ±0.05 
Sample size .2:, (1.96 + 1.28)2 X 0.22(1-0.22) 
(0.05)2 
> 720.6 
The number of studied employees needed to be .2:,721. The number of workers 
in a company varies from 10 to 3,500 with the peak between 100-450/firm. 
To avoid selecting too small or too large a company which is not 
appropriate for comparison, the number of workers in 4 selected companies 
was proposed to be about 100-450. 
To provide the geographical coverage of the sample firms in all areas of 
Bangkok, companies were classified into 4 groups by using the 4 subnetworks 
of the MEDSEC network. In each subnetwork group, companies were 
categorised into 2 groups by reason of having previously selected public 
or private as a main contractor. A simple random sampling technique was 
applied to choose 2 subnetwork groups for private group sample 
representatives and 2 subnetwork groups for public sample representatives. 
Simple random sampling techniques were applied to choose 1 company which 
had about 100-450 workers from the 4 subnetwork groups to provide 2 
companies in which the insured had experience of choosing private main 
contractors and 2 companies in which the insured had experience of choosing 
public main contractors before (figure 3.3). This was for comparison of 
the result of experience in public/private facilities. All the workers in 
the selected companies were interviewed using structured questionnaire 
(form No.3, annex 1) . 
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Figure 3.3 Sample groups and sampling technique in consumer substudy 
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For the health seeking behaviour investigation, a period of time was 
defined to include sickness episodes. A recall period of 1 month for mlnor 
acute morbidity and 6 or 12 months for maj or morbidity which needs 
admission to hospital were used to identify the sample groups. Although 
the best period to recall perceived morbidity is 2 weeks (Kroeger, 1983) I 
when incidence rate is considered, a month period should be applied because 
there is a more accurate number of episodes included (Ross et aI, 1984). 
Nchinda (1977) also supports that there was a considerably higher morbidity 
rate/week of recall when the period was 4 weeks (5.4%/week) relative to 2 
weeks (2.2%/week). Admission to hospital for ~1 night is a clearcut event 
for the patient to remember even with a long recall period such as 12 
months (Cartwright, 1983). Because of the problem of changing main 
contractors during a 12 months period, workers in the selected firms were 
interviewed about admission to hospital within 6 months, or 12 months if 
the firms had selected the MEDSEC network continuously for >1 year. 
3.7.3 Research design In this substudy the research design is a cross-
sectional descriptive study. Interview was carried out by trained 
interviewers between December 1994 - February 1995. 
3.7.4 Development of questionnaire 
Two firms which were not selected groups were randomly selected. Eight 
workers/firm were selected by quota technique. Group discussion was 
carried out with the selected workers once in each firm to identify proper 
questions for the structured interview questionnaire of workers and for the 
structured interview questionnaire of inpatients admitted to MEDSEC network 
and Nopparat hospital in the substudy of assessing the satisfaction of 
inpatients of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. The group discussion was 
concentrated within the guideline (annex 2) and led by a researcher. A 
pretest of the questionnaire was carried out with 60 workers of 2 firms, 
30 from each firm. Then the structural questionnaire was corrected 
according to the pretest result. 
Collection of data from the employers in the selected firms was also 
carried out by in-depth interview using guideline (form No.4, annex 1), and 
from existing records. These data were analyzed to look at: 
-performance of the worker before/after the contract with MEDSEC by 
looking at the rate of absenteeism of the workers, and the profit of 
the firm 
-incentive payment from MEDSEC to employers 
-marketing approach of MEDSEC 
-principle of choosing main contractor 
-reason why they chose MEDSEC network 
-employers' perception of services of providers in the network. 
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3.8 Substudy 4: Evaluation of quality of care 
The objective of this substudy is to explore the quality of care of 
facilities of networks by measuring infrastructure and satisfaction of 
inpatients between MEDSEC/Nopparat networks, and analysis of outpatient 
drug prescriptions and inpatient treatment between the insured/noninsured 
of MEDSEC facilities. 
3.8.l Approaches of quality assessment 
Broad indicators to evaluate the potential quality of services of hospitals 
are quality of administration and management, patient care, buildings and 
equipment, essential drugs (Thompson and Edwards, 1991), prescriptions 
(Hogerzeil et aI, 1993), and inpatient care (Phijaisanit et al., 1985). 
Donabedian (l980) defined the balance of health benefits and harms as the 
essential core of the definition of quality. Donabedian (1988a) stated 
that the purpose of assessment was to pass judgment on the quality of 
health care itself; regardless of whether the service was rendered by 
practitioners or institutions, implemented by patients or used by the 
community. There are 3 approaches to assess quality: 
- Structure refers to 
- material resources: facilities, equipment, drugs, and money 
- human resources: the number and qualifications of personnel 
- organizational structure: medical staff organization, methods 
of peer review, and methods of reimbursement. 
- Process includes 
- the patient'S activities in seeking care and carrying it out 
the practitioner's activities in making a diagnosis and 
recommendation or implementing treatment such as drug 
prescription, medical records 
- Outcome refers to 
- an improvement of patient's knowledge and beneficial changes in 
behaviour 
- the degree of patient's satisfaction with care 
- other changes which contribute to the patient's current and 
future health (Donabedian, 1988b). 
In the assessment of quality of care, it is vital to specify criteria, 
norms, and standards which tune the relevant attributes of structure, 
process, and outcome (Donabedian, 1981). There are 2 main types of 
criteria: implicit and explicit (Donabedian, 1988a), and some intermediate 
forms between these 2 main criteria. 
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In the implicit criteria, an expert uses an unspoken rule when he decides 
to give information about a case and is asked to use confidential knowledge 
and experience to judge the value of the process of service or of its 
outcome (Donabedian, 1988a). The important advantage of implicit criteria 
is the adaptability to a particular case if the reviewer is qualified and 
accomplished in the task (Donabedian, 1988a). However, it is remarkably 
expensive and rather ambiguous because there is a lack of accurate 
guidelines for quantification and limited knowledge on the part of the 
reviewer. 
In the explicit criteria, rules are defined in great detail usually by a 
panel of experts. There is little room for judgment by the reviewer. The 
major advantages are that the method is standardized and easy to use. The 
disadvantages are that it is expensive and difficult to develop criteria, 
it may not be relevant to the situations of practice, it may not be 
flexible to the different characteristics of particular cases, and it may 
not appropriately represent what is more or less effective in improving 
health. 
The difficulty has been controlled by designing the criteria which apply. 
The criteria are usually used only to classify cases into those which are 
likely to be well managed and those which are not. Then the cases are 
reviewed by using the implicit criteria (Donabedian, 1988a). There are 2 
basic defects in criteria design: deficient adaptability to the certain 
characteristics of each case and deficient notice regarding the relative 
importance of criteria items influencing the outcomes of services. 
Donabedian (1988a) recommended that the first defect can be corrected by 
using an improved form of criteria maps and the second by initiating a set 
of weights based on the contribution of specified progression in the 
criteria maps to the outcome of service. 
In this substudy, especially in analysis of inpatient care, the explicit 
criteria is applied. Rules and definitions were clarified by panels of 
medical experts. 
To measure the functions of the health care system, each distinguished 
health problem needs to be traced in relation to another (Kessner et al., 
1973). The tracer method is developed to measure both process and outcome 
of health care. Donabedian (1988b) recommended that the sampling technique 
should be either simple or stratified random sampling because cases are 
classified by diseases/conditions. In the "tracer method", patients may 
be first classified by subdivisions of the area of health service in 
general (Kessner et al., 1973). Then >1 purposively selected categories 
of patients, identified by diagnosis or otherwise, can be assumed to 
characterise clinical achievement of the service for the group. However 
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the tracers are selected and combined corresponding to the criteria. There 
are 6 criteria for selecting appropriate tracers: 
- A tracer should have a definite functional impact 
- A tracer should be relatively well defined and easy to diagnose 
Prevalence rates should be high enough to permit the 
collection of adequate data from the limited population sample 
- The national history of the condition should vary with utilization 
and effectiveness of medical care 
- The techniques of medical management of the condition should be 
well defined for ~1 of the following processes: prevention, 
diagnosis, treatment, or rehabilitation 
- The effects of the nonmedical component on the tracer should be 
understood (Kessner et al., 1973). 
Another approach to sampling is to begin with cases suffering from adverse 
outcomes and study the process of treatment that has influenced it. If the 
outcome is uncommon and destructive every case might be reviewed 
(Donabedian, 1988b). There is some evidence that, under particular 
condi tions, this method will distinguish a very high proportion of critical 
deficiencies in the process of care, but not of deficiencies that are less 
critical (Mushlin and Appel, 1980). 
In this substudy, the tracer method was applied to analyze outpatient drug 
prescriptions and inpatient medical records. 
In this substudy, selecting 3 approaches (structure, process, and outcome 
of services) to assess the quality of care of networks is reasonable since 
good structural characteristics increase the probability of good process 
of care, and good process of care increases the possibility of providing 
specified changes in the health and well-being of a particular person and 
population (Donabedian, 1988a, 1988b) . Although the structural 
characteristics are rather blunt instruments in quality appraisal, the 
assessment of this part is necessary. This is because good structural 
characteristics yield good kinds of care (Donabedian, 1988b). 
In process quality assessment, reports exist from many countries mentioning 
problems of drug prescription problems: polyphamacy; multiple 
prescriptions; fixed combination drugs; and too frequent use of 
antibiotics, vitamins and injections. Many studies agree that there is 
commonly inappropriate use of drugs to treat specific problems such as use 
of tetracyclines for children, chloramphenicol for minor infection, 
dypyrone as an analgesic, antidiarrhoeal antibiotics for diarrhoea where 
ORS will do (Ross-Degnan et aI, 1992). In Thailand where capitation 
payment is applied in social insurance, the most serious disadvantage is 
the risk of poor-quality service rendered by some providers due to 
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undertreatment, overusing unreasonable drugs. Therefore analyzing 
prescriptions is essential to measure the quality of care. 
Donabedian (1988b) stated that all the success in quality assessment 
depends on available, suitable, and accurate information. The major source 
of information regarding the process of care and current outcome is the 
medical record. But it is usually incomplete, especially missing vital 
parts of technical care and interpersonal process. Moreover, other 
essential information such as diagnostic tests, clinical observation, and 
clinical assessment is unfortunately inaccurate. However in the MEDSEC 
network, the insured outpatient prescriptions and inpatient medical records 
were crucially requested to be completed when they were sent to MEDSEC 
office to obtain reimbursement of the medical fee. For the noninsured, 
since the payment of the non insured was FFS basis, the outpatient 
prescriptions and inpatient medical records of the noninsured tended to be 
completed because the calculation for the patient fee needed a complete 
medical record. Therefore it is worthwhile to analyze the outpatient 
prescription and inpatient medical records of the insured/noninsured of 
MEDSEC network. 
In outcome quality assessment, there are patient characteristics 
convincingly related to patient satisfaction (Health Services Research 
Group, 1992). Satisfied patients are likely to carryon with their doctor, 
keep appointments, follow with treatment, refer other patients to their 
doctor and receive treatment. This satisfied behaviour of patients should 
improve the medical treatment outcome if the health care provided is of 
high technical quality. The validity of patients' judgments about 
interpersonal variables and issues of accessibility and availability tend 
to be accepted. 
Furthermore, consumer ratings of interpersonal aspects of care seem to be 
reliable and valid (Health Services Research Group, 1992). These ratings 
seem reasonably correlated with those of the technical quality (Hulks et 
al., 1970). The doctor's interpersonal practice when providing simple 
medical treatment such as upper respiratory infection (URI) may affect a 
patient's assessment of technical aspects of service. Therefore, in the 
outcome assessment, the degree of patient's satisfaction with care is an 
appropriate measure. This is because the patient's satisfaction would 
affect the medical treatment outcome. It may be judged to be 1 of the 
desired outcomes of care (Donabedian, 1988b) because other outcomes are 
difficult to measure or develop some time after treatment. 
The process of patients in seeking care is a possible measure in the 
process assessment. It is worthwhile because the continuity or increase 
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in the proportion of the insured seeking care from the registered facility 
is an indicator to assess the quality of care. 
In this substudy the selected aspects of quality assessment are: 
Structure of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks which involves material 
resources, human resources, and organizational structure 
- Outcome which is the degree of inpatients' satisfaction with care 
of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. 
Process includes outpatient drug prescription and inpatient 
treatment between the insured/noninsured 
3.8.2 Analysis of infrastructure of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
The objective of this substudy is to evaluate the quality of care of 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks by analysis of infrastructure compared between 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. The hypothesis of this substudy is that the 
infrastructure of a private network is better than of a publicly-organized 
network. 
- Distribution of facilities Address of all facilities (124) of MEDSEC 
network were identified and mapped. Coverage of workers by district of 
Bangkok, facility, and subnetwork was carried out to identify the work-load 
and accessibility. 
_ Sample group, sample size, and sampling technique Sample groups of the 
MEDSEC network were classified to be 5 groups: 4 subnetworks of the MEDSEC 
network and 1 general hospi tal group. Because the total number of 
facilities of MEDSEC network is 124 and of Nopparat network is 50, the 
ratio of sample size of MEDSEC:Nopparat network should be about 2: 1. 
Because of difficulty in access to all the facilities' managers, a quota 
technique (about 50% of facilities) was applied. The sample size of MEDSEC 
facilities was taken as 61. Thus the sample size of Nopparat network was 
31. Simple random sampling technique was applied to choose 15 facilities 
from each subnetwork, and 1 general hospital from the general hospital 
group. For the Nopparat network, 30 facilities were also selected by using 
simple random technique. The Nopparat hospital which is the only 1 general 
hospital of the network also was purposively selected. 
Research design In this substudy the research design is a cross-
sectional descriptive study. A postal questionnaire was sent to selected 
facilities of the MEDSEC network by the director of the MEDSEC office, and 
to selected facilities of Nopparat network by the director of Nopparat 
hospital during January-March 1995. Attached to each postal questionnaire 
there was a letter requesting the facility managers to answer the 
questionnaire faithfully because it would be used for monitoring the 
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structure of a particular facility every 6 months. This affected the 
validity of the data from the answered questionnaire. Therefore by this 
means the postal questionnaire was appropriate for the data collection. 
- indicators and questionnaire development Adapting from the questionnaire 
for evaluating contracting out hospitals of South Africa by Broomberg, J. 
(1994), the draft questionnaire was structured. The indicators in the 
questionnaire can be grouped into 6 sections: general administration, 
outpatient service, laboratory and X-ray, pharmacy, operating and delivery 
room, and inpatient ward. 
The draft questionnaire was sent to 4 clinics, 2 small hospitals, and 1 
general hospital of the MEDSEC network which were not those sampled for 
pretesting. The finalized questionnaire (from No.5, annex 1) was corrected 
and used. 
3.8.3 Measuring the satisfaction of inpatients of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks 
The objective of this substudy was to evaluate the quality of care of 
networks by measuring the satisfaction of inpatients in MEDSEC/Nopparat 
hospitals. The hypothesis of this substudy is that the insured of a 
private network are more satisfied with inpatient treatment than the 
insured of a publicly-organized network. 
- Research des ign In this substudy the research design is a cross-
sectional descriptive study. Inpatients were interviewed by trained nurses 
(one from each hospital) using a structured questionnaire {form No.6, annex 
I} during January-February 1995. The interview should be carried out on 
the last day of an admission. This is because patients are likely to be 
willing to express their opinions if they are about to be discharged. 
However, the most effective means of satisfactory assessment is by postal 
questionnaire. This is because in the interview by structured 
questionnaire, patients are likely to be unwilling to express their 
opinions. But the reason for the use of a structured interview was because 
the response rate to mail questionnaires in Thailand is very low «30%). 
- Sample group, sampling technique, and sample size This substudy was to 
compare inpatient satisfaction between MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. Four 
selected hospitals mentioned in section 3.3.1 and Parkket hospital 
(selected from the general hospital group of MEDSEC network by simple 
random sampling technique) were sample groups for the MEDSEC network. For 
Nopparat network, there is only 1 hospital of >50 beds, Nopparat hospital. 
Therefore the selected hospital as a sample group was Nopparat hospital. 
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There was not enough information about insured inpatients under the SSA to 
estimate the proportion of satisfaction. So the sample size for this 
substudy was decided to be 300 for MEDSEC and l50 for Nopparat networks. 
Data from MEDSEC office shows that, in 1994, there were about 30 
workers/month admitted to hospital. From this figure and the total sample 
size (300), the sample size for each individual MEDSEC hospital was 
classified as: 65 for each of the 4 small selected hospitals, and 40 for 
Parkket hospital. From MEDSEC data (1994), it is shown that the ratio of 
secondary:tertiary care was 10:1. In this substudy the ratio of sample 
size of secondary:tertiary care of MEDSEC hospital was set up to be 7:1 to 
provide the number of sample size of a hospital to be >30 to ensure 
comparison between hospitals. 
However from the data collection, there were 271 and 128 cases collected 
from MEDSEC and Nopparat respectively. According to the sample size 
calculations outlined below, the number obtained in this substudy has 75% 
power to detect a difference of l2.5%. 
Where: 
I = inverse cumulative normal distribution function 
P
1 
= expected satisfactory proportion in MEDSEC network 
P
2 
= expected satisfactory proportion in Nopparat network 
nl = sample size for MEDSEC network 
n2 = sample size for Nopparat network 
r = ratio of number of sample of MEDSEC relative to Nopparat 
networks 
= nl/n2 
d = Accepted tolerance error in proportion = P1 - P2 
Pilot studies have shown P1 is approximately equal to 0.8. A difference 
of 0.l25, is acceptably important to detect. The ratio of sample size of 
MEDSEC relative to Nopparat networks was proposed to be 2 due to the total 
number of the insured of MEDSEC in Bangkok in 1995 being 185,445 and in 
Nopparat 80,000. 
Choose a = 0.05 
b = 0.2{SO% power) 
Then n 1 = 7.S3 [ { 0 . S x 0.2} + ~2 x 0.675 x 0.325}] (0.125) 2 
= 300 
n 2 = 300/2 = 150 
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From the data collection, 271 and 128 samples were collected from MEDSEC 
and Nopparat networks respectively. This provides 75% power to detect a 
difference of 12.5%. 
- Indicators and questionnaire development 
McIver (1992) stated that identification of indicators and questions was 
very important when interviewing for inpatient satisfaction. He also 
suggested that pretesting of the questionnaire and selecting the 
appropriate questions is essential. However he recommended classification 
of the important satisfaction indicators into 5 groups: 
-admission activities 
-treatment and care 
-information and communication activities 
-ward environment and facility 
-discharge and outcome activities. 
After selecting the indicators suggested by McIver (1992), a structured 
questionnaire was constructed. The questionnaire was pretested with 14 
inpatients in a hospital which was not a sample hospital. Then the 
questionnaire was corrected especially the section of admission group 
indicators. This is because, in Thailand the GPs and referral system is 
not the same as in the UK. Finally the indicators were identified (annex 
2) • 
3.8.4 Analysis of outpatient drug prescriptions of the insured/non insured 
of MEDSEC hospitals 
The objective of this substudy is to evaluate the quality of care of MEDSEC 
facilities by analysis of outpatient drug prescriptions between the 
insured/non insured of MEDSEC facilities. The hypothesis of this substudy 
is that the insured of a private network have received less effective drug 
treatment than the noninsured in outpatient service. This is because the 
payment for the insured is by capitation. In this payment system, there 
are questions of poor quality of care. Facilities may tend to use fewer 
diagnostic tests and fewer drugs in order to increase their expected 
profit. 
- Indicators and method The essential selected drug-use indicators and 
recommended methods for data collection have been described by Hogerzeil 
et ale (1993). Such indicators recommended by WHO (1993) are: prescribing 
indicators, patient care indicators, and health facilities indicators 
(Hogerzeil et al., 1993). In this substudy, the indicators used are only 
prescribing indicators because there are no patient care indicators 
recorded. Some patient care indicators {% of drugs adequately labelled and 
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patients' knowledge of correct dosage) are studied in the measurement of 
infrastructure of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. For the health facility 
indicators, all study hospitals have a copy of the essential drug lists and 
key drugs available. Therefore the general indicators in this substudy are 
average number of drugs/encounter, percentage of drugs prescribed by 
generic name, percentage of encounters with an antibiotic prescribed, 
percentage of encounters with an injection prescribed, percentage of drugs 
prescribed from Thailand Essential Drug List, and average charge/encounter. 
It is suggested that the higher proportion of generic names and essential 
drugs prescribed in a prescription the better the quality of care is, but 
the higher proportion containing >1 antibiotic or an injection the lower 
quality of care is (Thompson and Edwards 1991, Hogerzeil et ale 1993). 
From the 6 criteria for selecting tracers mentioned before, 4 tracers: URI, 
arthritis, urinary tract disease (UTD), and Hypertension (HPT) were chosen 
for exploring in more detail in the prescribing analysis. Indicators to 
measure the quality of care in the tracers are the general indicators that 
have been mentioned before and amount of each item of drugs prescribed. 
The detail of treatment of the patients in this study was also compared to 
the standard treatments adopted from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
of Thailand which are the gold standard to treat 10 diseases (annex 2), and 
to the treatment in general medical text books. 
choose 4 tracers are: 
Detail of reasons to 
-URI It is the most common disease that affects workload, consumes 
a lot of resources, and is easy to diagnose because of its definite 
signs/symptoms. There is a gold standard treatment developed by FDA 
of Thailand. 
-Arthritis It is a chronic and high cost disease and consumes a lot 
of resources. The prevalence is high enough to permit the 
collection of adequate data. There is a gold standard treatment 
developed by FDA of Thailand. 
-UTD It is a high cost disease, consumes a lot of resources, and is 
easy to diagnose because of its definite signs/symptoms. The 
prevalence is high enough to permit the collection of adequate data. 
The treatment is well defined in general text books. 
-HPT It is a high cost disease which affects the financial system. 
The prevalence is high enough to permit the collection of adequate 
data. There is a gold standard treatment developed by FDA of 
Thailand. 
Research design In this substudy the research design is a cross-
sectional descriptive study. Prescriptions were collected by trained 
nurses (one from each hospital) by using a prescribing analysis form (form 
No.7, annex 1) during January-June 1994. 
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- Sample group, sampling technique, and sample size 
Four selected hospitals mentioned in section 3.3.1 constituted the sample 
groups in this substudy. An equal number of prescriptions of outpatients 
both insured and noninsured, were collected from each hospital. This was 
to compare whether the insured of the MEDSEC network received a less 
effective drug treatment than the noninsured in the outpatient service. 
A random or stratified sample of 20 facilities was recommended, with 30 
randomly selected general outpatient encounters/facility (Hogerzeil et 
al.1993) . Previous studies have indicated that this sample size results 
in a 95% CI of +7.5%. Hogerzeil et al. (1993) argued that since 
prescription patterns tend to be more uniform within than between health 
facilities, it is more cost-effective to increase the number of facilities 
than the number of prescriptions/facility. However, in cases when it is 
important to describe or compare drug use by individual facilities or 
prescriber, ~100 prescriptions/health facility or prescriber should be 
reviewed (Hogerzeil et al.1993). This sample will usually give a 95% CI 
of ±10%. In this substudy the quota technique is applied for the sample 
size (1,000 for the insured and 1,000 for the non insured). About 250 
prescriptions of the insured and 250 of the noninsured from each selected 
hospital (4 hospitals) were collected during January-June 1994 by using 
simple random technique. The reason for collecting prescriptions for 6 
months was because if it is >6 months, the number of samples in each month 
might be <30 which is too small for some statistical comparison; and due 
to the low response of collecting data from private facilities, 6 months 
is the maximum period accepted by managers of facilities for cooperation 
in collecting prescriptions. All the 2,000 prescriptions were analyzed 
according to the general indicators, and casemix of the sample groups; and 
then prescriptions of the 4 selected tracers were analyzed according to the 
general indicators, and amount of each item of drugs prescribed. 
3.8.5 Analysis of inpatient medical records of the insured/non insured of 
MEDSEC hospitals 
The objective of this substudy was to analyze the process aspect of quality 
of medical care of inpatients from medical records of MEDSEC hospitals and 
to investigate outcome aspects of medical treatment of a disease by postal 
questionnaire, comparing the insured and noninsured of the MEDSEC network. 
The hypothesis of this substudy was that the insured of a private network 
have received less effective treatment than the noninsured in the inpatient 
service. This is because payment for the insured is by capitation and for 
the noninsured on a FFS basis. And in FFS, inpatients possibly receive a 
higher quality of care than in the capitation method because of acceptable 
attractive premises, no excess referrals, no under investigation, high 
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courtesy and prompt service, and well organized and equipped surgeries; 
while in the capitation method, there are questions concerning poor quality 
of inpatient care probably due to short LOS, too few diagnostic tests and 
overused deputising services. 
- Research design In this substudy the research design was a cross-
sectional descriptive study. Inpatient medical records were collected by 
trained nurses (1 from each hospital) during August-October 1994. 
- Sample group, tracer selection, and sample size Four selected hospitals 
mentioned in section 3.3.1 were the sample groups in this substudy. From 
a study of Kamolrattanakul, P, et al (1993) it was found that diarrhoea was 
the most common disease (27.4%) of the social security inpatients. The 
second most common disease (16.5%) was acute appendicitis; in this substudy 
the sample group shared almost the same characteristics as in that study. 
Thus diarrhoea and acute appendicitis were selected to be tracers in this 
substudy. From the 6 criteria for selecting tracers mentioned before, the 
reason for choosing these tracers were: 
(1) Diarrhoea affects the service and financial system since it is 
the most common disease. It is very easy to diagnose due to having 
very definite signs/symptoms. There is a clearcut definition of 
this disease defined by WHO which has a standard international 
treatment. The outcome of treatment is easy to measure. If any 
result is discovered, it can be adopted internationally 
(2) Acute appendicitis affects the financial management of medical 
care since it is the second most common disease in this group and it 
is a surgical condition which has a high cost. Generally, under the 
capitation payment basis of social insurance in Thailand, there is 
no quality and cost control of this disease, therefore it affects 
both the quality of service and the financial system. It is easy to 
diagnose because it has definite signs/symptoms. There is a well-
defined and standard treatment. If there is any instrument (such as 
check list or questionnaire) or means for evaluating this disease 
discovered, it would be applicable internationally. 
From the study of Kamolrattanakul, et al (1993), the proportion of insured 
patients having diarrhoea is 0.27. To include >200 cases of diarrhoea 
which is enough for statistical comparison, the sample sizes of the 
inpatients included in this substudy should be about 800. 
Data from MEDSEC office have shown that, in 1993, there were about 70, 60, 
50, and 20 workers/month admitted to Rama-Suksawat, Ram-Intra, Wicharn-Yut, 
and Wipawadi-Rangsit hospitals respectively. From these admission figures 
and the total sample size (800), the sample sizes for individual hospitals 
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were calculated to be: 280 for Rama-Suksawat, 240 for Ram-Intra, 200 for 
Wicharn-Yut, and 80 for Wipawadi-Rangsit hospitals. 
- Indicator and questionnaire development There are 2 stages of data 
collection: general and tracer data collection. For general data 
collection, every inpatient medical record of selected hospitals was 
collected by trained nurses to classify casemix and price charged. The 
inpatient casemix classification of MOPH of Thailand adapted from ICDIO 
which was appropriate to this substudy was used because it is practical, 
not too detailed, and applicable to a small sample size. For the tracer 
data collection, data from every medical record of diarrhoea and acute 
appendicitis patient were identified and analyzed by using an inpatient 
medical record evaluation form (form No.8, annex 1). 
In diarrhoeal patients, indicators adapted from physical examination and 
the treatment form for diarrhoea of the Communicable Disease Control 
Department of Thailand were used. The main indicators for diarrhoea are 
history of patient, physical examination criteria, laboratory tests, 
diagnosis, treatments, and result of treatment (annex 2). After analyzing 
by using the indicators, a classification of effectiveness of drug use 
indicator was identified by 7 medical specialists in the diarrhoeal disease 
treatment section of Bumrajnaradun communicable control hospital to be 
high, moderate, low, and non effective for treatment of diarrhoea. This 
classification, a rating scale of effectiveness of drugs, was carried out 
twice. The first round was carried out individually and the second round 
was carried out by discussing the mode of the rating scale and then a 
consensus was made to achieve the final scale of effectiveness of- drugs 
used. Then this rating scale form was applied to analyze the effectiveness 
of drugs used in all the diarrhoeal inpatient medical records. Applying 
the cost of drugs used in 1 small hospital (Ram-Inthra) to other 3 
hospitals, an average total drug cost of diarrhoeal inpatients was 
calculated by non, low, moderate, and high effectiveness drugs used. The 
total cost of low, moderate, and high effective of drugs used, which were 
defined to be effective to treat these patients was also calculated. And 
then the proportion of cost-effective of drugs used was calculated by the 
following formula: 
Proportion of cost-effective drugs = Total cost of effective drugs used 
Total cost of all drugs used 
When -Total cost of effective drugs used = total cost of low, 
moderate, and high effective drugs used for diarrhoea 
-Total cost of all drugs used = total cost of all drugs used 
for diarrhoea 
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In acute appendicitis patients, general indicators for evaluating this 
disease were adapted from Rains et. al (1977). They were age, sex, nausea, 
vomiting, diarrhoea, abdominal pain, temperature, abdominal palpitation, 
rectal examination, complete blood count, urine analysis, duration between 
admission and operation, complete nurse notes, anaesthetic notes, surgical 
notes, pathological section examination, and LOS. After analyzing the 
patient records using general indicators, these indicators were classified 
by 7 general surgeons of Nonthaburi regional hospital of the MOPH using a 
5 points rating scale from less to more important for the quality of 
treatment of acute appendicitis. This classification was carried out 
twice. The first round was made by the doctors individually. The second 
round was carried out by group discussion with all doctors of the results 
of the first round in order to achieve the final consensus scale. Then 
this rating scale form was applied to analyze all acute appendicitis 
inpatient treatments. To complete the evaluation of treatment of acute 
appendicitis, evaluating outcome of treatment is essential. It was carried 
out by mailing a postal questionnaire to every acute appendicitis 
inpatient. The indicators used in the questionnaire were age; sex; 
duration between discharge from hospital and healthy recovery; duration 
between discharge from hospital and return to work; perception of quality 
of care; and complications: fever, micturition, wound infection, cough with 
sputum, anorexia, vomiting, abdominal pain, mucous bloody diarrhoea or 
dysentery, and hiccough. The completed questionnaires were analyzed to 
compare the quality of care and outcome of treatment between the insured 
and noninsured of the hospitals. 
3.9 Data processing and data analysis 
Qualitative data were transformed into well organized sets of notes. The 
data were ordered and compressed with regard to the objectives and aims. 
Coding, usually in short rememberable labels, was closely carried out to 
follow the topics in the guide or the checklist manual. Text from the 
organized sets of notes was analyzed. Data text which had belonged to the 
same issue was listed to be together. Summarizing data was executed by 
various forms: matrices, diagrams, flow charts, tables, and narrative text 
(Varkevisser et al., 1991). Findings from the summarized data were 
verified to detect associations between variables. Quantitative data was 
entered and analyzed by using programmes such as EPI-INFO, SPSSPC+. 
3.10 Summary 
MEDSEC is selected as a tracer network and Nopparat is selected as a 
comparative network. In the evaluation of outpatient and inpatient 
treatment, the non insured in the same selected private network facility 
were compared with the insured because of the difference of their payment 
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method. According to the conceptual framework, this study looked at the 
networks from consumer, provider, and purchaser perspectives. And to meet 
the objectives of this study, 4 substudies were carried out. 
In the first substudy, the operating system, financial management, and 
charge rate for medical care of MEDSEC; and the utilization rate of 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks were examined. Interviewing MEDSEC staff and 
collection of secondary data was made concerning how the MEDSEC network was 
set up and how it has grown over time, the payment system to providers, and 
the charge rate of MEDSEC. For the utilization rate examination, data were 
collected from both MEDSEC and Nopparat records. 
For the second substudy, knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers 
concerning how the MEDSEC network was set up and how it has grown over 
time, and the payment system to providers of MEDSEC were examined. Nine 
managers (4 of clinics, 4 of small hospitals, and 1 of a general hospital) 
were interviewed in-depth by a medical doctor. 
In the third substudy, health seeking behaviour, utilization rate (based 
on interviews with workers), knowledge, and satisfaction of the insured of 
MEDSEC with the services of MEDSEC facilities were examined. A structured 
questionnaire was used to interview 750 workers of 4 firms by trained 
interviewers. 
For the last substudy, evaluation of quality of care was carried out in 4 
aspects: analysis of infrastructure, assessing the satisfaction of 
inpatients, analysis of outpatient drug prescriptions, and analysis of 
inpatient treatment. In the analysis of infrastructure, postal 
questionnaires were randomly sent to 61 MEDSEC and 31 Nopparat facilities. 
For the assessment of the satisfaction of inpatients, a structured 
questionnaire was used to interview 271 inpatients of 4 MEDSEC hospitals, 
and 128 of Nopparat hospital by trained nurses. In the analysis of 
outpatient drug prescriptions, 1., 000 prescriptions of the insured and 1, 000 
of the non insured were collected from 4 MEDSEC hospitals by trained nurses. 
For the analysis of inpatient treatment, 800 medical records were collected 
from 4 MEDSEC hospitals by trained nurses. In the analysis of outpatient 
and inpatient treatment, tracer methods were applied to yield better 
results. 
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Chapter 4 
Operating and payment system in MEDSEC 
and Utilization rate of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
it 1.S To study how to organize the provision of care under the SSA, 
essential to examine the payment system of the MEDSEC network. Payment 
mechanisms probably influence the utilization rate of the insured. This 
chapter describes the payment systems in the MEDSEC network and the 
utilization rate of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks in 3 main sections. The first 
section describes the operating system and payment mechanisms of MEDSEC 
including the referral system, marketing and relationships within the 
network, the charge rate, proportion of payment and bonus, and the effect 
of payment mechanisms on behaviour of facilities. The second and last 
sections present the background of Nopparat network and the utilization 
rates of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. 
4.~ Operating and payment system in MEDSEC 
MEDSEC has been operating since 1992. It was initiated by the manager of 
the Pattaya Memorial Hospital in 1991. It is a for-profit network owned 
by a private company and not quoted on the stock-exchange. The network 
received seed money for the first capital cost from Pattaya Memorial 
Hospital which was to be repaid over a period of 1 year. Regarding the 
classification of subnetworks of MEDSEC mentioned in chapter 3, most of the 
RIG providers were located in the north and east of Bangkok. For RSG, EBG, 
CBG they were located in the west and the south, the east, and central 
areas respectively. Figure 4.1 shows the organization and referral system 
of MEDSEC. All the financial management was rendered by the MEDSEC office 
which had 10 full-time staff, controlled by the Executive Committee 
composed of 8 persons, 2 from each subnetwork. It is likely that MEDSEC 
bears no risk (money in equals money out). The profit has been shared by 
subnetworks and within subnetworks. About 3% of all facilities in MEDSEC 
quitted the network because they were penalised for over charging. 
Every OP prescriptions and IP medical records are sent to MEDSEC office 
through subnetworks offices. Subnetwork offices manage quality assurance 
by review the prescriptions and medical records. However, the quality 
assurance is not impressively carried out due to no incentive for this 
activities. 
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Figure 4.1 The organization and referral system 
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There is a difference in the number of clinics/polyclinics and small 
hospitals between the subnetworks. The distance between facilities was ~3 
kilometres. According to the director of MEDSEC, this rule was to protect 
the implicit and explicit profit gain of each facility. Every facility has 
to deposit 50,000 Baht to MEDSEC to guarantee the provision of care. 
Providers will be fined by forfeiting the guarantee deposit if they refuse 
to provide care. 
4.2.2 Referral system 
Each subnetwork has ~2 small hospitals (30-50 beds) to act as a centre for 
financial management, referral system management, marketing, etc. Since 
small hospitals provide outpatient services similar to clinics/polyclinics, 
they will be considered as providing primary as well as secondary care. 
Under each subnetwork there are >2 clinics/polyclinics pro"iding primary 
care. 
For outpatient care, patients were allowed to seek care from any providers 
in the network except general hospitals. For secondary and tertiary care, 
patients were referred from lower to higher level care within the 
subnetwork ie. from clinic/polyclinic to small hospital and then to any 
general/specialist hospital (figure 4.2) . 
Geographically, the consumers have unequal choice in services from 
different numbers of facilities in the subnetworks. At the primary care 
level, there was, in theory, considerable consumer choice in the network. 
But because of the problems of traffic in Bangkok and the distance between 
clinics/polyclinics (~ 3 kilometres), consumer choice was limited in 
practice. 
system. 
For secondary care, patient choices were limited by the referral 
However if the patients is willing to receive second level care 
from any provider, they can request to be referred to their favourite 
hospitals in the network. For tertiary care, generally patients were 
referred to a general hospital which was near to the subnetwork and charged 
the lower price. 
4.2.2 Payment system in MEDSEC 
The capitation payment is paid monthly from SSO to MEDSEC through the main 
contractors. There are 2 payment bases in MEDSEC network: FFS and 
capitation. FFS payment is applied to providers during the year. By the 
end of the year, capitation payment is applied to the subcontractor by 
considering the number of outpatient visits. If any subnetwork provides 
the highest number of outpatient visits for the workers of a firm, it will 
be considered as a fund holder of the quota of the capitation payment of 
that firm. Inpatient care takes first calIon the fund. There is a 
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guideline for rates which is both disease and procedure oriented for 
inpatient FFS charge applying to small hospitals and general hospitals but 
not to specialized hospitals. The rate was originally based on MOPH price 
list plus 15%. This rate has increased twice in 1994-1995, each time by 
10%. It is paid by type of surgical case and LOS for medical patient. For 
OP, there is a suggestion guideline for maximum charge/visit such as 170 
Baht/visit (1992) which is generally less than that of the noninsured 
patients. A monthly report of the fees and detail of services is sent from 
every provider to MEDSEC. By the 15th of the following month, the fee is 
paid according to the monthly report for OP care to every subnetwork and 
then paid to polyclinics/clinics in each subnetwork subsequently. The fee 
for inpatients is also paid to small hospitals through the subnetwork and 
paid directly to general hospitals. The fee is paid with a certain limit 
rate which is considered by the executive committee of MEDSEC. The rest 
of the fee is put in an account and paid later if there are enough funds 
at the end of the year. 
Figure 4.2 shows details of financial management. The SSO will 
prospectively pay 700 baht/person to MEDSEC through the main contractors. 
The total budget is allocated for administration (12.5%), and medical care 
fee and bonus to the providers (87.5%). In the network, there are 2 main 
groups: EG and GBG, with Pattaya Memorial hospital and the MEDSEC office 
as the administrative centres for EG and GBG respectively. The 
administrative budget is earmarked for the MEDSEC office (5%) and Pattaya 
Memorial hospital (1%), for subnetwork administration (4%), and risk fund 
(2.5%) . However this risk fund is now absorbed by MEDSEC office 
administration. The bonus is kept by the MEDSEC office during the year. 
For example, assume there are 100 workers in a company (figure 4.2). The 
total fee claimed is 3,000, 2,500, 200, 300 and 30,000 Baht for RIG, RSG, 
EBG, CBG and supracontractor respectively. This amount would usually be 
paid to subnetworks and supracontractors monthly. The mean fee/visit of 
the facility with the highest number of visits is taken as the standard. 
At the end of the year, the amount of money in excess of the mean fee paid 
to subnetworks which charged more than the mean fee should be returned to 
the fund-holder subnetwork. Subnetworks which charged less than the mean 
fee will receive compensation from the fund holder subnetwork to bring the 
payment up to the mean fee. In figure 4.2, RIG provided the highest number 
of visits. So the mean fee is 150 Baht/visit. So the total profit is 
61,250 - 30,000 - 4,050 - 1,500 - 300 - 150 = 25,250 Baht. This profit 
paid as a bonus to RIG, the fund holder subnetwork. In summary, the total 
amount paid to RIG, RSG, EBG, CBG and supracontractors is 4,050 (+ 25,250), 
1500, 300. 150 and 30,000 Baht respectively. In cases of insufficient 
budget. every subnetwork has to return their money to produce the same 
average fee/visit until the account for this particular company is 
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balanced. The specialized and general hospitals always get paid, so the 
subcontractors bear the risk. From the director of MEDSEC's viewpoint, 
this rule encourages subcontractors to save their expected profit by 
controlling the charge rate of facilities in their subnetworks. For 
general and specialized hospitals, there was a little price control run by 
nurses in the medical audit section of the MEDSEC office, using inpatient 
guideline charge rates which are very flexible. From the viewpoint of 
managers of small hospitals and clinics, this payment mechanism might 
create unfair resource allocation to smaller facilities in the network and 
cause major obstacles in case of deficit in the budget for reimbursement 
and bonus in the network. This deficit is expected and planned to be 
absorbed by the risk fund. Unfortunately the risk fund has been absorbed 
by the administration. The probable reason why general hospitals are able 
to take first slice of the profit is because the MEDSEC director is the 
main share-holder of 2 main contractors in MEDSEC network. This influenced 
the MEDSEC director to maintain his financial profit in his main 
contractors by protecting the first chance of profit in general hospitals 
in the network. 
According to the agreement, the facilities have to submit bills to MEDSEC 
by the 25th of the following month. Practically, some facilities only sent 
these in after 2 months. This causes delay of payment because allocation 
of quota of workers for bonus calculation is firstly made monthly and then 
yearly. If any bill is not presented or clearly agreed then all the 
payments should be suspended. 
There are mechanisms to cope with unexpectedly high reimbursement. Firstly 
the bills are audited byMEDSEC IP auditing personnel. If any bill charges 
the standard rate, it will be paid. The standard rate is the average 
charge for both simple and complicated cases. If any bill charges a higher 
rate than standard rate, the auditing personnel cut this to the standard 
rate. If the facilities are not satisfied with any payment, they can 
appeal to the medical committee and then to the executive committee. The 
decision of the executive committee is the final conclusion. The medical 
committee is composed of 4 doctors, 1 from each subnetwork. This process 
also applies to any bill that has no standard charge rate. 
There are 2 systems to pay providers in subnetworks by the subnetwork 
office, the capitation applied at the end of the year as from MEDSEC office 
and standard fee payment (about 150 Baht/outpatient visit). For the 
capitation the facility takes the risk. For standard fee payment, the 
subnetwork takes the risk. There is a special agreement of standard fee 
between the subnetwork and facilities to pay the agreed providers both for 
inpatient and outpatient care. The majority of facilities are paid by the 
capitation method except some facilities in EBG which are paid a standard 
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fee. This is because EBG had experiences a very high profit gained from 
the bonus in the first year of joining the MEDSEC network. However, the 
MEDSEC office tried to convince subnetworks to pay facilities by the 
capitation method as from MEDSEC to promote the bonus system. 
Figure 4.2 Financial management of MEDSEC 
sso J 
700 Baht/insured J 
Main contractors J 
-7.5% for admin(5% for 
general admin, 2.5% for 
MEDSEC l risk fund) 
-4% for subnetwork admin 
87.5% for provider -1% for Pattaya Memorial 
reimbursement monthly Hospital admin 
& yearly bonus 
Example, there are 100 workers in a company. 
So total budget is = 100 x 612.50 = 61,250 Baht. 
----------------;~~-------;~~-------~~~------;~~-----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--
&inpatient fee 
No.Visit 20 10 2 1 
Mean/visit l 150 250 100 300 
Subtotal 3,000 2,500 200 300 30,000 
To RIG 100x10 150x1 
50x2 From RIG __________________________ _ 
;~~~i;----------4-,-~;~-----;,-;~~-----3-~~----- 150 30,000 
--------------------------------------------
---------------------------
Note: 1. Mean/visit is a mean fee charged for outpatient, 
yearly. 
2. Total for RIG=3,OOO+1,OOO+150-100=4050 
RSG=2,500-1,000=1500 
EBG=200+100=300 
CBG=300-150=150 
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4.1.3 Marketing and relationships within the network From interview of the 
managers of facilities, since 1992 more providers and workers are involved. 
This is because its marketing skills and management services are working 
well, many subscribers have been choosing the network, its payment system 
with bonus is attractive, facilities serve medical care with reasonable 
prices and facilities have room to assist more patients, especially 
inpatients. From interview of MEDSEC staff, the marketing and propaganda 
activities of MEDSEC are: 
frequently sending information documents to introduce 
MEDSEC/network facilities' activities to managers of firms selecting 
MEDSEC 
- sending marketing personnel to see the managers and workers in the 
firms to inform them and answer expected questions regarding service 
problems 
assigning responsible areas for subnetworks to contact the 
managers and workers 
- assigning all facilities to public relations with SSO clients, 
using billboards and posters provided by MEDSEC, and by encouraging 
good doctor/nurse-patient relationships 
_ affixing billboards and posters in target areas where there are 
many workers and firms 
_ setting up mobile medical teams to serve workers in the firms 
sending a doctor to provide care in some firms having ~100 workers 
for 2 hours/week. 
Apart from the marketing and propaganda activities of the MEDSEC office, 
all facilities are assigned to contact firms and workers near to their 
setting. The marketing activities of facilities are: sending vouchers and 
documents about : facilities' venue and services available, process of 
services under SSA, how to select MEDSEC network, and fundamental problems 
and answers regarding services; frequent contact with company managers and 
workers to solve problems by telephone and direct contact; and sending 
facility's marketing personnel to contact the personnel managers of firms 
and workers to do public relation work. 
For the recruitment of providers, the subnetworks are assigned to search 
for new providers. The criteria to recruit providers are that new 
providers should be suitably located (close to firms, 3 kilometres away 
from the existing providers); and should meet the minimum infrastructure 
standards (staff, equipment, and premises). The providers may be rejected 
from MEDSEC if there are many complaints from workers. 
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There are some social activities within MEDSEC providers: social parties, 
group picnics, social dinners, and group investments in other interesting 
business. In the future, other acti vi ties are expected to be: a 
newsletter, journal, and occasional publications. 
4.l.4 Charge rate of MEDSEC network 
The purpose of this section is to examine the charge rate in order to 
further explore the effect of payment mechanisms in the MEDSEC network. 
The average charge/visit of outpatients of all facilities decreased every 
year from l72.33 Baht/visit (l992) to l71.43 (l993) and 157.07 (1994) 
(table 4.l). For inpatients of small hospitals, the charge rate increased 
from 79.97 (l992) to l26.ll (l993) and decreased to 80.05 Baht/worker/year 
(l994). The average charge/day for inpatients of small hospitals increased 
from 4l0. 98 (l992) to 627.39 {1993} and decreased to 458.20 Baht/day 
(l994). Comparing charge rates between subnetworks, in general, the charge 
rate of inpatients (/visit) and outpatient (/worker, /day) of Bangbon was 
highest in 1992 -l993 (table 3A.1-3A.2, annex 3). The high charge and 
utilization rates (presented later) affected the bonus of the Bangbon 
subnetwork to be a minus one (data from MEDSEC office). According to the 
director of MEDSEC, this caused Bangbon subnetwork to withdraw from the 
MEDSEC network in 1994. 
For general hospitals, the OP charge rate increased from 185.60 (1993) to 
262.49 Baht/visit/year (l994) which was higher than that of small hospitals 
in 1992-l994. The average charge/day of general hospitals was 766.15 
Baht/day in 1994 which was higher than those of the small hospitals in 
1992-l994 (table 4.l, 4.2). It is likely that the charge rates of small 
hospitals in 1994 were lower than 1992-l993. This is because the data 
available in 1994 was only for January-August and Siam general hospital 
joined the network. These affected the utilization rate (presented later) 
of the insured in terms of total LOS and total number of visit, which then 
affected the charge rates. 
Table 4.l Total charge, charge rate, and average charge of outpatients of 
all facilities and inpatients of MEDSEC small hospitals, 1992-1994 
Years 
outpatients of all facilities 
Total charged Average charge 
(Baht) /visit 
Inpatients of small hospital 
Charge rate Average charge 
/worker/year /day 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------410.98 
627.39 
458.20 
l72.33 
l7l.43 
l57.07 
79.97 
126.11 
80.05 
1992 
1993 
1994* 
l5,043,8l4 
3l,291,839 
l8,l70,830 
========================================================================== 
Note: * = January-August 1994 
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Table 4.2 Total charge, charge rate, and average charge/day of MEDSEC 
general hospitals, 1993-1994 
1993 1994* =-~~-~f-~h~-i~~~~~d-----------------------------~~~~~~~------~;~~;~;---
- No of patients 19,511 24,347 
- Charge in a year(Baht) 20,523,488 24,278,859 
- Charge rate(/worker/year) 185.60 262.49 
- Average charge/day (Baht) not available 766.15 
;~~~7=:=;=~~=;;:~~~:~=~;;~============================================ 
4.1.5 Proportion of payments to facilities and bonus 
The proportion of the payment budget going to general hospitals increased 
from 30.30% (1993) to 42.86% (1994); while the share of payment to 
clinics/small hospitals for OP cases, to small hospitals for IP cases, and 
for bonuses decreased. Moreover the bonus which has been claimed by MEDSEC 
to be an encouraging component to promote quality and efficiency of the 
network critically decreased from 1,970,360 Baht (1993) to 3,167 (1994) 
(table 4.3) . 
Table 4.3 Budget for medical fee payment to clinics, small and general 
hospitals; and bonus; 1993-1994 
1993 1994 
Total % Total % 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-Number of the insured 110,581 138,742 
-Total budget (87.5%) 67,730,863 100.00 84,979,475 100.00 
-Payment for OP of 13,945,176 20.59 12,216,360 14.38 
clinics & small hospitals 
-Payment for IP of 31,291,839 46.20 36,341,660 42.76 
clinics & small hospitals 
-Payment to general 20,523,488 30.30 36,418,289 42.86 
hospitals 
-Remaining for bonus 1,970,360 2.91 3,167 0.00 
======================================================================= 
The balance of income and expenditure regarding the insured was a surplus 
during 1992-1993. In 1994, the utilization rate (presented later) of the 
insured strikingly increased and all the facilities especially the general 
hospitals tried to charge higher IP fees (where the standard fee did not 
apply). Moreover the standard IP fee was increasing 10% every year while 
the capitation rate was still 700 Baht. Hence the expected bonus for 1994 
was possibly a very low surplus. From the half year evaluation of the 
bonus, the RIG subnetwork which is situated near to a general hospital, 
Siam hospital, was minus. Hence the balance of income and expenditure of 
facilities was likely to be minus in some subnetworks. 
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4.1.6 Effect of payment mechanisms on behaviour of facilities 
The charge rate (/worker/year) and the proportion of budget (%) paid to 
general hospitals (by FFS) increased while the proportion paid to other 
facilities (by capitation) decreased. Moreover, the charge rate/visit of 
outpatients of clinics and small hospitals decreased during 1992-1994. It 
is likely that the effect of the payment system in the MEDSEC network by 
capitation with an incentive bonus influenced the subcontractors to save 
their expected profit by controlling the charge rate of small hospitals and 
clinics in their subnetworks, while for general hospitals (by FFS) they 
could not. Since the general hospitals were always paid, it probably 
created unfair resource allocation to facilities and induced major problems 
in deficits in the budget for reimbursement and bonus. This is the danger 
of the payment system where the primary and secondary facilities bore all 
the risk. If the facilities or subnetworks face a high loss like Bangbon 
subnetwork, they might withdraw from the network. 
The payment system of MEDSEC also affects the referral behaviour of 
facilities. The MEDSEC IP standard fees are not able to cover all 
diseases/conditions. However, prices charged for the insured in case of 
no standard fee can be estimated from the price list for general patients 
of that particular hospital. According to the interview with managers of 
facilities, the price charges for diseases which were not priced in the 
standard fee affect the referral behaviour of facilities, as suggested by 
the behaviour of small hospitals or clinics which tend to refer patients 
to a general hospital with a cheaper general price list. 
The interview with managers of facilities also shows that the stage of 
patients when they were referred from clinics was usually not serious 
because patients seeking care from clinics are not seriously sick. If they 
are critically ill they will seek care from hospitals. From the view of 
the manager of a general hospital, the stage of MEDSEC patients when they 
were referred was usually very serious, because small hospitals try to keep 
their patients to save their fund-holding group bonus. 
4.2 Background of Nopparat network 
Nopparat network is the biggest publicly-organized network in terms of the 
number of the insured. The main contractor of this network is Nopparat 
hospital. In 1991, 50,829 workers selected Nopparat hospital. The number 
of the insured decreased to 36,974 (January 1993). Since there was only 
1 facility for the insured to seek care and Nopparat hospital has no 
outpatient service after working hours, this caused the problem of lower 
accessibility for the insured to seek care. Then an investigation to 
establish a network, to respond to the competition with other main 
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contractors especially with the private networks, was rendered in February 
1993 by examining the number of the insured and firms that selected 
Nopparat hospital. It was found that 330 firms in 25 districts in the east 
of Bangkok chose Nopparat hospital. Out of these 25 districts, 7 districts 
had >10 firms/district. These 7 districts were chosen as target areas to 
establish a network for Nopparat hospital. All private and public 
facilities were mapped to select some appropriate facilities for the 
network. A meeting with selected facilities to encourage them to join the 
network was held. Then a publicly-organized network, Nopparat network, was 
founded and has run since June 1993. At the time of establishment, it was 
composed of 38 facilities. By 1995 the number of facilities has increase9 
to 50. As regards the number of the insured, coverage increased from 
39,148 (1993) to 66,015 (1994) and 80,000 (1995). 
Nopparat network is managed and controlled by a committee composed of 
Nopparat hospital officers. There is a commitment between facilities and 
Nopparat hospital regarding payment system, referral system, and health 
care provision process. Payment to facilities is FFS with a maximum limit 
such as 170 Baht/visit of outpatients and 600 Baht/day of inpatients. 
In the referral system, clinics, polyclinics, health centres, and small 
hospitals have to refer patients to Nopparat hospital. The secondary and 
tertiary care is almost always provided by Nopparat hospital. The 
relationship between facilities is very limited, being only to provide care 
and payment activities. However, there was 1 meeting between 
facilities/year. Two providers quitted the network because of too few 
workers near 1 provider, and 1 facility was closed. There were also 2 
clinics withdrawn from the network due to their low quality of care. 
As Nopparat is a public hospital, there are a lot of restrictive 
regulations regarding subcontracting with private providers. 
Exceptionally, the MOPH has been allowed to launch this publicly-organized 
network. However, there are some restrictions of budget regulations. The 
bureaucratic regulation in the payment process has caused delay of payment 
and difficulty in management, such as delay of payment to private 
ambulances for referring patients to Nopparat hospital which was not 
mentioned in the agreement. This delay in payment decreases the moti va tion 
of the private ambulance to refer patients which influences the 
satisfaction of the insured and creates the misunderstanding of the 
facilities with the network. Moreover there is difficulty concerning 
publicity and recruitment of the insured. As Nopparat hospital is a public 
health care provider, having publicity or marketing/propaganda activities 
to recruit more insured is prohibited. This causes a lower ability to 
recruit more insured than the private network which has less prohibition 
regarding publicity. 
85 
4.3 Utilization rate of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
The hypothesis for this section is that the accessibility of seeking care 
of the insured of a private network is better than without a network and 
than a publicly-organized network. For the situation without a network, 
data were from a study of the insured in Samutprakarn by Tangcharoensathien 
et ale (1993). The purpose of this section is to examine the utilization 
rate of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. 
In the Samutprakarn study, the sample group were from firms selecting 5 
main contractors, 1 public and 4 private main contractors with no provider 
network, while in this study they were from firms choosing 3 private main 
contractors of the MEDSEC network. In Samutprakarn, firms were usually 
close to their main contractors but for MEDSEC, firm were distributed in 
all areas of Bangkok. 
4.3.1 Utilization rate of insured outpatients of MEDSEC!Nopparat networks 
The utilization rates of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks were increasing every 
year during 1992-1994. In the same year, that of MEDSEC was slightly 
higher than that of Nopparat network (Table 4.4). Comparing the rates with 
the Samutprakarn study (Tangcharoensathien et aI, 1993), the utilization 
rate of MEDSEC/Nopparat in 1992-1994 were higher than that of Samutprakarn 
in 1992 (0.63/worker/year). 
Table 4.4 Utilization rate/worker/year of OP of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks, 
1992-1994 
Years 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Nopparat 
No network 
1.22 
1.66 
MEDSEC 
1.24 
1.65 
1.69* 
==================================== 
Note: * = January-June 1994 
4.3.2 Utilization rate of insured inpatients of MEDSEC small hospitals 
Unfortunately data for the utilization rates of insured inpatients of the 
Nopparat network were not available due to poor records of insured 
inpatients in the Nopparat network. Therefore in this substudy, only the 
utilization rates of insured inpatient of MEDSEC network are presented. 
The utilization rates of insured inpatients of MEDSEC small hospitals were 
2.36, 4.40, and 3.22 visit/l00 persons/year in 1992, 1993, and 1994 
respectively (table 4.5). The average LOS in MEDSEC small hospitals 
increased every year from 0.19 (1992) to 0.20 (1993) and 0.23 
day/person/year (1994). The IP utilization rate (%)/year, charge 
rate/worker/year increased in 1993, and then decreased in 1994. This is 
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because in 1994, data were complete only between January-August, and from 
data of MEDSEC network in 1992-l993, the insured received care from the 
registered facilities during the first half of the year less than in the 
second half. Moreover, in 1994, the Siam general hospital, well-known by 
the public for good quality of care, joined the network. For general 
cases, special cases such as complicated cases and surgical cases, or 
serious cases which have a high price, the insured tend to seek care or 
request to be referred to Siam hospital. This caused the utilization rate, 
average charge/worker/year, and average charge/day of inpatients of small 
hospitals in 1994 to be lower than before. The evidence of increasing 
utilization rate in general hospitals, almost all in Siam hospital, is 
presented in the next section. 
Comparing utilization rates between subnetworks of MEDSEC, the utilization 
rate of inpatients and outpatients of Bangbon was the highest in 1992-1993 
(table 3A.3-3A.4, annex 3). The highest utilization rates affected the 
bonus of the Bangbon subnetwork to be minus as mentioned before. 
Table 4.5 Utilization rate (/lOO worker/year) and average LOS 
(day/worker/year) of MEDSEC small hospitals, 1992-1994. 
Utilization LOS 
---------------------------------------------
1992 
1993 
1994* 
2.36 
4.40 
3.22 
0.19 
0.20 
0.23 
============================================= 
Note: * = January-August 1994 
4.3.3 Utilization rate of the insured of MEDSEC general hospitals 
The utilization rate of insured inpatients of MEDSEC general hospitals 
increased from 1.12 (1993) to 1.56 admission/100 persons/year (1994). The 
average LOS of workers in MEDSEC general hospitals was 0.25 day/person/year 
in 1994. It was higher than that of the small hospitals which was 0.23 
day/person/year in 1994 (table 4.5, 4.6). The increase in utilization 
rates of general hospitals and their higher LOS than small hospitals 
affected the increase in the proportion of the budget for medical care to 
be allocated to general hospitals as mentioned before. 
Table 4.6 Utilization rate/l00 person/year and LOS (day/person/year) of 
inpatient of MEDSEC general hospitals, 1993; and January-August 1994 
Number/rate 1993 1994 
=-~~iii;~~i~~-~~~~---------------------------------~~~;---------~~~~---
- Total admission days not available 23,123 
- LOS not available 0.25 
======================================================================= 
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4.4 Summary 
MEDSEC was operated by the MEDSEC office controlled by the Executive 
Committee. It was likely that MEDSEC bears no risk. The profit or risk 
was shared by subnetworks and within subnetworks. Outpatients were treated 
by any providers except general hospitals. For secondary and tertiary 
care, patients were referred from lower level care to higher level care. 
A lot of marketing and propaganda activities were performed by MEDSEC and 
subnetwork offices to recruit and maintain their insured. There were some 
social activities within MEDSEC providers to maintain their relationships. 
There were 2 payment bases in MEDSEC: capitation with incentive bonus 
applied to primary and secondary level care facilities and FFS to tertiary 
care hospitals. 
The average charge/visit of outpatients of MEDSEC decreased every year. 
For inpatients of small hospitals, charge rates, and average charge/day 
increased in 1993 and decreased in 1994. Comparing subnetworks of MEDSEC, 
the charge rates of Bangbon were the highest. For general hospitals, the 
charge rate increased in 1994, and the charge rate and the charge/day were 
higher than those of small hospitals in the same year. 
In 1994, the proportion of the medical care budget paid to general 
hospitals was highest compared to other provider groups. Compared to 1993, 
the proportion of payment to general hospital increased while the share to 
other facilities and for bonus decreased. The bonus, which is an important 
component in the MEDSEC network, decreased critically from 1.97 million 
Baht (1993) to 3,167 Baht (1994). 
According to the view of managers of general hospitals, the stage of 
patients referred from clinics was not serious, but from small hospitals 
was very serious because small hospitals tended to keep their patients to 
save their bonus. Price charges of general hospitals which were not priced 
according to the standard fee influences small hospitals or clinics to 
refer patients to a cheaper general hospital. There was a danger in the 
MEDSEC payment system where the first and second level facilities bore all 
the risk. If they face high loss from high utilization or charge rate like 
Bangbon subnetwork, they will probably withdraw from the network. 
The Nopparat network was managed and controlled by a committee composed of 
Nopparat hospital officers. Payment was by FFS method with a maximum 
limit. For the referral system, all facilities had to refer patients to 
Nopparat hospital. The secondary and tertiary care was almost all provided 
by Nopparat hospital. The relationship between facilities was very 
limited. As Nopparat is a public hospital, there were a lot of restrictive 
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regulations regarding subcontracting with private providers, payment 
method, publicity and recruitment of the insured. 
In 1994, the OP utilization rate of the insured of the MEDSEC network was 
1.69 /worker/year and IP admission rate was 4.78 (3.22+1.56) /100 
workers/year. 
The OP utilization rates of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks increased while the 
OP average charge/visit of MEDSEC was decreasing every year during 1992-
1994. The OP utilization rate of MEDSEC was higher than that of Nopparat 
network (a publicly-organized network). The OP utilization rates of 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks were higher than that of the main contractors in 
Samutprakarn (without network). Since the data of IP utilization rate and 
LOS of Nopparat facilities was not available, this substudy presents only 
those of MEDSEC network. The IP utilization rate of small hospitals 
increased in 1993, and then decreased in 1994. The average LOS in MEDSEC 
small hospitals increased every year from 1992-1994. For general 
hospitals, the IP utilization rate increased from 1993-1994. The average 
LOS of general hospitals were higher than those of small hospitals in the 
same year. The increase in IP utilization rates of general hospitals and 
their higher LOS increased the proportion of budget for medical care 
allocated to general hospitals. Comparing OP and IP utilization rates 
between subnetworks of MEDSEC, those of Bangbon were the highest in 1992-
1993. This caused the bonus of the Bangbon subnetwork to be minus, 
resulting in the Bangbon subnetwork withdrawing from the network. 
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Chapter 5 
Knowledge, health seeking behaviour, utilization rate, 
and satisfaction with MEDSEC facilities 
In this substudy, 1,044 workers from 4 firms - Sahafarm, Yatming, Almond, 
and Eden, and 4 managers of the firms - were interviewed during December 
1994 - February 1995. The results are presented in 5 sections: knowledge 
of the insured, health-seeking behaviour and utilization rate, satisfaction 
of the insured, factors affecting utilization rate, and employer knowledge 
and attitude. The sex ratio of male:female of the samples is 1:4. Other 
characteristics of the insured in this study are presented in tables 4A.1-
4A.10 (annex 4) . 
5.1 Knowledge of the insured 
It was found that 33.4 % of the insured gave incorrect answers for the name 
of their main contractors, or did not know; 33.9 % answered the question 
on the working hours of facilities incorrectly; 54.7% answered question on 
the list of diseases which were not covered by the scheme incorrectly (~4 
out of 15); 12.5 % did not know that they have to present the Social 
Security card when they receive care; 70.7 % didn't know which facilities 
they can receive free care at in case of an emergency; 22.2% answered 
incorrectly about the expenditure for emergency care which can be 
reimbursed from SSO; 75.6% did not know about categories of benefits 
covered by SSA in 1995 (table 4A.11); and 93.9% of the insured (973 
workers) would like to choose their main contractors. 
5.2 Health seeking behaviour and utilization rate 
During 1 month, 265, 83, 65, and 20 workers were perceived to be sick for 
1, 2, 3, and 4 episodes respectively. From these, the OP illness rate/year 
can be calculated as the following: 
OP illness rate/year = total number of episode in a year 
total number of population 
= [265+(83x2)+(65x3)+(20x4)] x 12 
1036 
= 8.18 episodes/person/year 
The most common place for the insured to seek OP care is at working place 
clinics run by their firms (41.1%), followed by MEDSEC facilities (26.3%), 
other private clinics (16.8%), self prescription (13.1%), and other 
hospitals (2.7%). At working place clinics of some firms (>100 workers), 
MEDSEC sends medical doctors to treat the sick insured for 2 hours/week. 
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From the proportion of OP seeking care from MEDSEC (0.263), and OP illness 
rate (8.17), the OP utilization rate of MEDSEC can be calculated as the 
following: 
MEDSEC OP utilization rate/year = illness rate x proportion of using MEDSEC 
= 8.17 x 0.263 
= 2.15 visit/person/year. 
The most common reason for those insured with MEDSEC to seek care from 
other places is dissatisfaction with MEDSEC services (46.9%), followed by 
difficulty of access (25.5%), emergency sickness (13.8%), and other (13.8%) 
(table 4A.12, annex 4) . 
During 1 year, 127, 34, 8, 5, 4, and 1 workers were seriously ill (need 
admission) for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 episodes respectively. The IP illness 
rate can be calculated as the following: 
IP illness rate/year = total number of illness(admitted) in a year 
total number of population 
= 127+(34x2)+(8x3)+(5x4)+(4x5)+(lx6) 
1036 
= 0.256 times/person/year 
During 1 year, 930 persons (89.7%) were not seriously ill (did not need 
admission to MEDSEC hospitals); 65 (6.3%), 29 (2.8%), 6 (0.6%), 4 (0.4%), 
and 2 (0.2%) persons admitted to MEDSEC facilities for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
times respectively. The admission rate can be calculated as the following: 
MEDSEC admission rate/year = total number of admissions in a year 
total number of population 
= 65+(29x2)+(6x3)+(4x4)+(2x5) 
1036 
= 0.161 times /person/year 
From the data of total number of illness (admitted), and the total number 
of admission to MEDSEC facilities in 1 year mentioned before, the 
proportion of the insured admitted to MEDSEC hospitals can be calculated 
as the following: 
Proportion (%) of the insured admitted to MEDSEC facilities 
= total number of admission to MEDSEC hospitals x 100 
total number of illness (admitted) 
= 65+(29x2)+(6x3)+(4x4)+(2x5) x 100 
127+(34x2)+(8x3)+(5x4)+{4x5)+(lx6) 
= 63% 
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Since the traffic in Bangkok is heavy, patients tend to seek care from 
facili ties near to the' h k I lr omes or wor paces. To examine the places where 
the insured get sick and start seeking care is essential. The most common 
place where the insured got sick was at the work place (58. 3%), and insured 
started seeking care most commonly from the work place (50.7%, table 5.1). 
When the proportion of the insured becoming sick in work place was compared 
with the proportion seeking care from the work place, the proportion was 
higher for those becoming sick. But if the proportion of the insured got 
sick and started seeking care from home were compared, the proportion is 
higher for when they started seeking care {table 5.1}. It is therefore 
likely that the insured went back horne then sought for medical care. 
Table 5.1 
Place 
Place where the insured become 
When sick{%) 
{N=708} 
sick and start seeking care 
Start seeking care{%) 
(N=708 ) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
- Home 
- Work place 
- Other 
40.1 
58.3 
1.6 
44.8 
50.7 
4.5 
-------------------------------------------------------------------Total 100.0 100.0 
=================================================================== 
5.3 Satisfaction of the insured 
Regarding the satisfaction of the insured with services, majority of the 
insured were satisfied with all aspects (except with cleanliness) at the 
"fairly satisfied" level. The highest level of satisfaction with 
cleanliness is "very satisfied" {table 5.2}. From table 5.2, changing the 
5 to 3 points rating scale by joining "very much" and "very satisfied" to 
become "satisfied", and compressing "very dissatisfied" and "very much 
dissatisfied" to become "dissatisfied"; the insured were more satisfied 
than dissatisfied with all aspects with the highest proportion of 
satisfaction with cleanliness (66.6%, table 4A.13, annex 4) . 
As regards the satisfaction with MEDSEC services compared with experience 
of public facilities, the majority of the insured who were satisfied with 
MEDSEC was the same as with public facilities for all variables (table 
5.3). Changing the 5 point scale to a 3 point one, by joining "much more" 
and "more satisfied" on MEDSEC to become "satisfied" with MEDSEC, and 
compressing "much more" and "more satisfied" with public facilities to 
become "satisfied" with public facilities, the insured were more satisfied 
with all studied aspects of MEDSEC than those of public facilities with the 
highest proportion of satisfaction with the waiting time (49.7%, table 
4A.14, annex 4). 
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Table 5.2 Satisfaction of the insured with services of MEDSEC facilities 
(5 point scale, N=708) 
Very Much Very 
Variable Satisfied Satisfied 
(%) (%) 
Fairly 
Satisfied 
(% ) 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
Very Much 
Dissatisfied 
(% ) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Accessibility 5.9 28.4 42.1 15.7 7.9 
-Waiting time 8.8 31.1 37.8 13.7 8.8 
-Perception on 6.3 32.2 43.3 11. 9 6.3 
medical quality 
-Reception 7.4 32.6 44.9 0.6 5.5 
-Friendliness of 7.1 33.8 41.5 12.5 0.1 
personnel 
-Cleanliness 9.5 51.1 32.1 4.5 2.7 
============================================================================= 
Table 5.3 Satisfaction (%) of the insured with services by experience with 
MEDSEC and public facilities (5 point scale, N=708) 
Variables 
Much More 
satisfied 
with MEDSEC 
More The More 
satisfied Same Satisfied 
with MEDSEC satisfaction with public 
Much More 
Satisfied 
with public 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Accessibility 14.9 25.0 32.1 17.2 10.8 
-Waiting time 16.6 33.1 31.0 11.2 8.0 
-Perception on 13.7 30.3 33.7 13.9 8.4 
medical quality 
-Reception 14.4 32.4 33.5 11. 9 7.9 
-Friendliness of 14.0 29.7 36.5 14.1 5.7 
personnel 
-Cleanliness 14.7 27.9 40.5 10.2 6.6 
============================================================================== 
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5.4 Factors affecting utilization rate 
Since there are evidences of very low utilization rate under SSA 
(Tangcharoensathien et aI, 1993), investigation of factors affecting the 
utilization rate is necessary for drawing the policy recommendations to 
improve the circumstance. Factors affecting the utilization of the insured 
can be classified into 4 groups: firms that the insured belong to ~ 
socioeconomic factors; knowledge of the insured; and satisfaction with 
services. Logistic regression was applied to analyze factors affecting OP 
and IP utilization rate to control for confounding variables. Dependent 
variables were converted into dichotomous responses of 0 and 1. The 
general model for fitting is: 
Probability (event) = 1 
1 + e-z 
where Z is the linear equation of 
and the Bi coefficient is the natural logarithm of the odds of the i-th 
independent variable when it increases by one unit (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1981) . 
Independent variables to determine the likelihood are listed in table 
4A.15, (annex 5). Dummy variables for firms, marital status, and 
educational status, were created. 
The characteristics of study variables by MEDSEC/other, and OP/IP are 
presented in table 5.4. Generally, means of the variables are similar 
between all OP/IP patients except for Sahafarm workers of OP which is 
remarkably lower than those of IP. This mean suggests that 10% of OP and 
23% of IP came from Sahafarm. Comparing between OP of MEDSEC/other, means 
of the variables are similar between MEDSEC/other patients except for 
Sahafarm workers, married marital status, and knowledge about social 
security benefit and opening hour of MEDSEC facilities, for which the means 
of MEDSEC OP are markedly higher than those of the other. Also, the means 
of MEDSEC OP for Eden workers, manual producer, and knowledge about 
reimbursement of emergency fee are remarkably lower than those of the 
other. For IP of MEDSEC/other, the means of MEDSEC/other IP are similar 
except for Eden workers, primary school graduation, and knowledge about 
social security benefit, for which the means of MEDSEC IP are strikingly 
higher than those of the other. Also, the means of MEDSEC IP for Almond 
and Sahafarm workers are markedly lower than those of the other. 
During the initial logistic regression modelling for OP and IP; single and 
other marital status variables, and higher educational status were included 
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in the models, but none gave significant results. There was a 
statistically significant correlations between single and married marital 
status (R coefficient = 0.8999). So, at the final stage, these 2 variables 
were dropped out for OP and IP models. For OP models, since there were 
statistically significant correlations between all satisfactory variables 
(R coefficient ~ 0.96), and the variable for cleanliness satisfaction gave 
a higher significant than the others for OP models, at the final stage, all 
satisfactory variables except cleanliness were dropped out from OP models. 
However, in the OP model, 3 models for 3 episodes of illness were tested, 
the second and third episodes models were not statistically significant. 
Therefore only the first episode model is presented. 
Table 5.4 Mean of variables used in logistic regression models by OP for 
first episode and IP & by using MEDSEC and other facilities 
OP IP 
Variables MEDSEC OTHER Total MEDSEC OTHER Total 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firms 
ALM 
EDEN 
SAH 
Yatming* 
Socioeconomic 
AGE 
MSTATM 
MSTATS* 
NJOB 
PEDUCAT 
SEDUCAT 
SEX 
TINCOME 
WHOUR 
Knowledge 
KCARD 
KCOVER 
KDIS 
KEMERG 
KHOUR 
KMAIN 
KPAY 
Satisfaction 
CLEAN 
FRIEND 
NEAR 
QUAL 
RECEPT 
0.15(0.4) 
0.38(0.5) 
0.23(0.4) 
0.24(0.4) 
30.20 
(8.8) 
0.59(0.5) 
0.33(0.5) 
0.66(0.5) 
0.44(0.5) 
0.39(0.5) 
0.20(0.4) 
5103.47 
(2519.4) 
61.17 
(16.2) 
0.96(0.2) 
0.37(0.5) 
0.47(0.5) 
0.33(0.5) 
0.72(0.5) 
0.64(0.5) 
0.72(0.5) 
0.23(0.4) 
0.48 (0.5) 
0.06(0.2) 
0.23 (0.4) 
30.05 
(13.3) 
0.46 (0.5) 
0.46(0.5) 
0.76(0.4) 
0.42(0.5) 
0.44(0.5) 
0.18(0.4) 
4985.95 
(3077.1) 
61.98 
(15.2) 
0.91(0.3) 
0.16(0.4) 
0.44(0.5) 
0.32(0.5) 
0.63 (0.5) 
0.60(0.5) 
0.81(0.4) 
0.93(0.3) 
0.83(0.4) 
0.81(0.4) 
0.84 (0.4) 
0.86(0.4) 
0.82(0.4) 
0.21(0.4) 
0.46 (0.5) 
0.10(0.3) 
0.23(0.4) 
30.09 
(12.3) 
0.50(0.5) 
0.43(0.5) 
0.74(0.4) 
0.42(0.5) 
0.43 (0.5) 
0.18(0.4) 
5014.72 
(2948.0) 
61.78 
(15.4) 
o . 92 (0 .3) 
0.21(0.4) 
0.45(0.5) 
0.32(0.5) 
0.65(0.5) 
0.61(0.5) 
0.79(0.4) 
0.94(0.3) 
o . 84 (0.4) 
0.82(0.4) 
o . 84 (0.4) 
0.87(0.3) 
0.83(0.4) 
0.07(0.3) 
0.64(0.5) 
0.12(0.3) 
0.10(0.3) 
33.62 
(17.1) 
0.51(0.5) 
0.42(0.5) 
0.68(0.5) 
0.48(0.5) 
0.36(0.5) 
0.25(0.5) 
5258.24 
(2383.9) 
62.60 
(16.8) 
0.92 (0.3) 
0.22(0.4) 
0.41(0.5) 
0.35(0.5) 
0.67(0.5) 
0.61(0.5) 
0.73(0.4) 
0.89(0.3) 
0.86(0.4) 
0.83(0.4) 
0.82(0.4) 
0.87(0.3) 
0.78(0.4) 
0.33(0.5) 
0.19(0.4) 
0.42(0.5) 
0.17(0.4) 
29.22 
(9.2) 
0.53(0.5) 
0.43(0.5) 
0.74(0.4) 
0.29(0.5) 
0.43(0.5) 
0.33(0.5) 
5277.43 
(2175.3) 
56.38 
(12.7) 
0.94(0.3) 
0.12(0.3) 
0.38(0.5) 
0.37(0.5) 
0.60(0.5) 
0.62(0.5) 
0.69(0.5) 
0.91(0.3) 
0.92(0.3) 
0.89(0.3) 
0.89(0.3) 
o . 94 (0 .2) 
0.84(0.4) 
0.17(0.4) 
0.48(0.5) 
0.23(0.4) 
0.13(0.3) 
32.00 
(14 .8) 
0.52(0.5) 
0.42(0.5) 
0.70(0.5) 
0.41(0.5) 
0.38(0.5) 
0.28(0.5) 
5265.26 
(2305.6) 
60.32 
(15.7) 
0.92(0.3) 
0.18(0.4) 
0.40(0.5) 
0.36(0.5) 
0.64(0.5) 
0.61(0.5) 
0.72(0.5) 
0.90(0.3) 
0.88(0.3) 
0.85(0.4) 
0.84(0.4) 
0.89(0.3) 
0.80(0.4) 
WAIT 
0.96(0.2) 
0.85(0.4) 
0.85(0.4) 
0.85(0.4) 
0.88(0.3) 
0.85(0.4) 
-----------------
-----------------------------------------
--------------------- 265 105 324 429 168 97 Sample size ______________ ========== 
=======================================================--------------
Note: ----(-----) = mean(SD) A 15 
_ Key concerning variable names and value labels is in table 4. , 
annex 5 
* Variables excluded from models 
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Table 5.5 shows coefficients for logistic regression models explaining OP 
and IP utilization. Significant variables (P-value<O.05) that reduced the 
probabilities of receiving OP care are being an Eden worker relative to 
Almond, Sahafarrn and Yatming workers i being a manual producer i and 
knowledge about reimbursement of fee for emergency care. Significant 
variables (P-value<O.05) that increased the probabilities of receiving OP 
care are being Sahafarrn workers relative to Almond, Eden and Yatming 
workers i higher total income; higher number of working hour/day i and 
knowledge about social security cards, social security benefit, and opening 
hours of MEDSEC facilities (table 5.4-S.S). The most important factors 
influencing the OP probabilities of receiving care are knowledge variables 
followed by firm variables. For socioeconomic variables, the most 
influential variable to the model is being a manual producer which 
associates with the income and working hour/day of the workers. 
For IP model, significant variables (P-value<O.OS) that reduced the 
probabilities of receiving IP care are being Almond and Sahafarm workers 
rela ti ve to Eden and Ya tming workers, and being a manual producer. 
Significant variables (P-value<O.OS) that increased the probabilities of 
receiving IP care are being an Eden worker relative to Almond, Sahafarm and 
Yatming workers i graduation from primary school, knowledge about emergency 
services, and satisfaction with cleanliness (table S.4-S.S). The most 
important factors influencing the IP probabilities of receiving care are 
being a worker in firms, followed by nature of the job and educational 
status of the workers. There is only 1 variable of the knowledge and 
satisfaction variables influencing the models. The power of OP models is 
83.68%, and IP is 81.89%. 
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Table ~.5. Regression coefficients and P-values for OP (first episode) 
IP loglstlc regression models and 
Variables 
OP 
Coeff. P-value 
IP 
Coeff. P-value 
--------
----------------
----------------------------Firms 
ALM 
EDEN 
SAH 
Socioeconomic 
AGE 
MSTATM 
NJOB 
PEDUCAT 
SEDUCAT 
SEX 
TINCOME 
WHOUR 
Knowledge 
KCARD 
KCOVER 
KDIS 
KEMERG 
KHOUR 
KMAIN 
KPAY 
Satisfaction 
CLEAN 
FRIEND 
NEAR 
QUAL 
RECEPT 
WAIT 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
df 
-0.04 
-1.16 
1.85 
0.02 
0.46 
-0.66 
-0.30 
0.02 
0.54 
0.01 
0.03 
1.39 
2.35 
-0.35 
-0.02 
0.64 
0.28 
-0.84 
0.73 
95.75 
19 
power of model 83.68% 
0.93 
0.01* 
0.00* 
0.26 
0.09 
0.04* 
0.50 
0.97 
0.14 
0.03* 
0.01* 
0.04* 
0.00* 
0.26 
0.94 
0.04* 
0.33 
0.02* 
0.24 
<0.05* 
-2.82 
1.53 
-2.77 
0.01 
0.63 
-1.75 
1.28 
0.72 
0.80 
-0.01 
-0.01 
0.64 
0.12 
-0.34 
0.91 
-0.33 
0.20 
-0.01 
2.53 
-0.80 
0.13 
-1.05 
-0.60 
-0.30 
125.11 
24 
81.89% 
0.00* 
0.04* 
0.00* 
0.62 
0.14 
0.00* 
0.02* 
0.21 
0.08 
0.07 
0.44 
0.47 
0.84 
0.45 
0.04* 
0.50 
0.61 
0.99 
0.00* 
0.35 
0.85 
0.22 
0.58 
0.63 
<0.05* 
================================================== 
Note: * = Statistically significant, P-value<0.005 
5.5 Employer knowledge and attitude 
The interviews with managers of 4 firms, the reasons that many clients 
select MEDSEC are because its marketing skills are working well, there are 
a lot of providers in the network, and facilities serve satisfactory 
medical care to workers. The managers know of MEDSEC through various 
means: introduction by the director of a small hospital and by a personnel 
manager of one firm, from a letter and mail voucher sent by the manager of 
MEDSEC office, from a doctor of one clinic, from a facsimile sent by MEDSEC 
office, and from marketing personnel of MEDSEC. Moreover during a year, 
employers are frequently approached by MEDSEC in various ways: frequently 
receiving a document introducing MEDSEC/network about the objective of 
MEDSEC, names and venue of facilities, operating activities, outcome of 
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services, and problems and interventions to solve problems ; receiving 
instruction and explanation of problems, constraints, and questions 
regarding services through direct contact with marketing personnel of 
MEDSEC and directors of MEDSEC facilities; being contacted by telephone 
with MEDSEC nurse and doctor in case of emergency treatment for the worker; 
l annual meeting with the personal manager of firms outside Bangkok which 
include some sightseeing; 2 meetings in Bangkok to understand the process 
of service and to discuss problems in September (before selecting main 
contractor) and February each year; being sent a doctor to treat workers 
in the work place, 2 hours a week. This saves the expense of the firm for 
hiring doctors for this inevitable activity; occasionally being serviced 
by a mobile medical team to serve workers in the firm; and being sent 
vouchers, billboards, and posters related to social security acti vi ties for 
further updating information of workers. This marketing approach of MEDSEC 
has created a warm relationship between the employers and the network. 
Managers tend to select a main contractor that has a network, has more 
facilities in the network, has more specialized hospitals in the network, 
has facilities near to the firm and workers' home, and has service after 
working hours of the workers. Half of the managers (2 persons) have 
considered the workers' satisfaction by giving a questionnaire to their 
workers before choosing the main contractor. Moreover, the employers 
preferred the main contractors that can help their company to increase 
working hours of the worker by reducing absenteeism from sickness and time 
consumed to seek care and decrease company heal th care expenditure by 
reducing the reimbursement of private clinic fees of workers (some 
companies have had this health benefit since before the SSA was enacted) . 
However, from the viewpoint of the manager of Eden firm, the absenteeism 
rate of the worker in the company has decreased by about 3l.3% after 
choosing MEDSEC. This is because the workers can receive care from 
facilities during after working hours. 
All employers denied that there is a direct incentive payment to employers 
if they select MEDSEC. There are some meetings for personal managers of 
firms outside Bangkok plus some sightseeing, and some small gifts to 
employers during new year celebrations. 
The categories of satisfaction of the employers with MEDSEC facilities 
were: prompt treatment for emergency care, less waiting time, availability 
of service after working hours to save worker working hours, cleanliness 
of premises of MEDSEC network, easy access to facilities both from home and 
work place, availability of ambulance service, good referral system to 
. h e hospitals, and less refusal to provide care (less hl.g er car 
discrimination) compared to past experience with public main contractors. 
The categories of dissatisfaction of the employers with MEDSEC facilities 
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were: small setting of hospitals and clinics, less medical equipment in a 
particular setting, different drugs used between the insured/noninsured, 
and changing of general practitioners for a worker over time lead to less 
patient-doctor relationship. Managers commented that public contractors 
provide care mainly during working hours of the workers. This is not 
convenient for either the insured and or the firms. Moreover the insured 
complained that they were not satisfied with the services of public 
contractors. 
5.6 Summary 
More than 50% the workers did not know about uncovered diseases and 
conditions, free of charge emergency care, and benefits under SSA; 22-50% 
of the workers did not know about their main contractor's name, the working 
hours of MEDSEC facilities, or about reimbursement fees for emergency care; 
12.5% of the workers did not know that they have to present Social Security 
card when they receive care; and 93.9% would like to choose their main 
contractors. 
The OP illness rate of the insured of MEDSEC network is 8.18 
episodes/person/year. The IP illness rate is 0.256 times/person/year. The 
admission rate to MEDSEC hospitals is 0.161 times/person/year. IP 
utilization proportion to MEDSEC hospitals is 63%. The proportion OP 
seeking care from MEDSEC facilities is 26.3%. The OP utilization rate was 
2.15 visit/person/year, during November 1994-January 1995. When the 
insured became sick and started seeking care, it is likely that the sick 
insured went back home then sought care. 
Comparing 6 'satisfaction variables', the insured were more satisfied than 
dissatisfied with MEDSEC in all variables, with the highest proportion of 
satisfaction with the cleanliness. The insured were more satisfied with 
MEDSEC care than with experiences with public facilities for all the 6 
variables, with the highest proportion of satisfaction with the waiting 
time. 
Logistic regression was used to analyze factors affecting OP and IP 
utilization rate. Two models, OP first episode and IP models, were 
presented. Variables affecting the probability of receiving OP care were: 
being a worker in Eden and Sahafarm firms; being a manual producer; total 
income/month; working hours/day; and knowledge about social security cards, 
social security benefit, opening hours of MEDSEC facilities, and 
reimbursement of fees for emergency care. For the IP model, variables 
explaining the probability of seeking IP care were: being a worker in 
Almond, Eden and Sahafarm firms; being a manual producer; graduation from 
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primary school; knowledge about emergency services; and satisfaction with 
cleanliness. The power of OP models is 83.68% and IP is 81.89%. 
Results from in-depth interviews with 4 employers shows that the main 
contractor to be chosen should be a network having more facilities and more 
specialized hospitals, having facilities near to the firm and worker's 
horne, and having services after working hours of workers. All employers 
said that there is no direct incentive payment to employers but only some 
meetings outside Bangkok plus sightseeing, and some gifts to employers on 
some occasions. An employer mentioned that after choosing MEDSEC, the 
absenteeism of workers dropped about 30% because of the availability of 
MEDSEC services during after working hours. 
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Chapter 6 
Evaluation of quality of care 
This chapter presents the results from evaluating 4 aspects of quality of 
care of the MEDSEC/Nopparat networks. It begins with the evaluation of 
structural aspects, followed by satisfaction of MEDSEC inpatients and 
prescribing practises at MEDSEC facilities. The final section presents the 
evaluation of inpatient treatment at MEDSEC hospitals. 
6.1 Structure of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
The objective of this section is to assess the quality of care of 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks by analyzing the infrastructure of each of the 
networks. The hypothesis of this section is that the infrastructure of a 
private network is better than that of a publicly-organized network. 
6.1.1 Distribution and coverage of MEDSEC and Nopparat facilities 
- MEDSEC facilities 
In order to review the organization of a provider network under the SSA and 
because the MEDSEC network is the largest network and has expanded over 
time, it is helpful to study the distribution of its facilities and their 
coverage to demonstrate the features of the network. 
In 1995, the insured of MEDSEC were 280,000; 230,000 lived in greater 
Bangkok and 185,445 lived in 35 districts of Bangkok. The mean of number 
of workers covered was 5,298. 4/district and of firms selecting MEDSEC 
network was 48.5/district (table 6.1.1). There were 124 facilities in the 
MEDSEC network, 77 were in Bangkok. The mean of number of 
facilities/district in Bangkok was 2.8. Nine districts had no facility, 
2 districts had ~3,OOO workers but had no facility, 3 districts had ~5,000 
workers/facility. The mean of average workers/facility/district was 
2,533.8+2,609.7. 
MEDSEC facilities were concentrated in the centre and along the main roads 
of Bangkok (figure 6.1). The distribution of facilities can be described 
as in 4 areas: north and northeast of Bangkok for RIG, west and southwest 
for RSG, southeast for EBG, and central for CBG (Figure 6.1). From the 
policy of MEDSEC executive committee, the indicator used to increase the 
number of facilities/district was the number of additional insured over the 
previous year. One additional facility was provided in any district that 
had 5,000 additional insured people compared to the previous year. 
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Table 6.1.1 Number of firms, workers, facilities, and worker/facilities 
by district of Bangkok 
Districts Number of Mean (worker) 
No. firms workers facility /facility 
------------------------------------------------------------
1 10 274 1 274.0 
2 8 757 0 * 
3 165 12694 1 12694.0 
4 20 1007 2 503.5 
5 104 13319 2 6659.5 
6 17 608 0 * 
7 19 814 1 814.0 
8 14 926 2 463.0 
9 6 93 0 8 
10 79 15336 5 3067.2 
11 22 2095 4 523.8 
12 37 6286 6 1047.7 
13 23 1020 0 * 
14 51 2783 1 2783.0 
15 37 2604 2 1302.0 
16 76 7281 3 2427.0 
17 29 6006 0 * 
18 44 3434 3 1144.7 
19 93 6331 1 6331.0 
20 22 3449 0 * 
21 81. 5733 2 2866.5 
22 216 25884 1.2 2157.0 
23 15 1.990 0 * 
24 65 6931 3 2310.3 
25 49 1.0574 4 2643.5 
26 40 6385 4 1596.3 
27 67 13030 3 4343.3 
28 26 3429 1 3429.0 
29 27 5897 4 1474.3 
30 1.4 488 1 488.0 
31 11 925 0 * 
32 15 688 0 * 
33 16 1.269 1 1269.0 
34 8 1841 3 613.7 
35 170 13264 5 2652.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
total 1.696 185445 77 
mean 48.5 5298.4 2.8 2533.8** 
SD 49.3 5639.9 2.4 2609.7** 
Minimum 6.0 93.0 0.0 
Maximum 216.0 25884.0 12.0 
============================================================ 
Note: * = no facility in the district 
** = exclude 9 (no facility) districts 
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Figure 6.1 Mapping of MEDSEC facilities and subnetworks in Bangkok and metropolitan 
- Nopparat facilities 
Figure 6.2 shows the coverage area of the Nopparat network. At the time 
of its establishment, June 1993, it was composed of 36 facilities: 28 
private clinics/polyclinics, 7 Bangkok Metropolitan health centres, and 
Nopparat hospital. There were .2:,2 facilities in a particular target 
district. The number of facilities increased to 50 in 1995: 1 general 
hospital, 2 public community hospitals, 7 Bangkok Metropolitan health 
centres, 1 private small hospital, and 39 private clinics/polyclinics. 
However the coverage area was still 7 districts. From the interview with 
the Nopparat hospital director, the indicator used to increase the number 
of facilities/district was the number of additional firms selecting 
Nopparat network in comparison to the previous year. 
6.1.2 Infrastructure of the MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
Quota technique was used to select 50% of facilities, 61 from the MEDSEC 
and 31 from the Nopparat network. Simple random sampling techniques were 
applied to choose facilities. A postal questionnaire, with a letter from 
the director of the particular network asking the facility managers to 
answer the questionnaire faithfully, were sent to the selected facilities. 
The response rate was 100%. 
This section presents the comparison between 6 clusters of structural 
aspects of the networks. The proportion of MEDSEC clinics in the sample 
is less than for the Nopparat network. The number of MEDSEC hospitals was 
higher than in the Nopparat network but Nopparat had 1 large hospita~ 
(Table 6.1.2). The dominant service for the clinics is outpatient primary 
carei for hospitals with 10-51 beds is outpatient and nonspecialized 
inpatient carei for hospitals with 100-300 beds is general practitioner and 
general specialized (medicine, surgery, obstetrics, and paediatrics) 
outpatient and inpatient carei and for hospitals with >400 beds is general 
practitioner, general specialized, and subspecialized outpatient and 
inpatient care. In the MEDSEC network, 10-30% of patients were insured, 
and in Nopparat 5-20%. 
- General administration cluster 
Characteristics for this cluster were similar for both networks except for 
the proportion having emergency electricity sources and autoclave services 
which were more common in facilities of the MEDSEC network (P-value<0.05, 
table 5A.1.1-5A.1.2, annex 5). For IP information, although there was no 
statistical significant difference, Nopparat had generally better IP 
information than the MEDSEC network. 
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Figure 6.2 Coverage area of Nopparat network in Bangkok 
Table 6.1.2 Characteristics of facilities for MEDSEC(N=61) and 
Nopparat(N=31) facilities in the sample by number of beds registered or 
operated 
Registered Operated 
No of bed MEDSEC Nopparat MEDSEC Nopparat 
------------------------------------------------------------------
0 47(77.0) 25(80.6) 47(77.0) 25(80.6) 
10-51 11(18.0) 5(16.1) 10(16.4) 5(16.1) 
100 2(3.3) 0(0.0) 4(6.6) 0(0.0) 
300 1{1.6) O{O.O) 
420 O{O.O) 1{3.2) 
650 O{O.O} 1{3.2} 
================================================================== 
Note: ----(----} = Number(%) 
Outpatient service cluster 
For OP personnel, the main personnel groups studied were medical doctors, 
registered nurses and technical nurses. In clinics, mean numbers of 
personnel working in MEDSEC facilities were higher than for the Nopparat 
network during 16.30-21.30 and 21.30-6.00 hours except for registered 
nurses. During the shift 8-16.30 hours, mean numbers of personnel were 
similar for the 2 networks. For medical specialist, mean numbers of 
specialist doctors were similar except for OB-GYN doctors with MEDSEC 
having higher number than Nopparat network (P-value<0.05, table 6.1.3). 
For facilities with 10-30 beds, table 6.1.4 demonstrates that staffing 
levels of personnel were similar except for general surgeons, plastic 
surgeons, and orthopaedic doctors where MEDSEC had higher level than 
Nopparat {p-value<0.05}. 
For facilities with >100 beds, mean numbers of personnel and specialist 
doctors of MEDSEC networks were lower than Nopparat hospital except of 
personnel on duty during 16.30-21.30 hours where the MEDSEC numbers were 
higher than the Nopparat network. The mean number of personnel at Nopparat 
hospital during 16.30-21.30 hour was lower than during 21.30-6.00 hour. 
This is likely because during 16.30-21.30 hours the doctors and nurses of 
Nopparat hospital tend to work in their own private clinics which were 
mostly open during 16.30-21.30 hour and there were choices of Nopparat 
network facilities available during that period to serve the insured (table 
5A.1.3, annex 5) . 
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Table 6.1.3 
networks Personnel working in the OP service, for clinics of the 
Mean (SD) 
Variable MEDSEC(N=47) Nopparat(N=25) P-value* 
--------------------------------------------------------------1.Personnel(No), 8-16.30 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 1.0(0.5) 0.8(0.9) 0.09 
- Register Nurse 0.5 (0.7) 1.3(2.7) 0.05 
- Technical Nurse 0.5(0.7) 0.3(0.7) 0.25 2 . Personnel (No) , 16.30-21.30 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 1.3(0.5) 1.0(0.6) 0.01 
- Register Nurse 0.5(0.5) 0.4(0.5) 0.41 
- Technical Nurse 0.4(0.5) 0.2(0.4) 0.03 3 . Personnel (No) , 21.30-6.00 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 0.4(0.5) 0.1(0.2) 0.00 
- Register Nurse 0.1(0.4) 0.0(0.0) ** 
- Technical Nurse 0.1(0.4) 0.0(0.0) ** 4.Medical specialist 
- Medicine 0.8(2.1) 0.2 (0.4) 0.14 
- General Surgery 0.4(0.7) 0.1(0.3) 0.10 
- Plastic Surgery 0.1(0.4) 0.1(0.3) 0.41 
- Orthopaedics 0.2 (0.4) 0.1(0.3) 0.35 
- Paediatrics 0.3(0.5) 0.2(0.4) 0.29 
- OB-GYN 0.7(0.8) 0.2(0.4) 0.00 
============================================================== 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail), 
** No variance for comparison 
Table 6.1.4 Personnel working in the OP service, for facilities with 10-30 
beds of the 2 networks 
Mean (SD) 
Variable MEDSEC(N=47) Nopparat(N=25) P-value* 
--------------------------------------------------------------
1.Personnel(No), 8-16.30 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 2.3(0.9) 3.0(2.0) 0.37 
- Register Nurse 2.8(1.3) 3.0(3.7) 0.88 
- Technical Nurse 1.0(1.2) 0.8(0.4) 0.72 
2. Personnel (No) , 16.30-21.30 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 2.0(1.3) 1.8(0.8) 0.77 
- Register Nurse 2.5(1.6) 1.6(1.5) 0.31 
- Technical Nurse 0.7(0.5) 1.2(0.8) 0.16 
3. Personnel (No) , 21.30-6.00 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 1.2(0.6) 0.6(0.5) 0.10 
- Register Nurse 1.8(1.0) 1.6(1.5) 0.77 
-
Technical Nurse 0.7(0.8) 0.8(1.1) 0.85 
4.Medical specialist 
- Medicine 1.5(0.9) 0.8(0.4) 0.11 
- General Surgery 2.1(1.1) 0.6(0.5) 0.01 
- Plastic Surgery 1.1(0.3) 0.6(0.5) 0.04 
- Orthopaedics 2.1(1.1) 0.8(0.5) 0.03 
- Paediatrics 0.9(0.3) 1.0(0.0) ** 
- OB-GYN 1.2(0.4) 0.8(0.4) 0.11 
============================================================= 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail) 
** No variance for comparison 
The proportions for specialty clinics in facilities of outpatient cluster 
were similar for the 2 networks (P-value>0.05, table 5A.1.4-5A.1.6, annex 
5). Most mean numbers of other variables were similar except of OP room 
and physical examination beds for MEDSEC clinics which were higher than 
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those for the Nopparat network. Also OP visits to MEDSEC small hospitals 
were lower than those for the Nopparat network (P-value<O. OS, table SA.1. 7-
SA.I.8, annex S). For hospitals with ~100 bedded, mean numbers of other 
variables of Nopparat hospital were better than those for the MEDSEC 
network except toilets {table SA.1. 9, annex S}. For other variables of the 
outpatient cluster, most were similar between the networks except the 
proportion of patients receiving care after working hours (17-22 hour) at 
clinics which was higher in the MEDSEC than the Nopparat network (P_ 
value<O.OS, table SA.1.10-SA.1.12, annex S). 
Laboratory and X-ray service cluster 
For the laboratory service, levels of provision for most of the variables 
were similar except the proportion of determining urine analysis, urea and 
electrolyte test, and malaria slide examination which were higher at MEDSEC 
clinics than in the Nopparat network; and the proportion of facilities 
reporting simple test results within an hour which was lower at MEDSEC 
clinics than those of Nopparat (P-value<O.OS, table 6.1.S-6.1.7, SA.1.13 
in annex S). For hospitals, most services listed in table 6.1. S were 
available and showed no difference between the 2 networks. In table 6.1.6, 
the majority of MEDSEC/Nopparat clinics had no laboratory service section 
and specimens were sent to be tested at outside laboratory facilities. 
This demonstrates that clinics tended to invest less capital in laboratory 
services but most could provide necessary tests listed in table 6.1.S. 
However because there was no laboratory on site, most could not provide 
emergency laboratory services. Table 6.1.7 shows that 20% of MEDSEC small 
hospitals had no laboratory service section in facilities while those of 
Nopparat had. This suggests that the MEDSEC hospitals tended to invest 
less capital cost in laboratory service but most facilities of both 
networks could provide necessary tests listed in table 6.1.S. However 
because of the effect of no on site laboratory service section, MEDSEC 
small hospitals had less emergency laboratory services than those of the 
Nopparat network. One of the reasons that the MEDSEC network was able to 
service more tests than the Nopparat network was because the majority of 
tests in MEDSEC were carried out by other private laboratories outside the 
facilities, while in the Nopparat network these were done at the facility 
itself. So they are able to have a wider range of tests serviced than in 
the Nopparat facilities. However this affects the period of time to report 
the simple tests which were longer in MEDSEC than in the Nopparat network. 
For the X-ray service, most of the structures were similar except the 
proportion having emergency X-ray services at clinics where for MEDSEC it 
was higher than in the Nopparat network (P-value<O. OS, table 6.1.8, 
SA.1.14-SA.1.1S in annex S). However (table SA.1.1S, annex S) 2S% of large 
MEDSEC hospitals had no emergency X-ray service while Nopparat hospital 
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had. Items for X-ray services at MEDSEC clinics and age of X-ray machines 
at small MEDSEC hospitals were better than those of Nopparat network~ 
<table 6.1.9-6.1.10); and items of variables at the largest hospitals of 
Nopparat were better than in the MEDSEC network except for the age of X-ray 
machines of MEDSEC which were better than in the Nopparat network (table 
6.1.11) . 
Table 6.1.5 Laboratory services for clinics of MEDSEC (N=47) and Nopparat 
(N=25) networks 
Service available 
Proportion(%) 
MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
----------------------------------------------------------------
-Urine analysis 
-Urea and electrolyte 
-Serum glucose 
-CBC 
-Pregnancy test 
-Malaria slide 
-VDRL 
-Cerebo-spinal fluid microscope 
-Widal test 
-Platelet count 
-Stool microscope 
-Liver function test 
-CSF chemistry 
-Stool culture/sensitivity 
89.4 
74.5 
83.0 
87.2 
97.9 
83.0 
83.0 
29.8 
76.6 
78.7 
83.0 
78.7 
17.0 
27.7 
60.0 
32.0 
68.0 
68.0 
84.0 
56.0 
68.0 
8.0 
52.0 
64.0 
60.0 
68.0 
12.0 
24.0 
0.01 
0.00 
0.25 
0.10 
0.09 
0.03 
0.25 
0.07 
0.07 
0.29 
0.06 
0.47 
0.83 
0.96 
================================================================ 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) . 
- done by facility itself or sending specimens outside 
Table 6.1.6 Characteristics of laboratory section for clinics of MEDSEC 
(N=47) and Nopparat (N=25) networks 
Proportion(%) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
- Laboratory section owned, 
By facility itself 
By other institute 
No laboratory service section** 
- Time consumed to report simple test 
Within hour 
Same day 
By 2 days 
By 3 days 
By more than 4 days 
No laboratory service 
- Technical laboratory quality inspecting 
No laboratory in facility 
Done by facility itself 
Done by external group 
Done by itself and external group 
- Emergency service 
No emergency service 
Done by facility itself 24 hour 
On call come by 1 hour 
23.4 
2.1 
74.5 
12.8 
23.4 
59.6 
2.1 
0.0 
2.1 
27.7 
25.5 
29.8 
17.0 
85.1 
6.4 
8.5 
16.0 0.70 
4.0 
80.0 
16.0 0.00 
16.0 
32.0 
0.0 
16.0 
20.0 
52.0 0.22 
20.0 
20.0 
8.0 
92.0 0.32 
8.0 
0.0 
;=~=~=:==~~;::;;:;;=;::;=:i;~=;:;:~:=~~;;:~;i~~=(;=;:i~)~=============== 
o e. ** Sending to other laboratory outside facility 
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Table 6. J.. 7 Characteristics of laboratory section for hospitals with 10-30 
beds by network 
Variable 
Proportion(%) 
MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
(N=10) (N=s) 
=-~~b~~~~~~-;~;;i;~-;~~d:---------------------------------------------
By facility itself 70.0 80.0 0.52 
By other institute 10.0 20.0 
No laboratory service section** 20.0 0.0 
- Time consumed to report simple test 
Within hour 
Same day 
By 2 days 
By more than 3 days 
- Technical laboratory quality inspecting 
No laboratory in facility 
Done by facility itself 
Done by external group 
Done by itself and external group 
- Emergency service 
No emergency service 
Done by facility itself 24 hour 
On call come by 1 hour 
60.0 
20.0 
20.0 
0.0 
20.0 
20.0 
10.0 
50.0 
50.0 
30.0 
20.0 
80.0 
0.0 
0.0 
20.0 
0.0 
60.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
60.0 
20.0 
0.24 
0.31 
0.47 
==================================================================~====== 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail). 
** Service by sending to other laboratory outside facility 
Table 6.1.8 Characteristics of structure of x-ray cluster for clinics by 
network 
Proportion(%) 
variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value 
- Have ultrasound(Nl=47,N2=25} Yes 12.8 0.0 0.09** 
- Emergency x-ray No emergency service 63.8 96.0 0.01* 
service Result by 2 hour 25.5 4.0 
(NJ.=47,N2=25) other 10.6 0.0 
- X-ray room standard qualified 90.3 71.4 0.22** 
(NJ.=31, N2=7) Not standard 9.7 28.6 
==================================================================== 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail). 
Nl, N2 = Total number of MEDSEC, and Nopparat facilities. 
** Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
Table 6.1.9 Characteristics of structure of facilities of the X-ray 
service cluster for clinics of MEDSEC (N=47) and Nopparat (N=2s) networks. 
Mean (SD) 
variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
J..X-ray service/year (No.) 306.2(340.1} 108.3(300.6} 0.03 
2.X-ray personnel (No. ) 0.9(0.8} 0.3(0.7) 0.00 
3.X-ray personnel trained/year J..1(2.8) O.O(O.O} ** 
(day) 
0.3(0.4) 0.00 4.X-ray machine(No.) 0.7(0.5) 
5.Age of X-ray 
machine set (year) 6.0(2.6) 7.7(2.9) 0.02 
======================================================================= 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail) 
** No variance for comparison 
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Tabl7 6.1.10 Characteristics of structure of facilities of the X-ray serv~ce cluster for hospitals with 10-30 beds of MEDSEC (N=10) (N=S) networks. and Nopparat 
Mean (SD) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat 
~ ~~=~~; -~~~~i~~/;~~~ (~~ ~) ----~;~; ~; (~;;; ~ ~;- ----~;8-.-; (~8-2-.-;)- - - - - - - - - - --
; o~-ray personnel (No 0 ) L 5 (005) 1. 0 (000) 00.\4 
. -ray personnel trained/year 0.9(l.3} 0 2(0 5) 0 28 {day} .. . 
4
s
.
A
x-ray
f
machine(No.) 1.0(0.0) 1.2(0.4) 
. ge 0 X-ray 
** 
.. 8.6 0.9) 0.00 machine set (year) 4 9 (1 6) ( 
;;~~~=:==;:~~;~=;;;l~~=~~;i~~~~=~;~i;~~~~=(;=~~il)==================== 
** No variance for comparison 
Table 6.1.11 Characteristics of structure of facilities of the X-ray 
service cluster for hospitals with >100 beds of MEDSEC (N=4) and Nopparat 
(N=l) networks. -
Mean (SD) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat 
----------------------------------------------------------
1.X-ray service/year(No.} 
2.X-ray personnel (No.) 
3.X-ray personnel trained/year 
(day) 
4.X-ray machine (No.) 
S.Age of first X-ray 
machine set (year) 
6.Age of second X-ray 
machine set (year) 
7.Age of third X-ray 
machine set (year) 
404.8(290.8} 
1.3(0.5} 
0.0(0.0) 
1.8(1.5) 
5.3(5.2) 
4.0(0.0) 
3.0(O.0} 
25000.0 
2.0 
5.0 
3.0 
11.0 
8.0 
5.0 
========================================================== 
Note: -No variance for significant test, 
- Pharmacy cluster 
Table 6.1.12-6.1.14 indicate that most variables in the pharmacy cluster 
were similar except the proportion having a pharmacist and a drug stock 
system which were higher at Nopparat clinics than those of the MEDSEC 
network (P-value<O. 05). Although there was no statistical difference, 75% 
of large hospitals of MEDSEC had no pharmacist, and 50% of these hospitals 
had no expiry date labelled on drug packages while Nopparat hospital had 
(table 6.1.14). 
_ Operation and labour room cluster 
Most characteristics of structures for this cluster were similar between 
the networks except for the proportion having complete emergency sets in 
the OR which was higher in MEDSEC than in the Nopparat networks (P-
value<O.OS, table 5A.1.16-5A.l.17, annex 5). 
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Table 6.1.12 
by network 
Characteristics of structure of pharmacy cluster for clinics 
Proportion(%) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value 
(N=47) (N=25) 
=-~~~i~~-~h~~~~i~~~--------------~~~-----;~~------------------------
. 24.0 0.00** 
- Patlent's name on package Yes 95.7 96.0 1.00** 
- Dosage used on package Yes 95.7 100.0 0.54** 
- Expired date on package Yes 14.9 16.0 0.90* 
- Recheck before delivery No 6.4 16.0 0.42* 
Yes, every time 53.2 48.0 
Yes, sometime 40.4 36.0 
- Drug stock system 
- Air condition at drug stock, 
Yes, some 
Yes, almost every 
Yes, every 
Yes 12.8 60.0 
No 14.9 24.0 
room 53.2 40.0 
room 10.6 8.0 
room 21.3 28.0 
0.00* 
0.62* 
===================================================================== 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
** Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
Table 6.1.13 Characteristics of structure of pharmacy cluster for 
hospitals with 10-30 beds by network 
Proportion(%) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value 
(N=10) (N=5) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Having pharmacist, Yes 50.0 80.0 0.58* 
- Patient's name on package Yes 100.0 100.0 *** 
-
Dosage used on package Yes 100.0 100.0 *** 
- Expired date on package Yes 30.0 20.0 1.00** 
- Recheck before delivery, Every time 70.0 100.0 0.51** 
Sometime 30.0 0.0 
- Drug stock system Yes 100.0 100.0 *** 
- Air condition at drug stock, Some room 30.0 0.0 0.38* 
Almost every room 10.0 20.0 
Every room 60.0 80.0 
===================================================================== 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
** Fisher exact test (2 tail), *** Cannot compute 
Table 6.1.14 Characteristics of structure of pharmacy cluster for 
hospitals with ~100 beds by network 
Proportion(%) 
variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value (N=4) (N=l) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- Having pharmacist, 
- Patient's name on package 
- Dosage used on package 
- Expired date on package 
_ Recheck before delivery 
- Drug stock system 
_ Air condition at drug stock, 
Yes, almost every 
Yes, every 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
room 
room 
25.0 
100.0 
100.0 
50.0 
100.0 
100.0 
25.0 
25.0 
50.0 
100.0 0.40** 
100.0 *** 
100.0 *** 
100.0 1.00** 
100.0 *** 
100.0 *** 
0.0 0.66* 
0.0 
100.0 
====================================================================== 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
** Fisher exact test (2 tail), *** Cannot compute 
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- Inpatient service cluster 
Most characteristics of structural aspects for this cluster were similar 
between the networks except for the mean of % of beds with sphygmomanometer 
(BP) where the % for MEDSEC second ward was higher than for the Nopparat 
network (P-value<O.os, table SA.2.28, annex 5). 
6.2.3 Summary 
The MEDSEC network has a wide coverage of facilities in districts of 
Bangkok with only 9 districts not being covered. There were 2 districts 
which had ~3,000 workers but had no facility and 3 districts had ~S,OOO 
workers/facility. For the Nopparat network, facilities were restricted 
to 7 districts in the east of Bangkok and which provided coverage for the 
insured of ~20 firms/district choosing Nopparat network. The indicator 
used increase facilities/district for MEDSEC was 5,000 additional insured 
over the previous year for 2 additional facility. For Nopparat network, 
it was the number of additional firms selecting Nopparat network from the 
previous year. 
The infrastructure was compared by 6 clusters: general administration, 
outpatient service, laboratory and X-ray service, pharmacy, operation and 
labour room, and inpatient service. Variables for which MEDSEC had a 
better infrastructure than Nopparat network or vice versa are shown in 
table SA. 2.29. In clinics, MEDSEC had better structural variables in 
several clusters than the Nopparat network but in large hospitals, Nopparat 
had better structure than those of the MEDSEC network. For small 
hospitals, both networks were similar for structural quality. 
For the outpatient cluster, the mean numbers of personnel at clinics during 
26.30-6.00 hours (after working hours), and the mean numbers of outpatient 
rooms and examination beds in MEDSEC were higher than in the Nopparat 
network. In small hospitals, MEDSEC had more specialist doctors than 
Nopparat network because, according to MEDSEC policy, small hospitals in 
the network need to have specialist doctors to attract the insured to 
select the MEDSEC network. For large hospitals, the Nopparat network 
generally had better indicators of structure than the MEDSEC network 
because the Nopparat sample hospital was Nopparat hospital which has 420 
beds while the sample hospitals of MEDSEC were all 200 bedded hospitals. 
usually the bigger the size of hospital the better structure is. However, 
since the MEDSEC network tended to provide more services than the Nopparat 
networks after working hours, the personnel during 16.30-21.00 hours at the 
larger hospitals of MEDSEC were more than in the Nopparat network. 
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6.2 Satisfaction of inpatients admitted to MEDSEC and Nopparat hospitals 
This section presents the results from evaluating satisfaction of inpatient 
of MEDSEC/Nopparat hospitals. It concentrates mainly on 4 aspects of 
services provided: medical treatment and care; information and 
communication; ward environment and facilities; and discharge and outcome. 
All the inpatients, 399 workers (S7, 69, S6, 61, 28, and 128 from Rama-
Suksawat, Ram-Intra, Wicharn-Yut, Wipawadi-Rangsit, Parkket, and Nopparat 
hospitals respectively) were interviewed just before being discharged. 
during January-February 1995. The ratio of Male:female of all samples is 
4: 6. However there was no significant difference by gender or MEDSEC 
hospitals in the 4 aspects (table SA.2.1-SA.2.12, annex S), therefore the 
data were pooled. The majority of the workers were married and had 
graduated from primary school. There was no significant difference 
concerning age, marital status, and educational status of the insured 
between MEDSEC/Nopparat networks (table SA.2.13-SA.2.1S, annex S). 
Table 6.2.1 shows that a greater proportion of patients were satisfied with 
outpatients/inpatients general care at MEDSEC than those using the Nopparat 
network (P-value<O.OS). 
Table 6.2.1 Proportion (%) of patients satisfied with general care by 
network 
Level of satisfaction MEDSEC 
(N=271) 
Nopparat 
(N2=128) 
P-value* 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1. Outpatient 
Good 98.S 82.0 0.00 
Fair 1.1 17.2 
Bad 0.4 0.8 
2. Inpatient 
Good 97.8 78.9 0.00 
Fair 1.1 19.5 
Bad 1.1 1.6 
6.2.1 Medical treatment and care 
Table 6.2.2 demonstrates that patients using MEDSEC were significantly more 
satisfied with medical treatment aspects than those using the Nopparat 
network (P-value<O.OS) except for feelings of embarrassment. 
For S levels of satisfaction concerning different groups of personnel, the 
proportion of the insured rating their satisfaction either as 'excellent' 
or 'very good' regarding all groups of personnel, was higher for MEDSEC 
than for the Nopparat network (table 6.2.3). If the 5 level rating scale 
was changed to a 3 level scale by combining excellent and very good, and 
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fair and bad together, the insured were still more highly satisfied at the 
level of excellent and very good in the MEDSEC rather than the Nopparat 
network for all 5 groups (P-value<0.05). 
6.2.2 Information and communication 
The proportion of patients satisfied for all variables concerning 
perception about communication in medical care provided was higher for 
MEDSEC than the Nopparat network (P-value<0.05, table 6.2.4). 
6.2.3 Ward environment and facility 
Levels of satisfaction for all variables concerning perception of the 
inpatient environment and facilities were higher for MEDSEC than the 
Nopparat network (P-value<O. 05) except regarding keeping personal belonging 
(table 6.2.5). 
Table 6.2.2 Patients' perception about medical care by network 
Proportion(%) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1.Explain regulation and 
available facilities 
(Nl=271,N2=128) 
2.Explain before providing 
treatment, (Nl=271,N2=128) 
3.Patient need,considered 
(Nl=271, N2=128) 
4.Made embarrassed 
(Nl=271,N2=128) 
5.Respect patient privacy, 
(Nl=271, N2=128) 
6.Respond for assistance** 
(Nl=182,N2=84), Immediate,<lO 
Quick,10-15 
7.Satisfy to pain 
(N1=226, N2=111) 
Slow, >15 
released** 
8.General satisfaction with 
treatment, (N1=271,N2=128) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Min 
Min 
Min 
Yes 
Yes 
70.5 
80.8 
83.4 
6.6 
78.6 
84.1 
14.8 
1.1 
96.5 
94.8 
46.1 
57.0 
63.3 
11.7 
64.1 
53.6 
25.0 
21.4 
69.4 
82.0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
;~~:==:==~~i:~~:;:=~:~~=:i~~=~:~:~~=~~;;:~~i~:=(;=~:ii)========== 
Nl N2 = Total number of MEDSEC, Nopparat patients 
**'Applied only with relevant inpatients 
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Table 6.2.3 Inpatients' satisfaction with personnel between MEDSEC (N=271) 
and Nopparat (N=128) networks 
Personnel 
Pro]2ortion{%l 
group Excel- Very Good Fair Bad P-value* 
lent good 
--------------------------------------------------------
--------------
Medical doctor MEDSEC 19.9 35.1 33.6 9.2 2.2 0.00 
Nopparat 14.1 19.5 49.2 13.3 3.9 
Nurse MEDSEC 16.6 35.8 32.5 14.8 0.4 0.00 
Nopparat 5.5 10.9 46.1 32.0 5.5 
X-ray & laboratory MEDSEC 25.1 11.8 59.4 3.3 0.4 0.00 
Nopparat 13.3 8.6 52.3 19.5 6.3 
Cleaner MEDSEC 6.6 15.5 47.6 28.8 1.5 0.00 
Nopparat 3.1 12.5 42.2 30.5 11.7 
Other group MEDSEC 9.2 15.9 45.0 29.5 0.4 0.00 
Nopparat 1.6 3.9 57.8 28.9 7.8 
====================================================================== 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
Table 6.2.4 Inpatients' perception about communication in medical care 
provided by network 
Variable 
Pro]2ortion{%l 
MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
(N=2 71) (N=128) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-Doctor & nurse explain 
before providing treatment 
-Doctor's time to explain 
patient's question 
-Nurse's time to explain 
patient's question, 
Satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
Satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
Satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
-Interaction with X-ray & 
laboratory staff Satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
-Relative informed adequately 
-Personnel's time to explain 
relative's question 
satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
Satisfied 
Unsatisfied 
116 
89.3 
10.7 
89.3 
10.7 
95.6 
4.4 
91.1 
8.9 
87.8 
12.2 
80.8 
19.2 
69.5 
30.5 
71.1 
28.9 
75.8 
24.2 
67.2 
32.8 
64.8 
35.2 
61.7 
38.3 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Table 6.2.5 Inpatients' perception about the hospital environment and 
facilities by network 
Proportion(%-) Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
(N=271) (N=128) 
=;~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~------------------;~~~---~;~~-----------------------62.5 0.00 
-Patient bed 
-Cleanliness 
-Food 
-Disturbance while 
sleeping/resting 
-Bothering of ward 
rule 
Fair 
Bad 
Good 
Fair 
Bad 
Clean enough 
Something not clean 
Good 
Not good 
Yes 
No, fine 
No, fine 
Yes, some bothered 
-Place to keep valuable 
personal belonging 
Yes 
No 
12.5 36.7 
0.0 0.8 
90.8 74.2 0.00 
9.2 25. 
0.0 0.8 
70.1 46 .. 9 0.00 
29.9 53.1 
87.1 67.2 0.00 
12.9 32.8 
12.9 27.3 0.00 
87.1 72.7 
93.0 80.5 0.00 
7.0 19.5 
38.0 39.8 0.81 
62.0 60.2 
===================================================================== 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
6.2.4 Discharge and outcome 
A significantly higher proportion of patients were satisfied for all 
variables related to inpatient's perceptions about discharge and outcome 
in the MEDSEC than the Nopparat network (P-value<0.05) except concerning 
written notice given for follow up appointments (table 6.2.6). 
Table 6.2.6 Inpatients' perception about discharge and outcome by network 
Variable 
l. Right time to discharge Yes 
2. Explanation about taking Adequate 
drug at home Not adequate 
3. Explanation to help patient Yes 
getting better at home 
4. Given written notice for Yes 
follow up No notice 
No FU appointment 
5. Perception of health at Better 
discharge Not sure 
Worse 
Proportion(%-) 
MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
(N=271) (N=128) 
96.7 82.0 0.00 
97.0 88.3 0.00 
3.0 11.7 
91.9 75.0 0.00 
80.8 80.5 0.48 
11.1 14.1 
8.1 5.5 
91.9 76.6 0.00 
8.1 19.5 
0.0 3.9 
======================================================================= 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
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6.2.5 Summary 
In this substudy, 399 insured inpatients (271 from MEDSEC and 128 from 
Nopparat networks) were interviewed to compare levels of satisfaction 
between the networks. Higher proportions of inpatients were satisfied with 
33 variables (91.7%) of the 4 aspects of inpatient services in MEDSEC in 
comparison to those using the Nopparat network, except for 3 variables 
(8.3 %): patient feelings of embarrassment, service for looking after 
personal belongings, and written notice given for follow up appointments. 
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6.3 Prescribing analysis for MEDSEC facilities 
The objective of this section is to assess outpatient care at MEDSEC 
facilities by analyzing drug prescriptions between those for the insured 
and noninsured. The hypothesis is that the insured of a private network 
have received less effective drug treatment than the noninsured. The 
result is presented in 2 parts: general analysis of prescriptions and 
prescription analysis for 4 tracers. 
6.3.1 General analysis of prescriptions 
Outpatient prescriptions, 1,845 cases from 4 small hospitals (1 from each 
sub-network), are analyzed. The ratio between male:female patients was 
1:1.5. The insured numbered 1,017, non insured 828. The duration of study 
was 6 months, January-June 1994. Mean of samples of the insured/noninsured 
at each hospital/month was 38.3+53, maximum 45, minimum 30. 
URI was the most common disease among the insured (Table 6.3.1), with the 
highest proportion at 28.7% I followed by gastro- intestinal (GI) tract 
infection (15.1%), surgery and trauma (14.0%) and arthritis (9.3%). For 
the noninsured, surgery and trauma was the most common (21%). 
The mean number of items of drugs/prescription for the insured was higher 
than for the non insured but the price/prescription for the insured was 
lower than that for the noninsured (P-value<0.05) (Table 6.3.2). 
Proportion of items of generic names and essential drugs shared in a 
prescription for the insured were higher than for the noninsured (p-
value<0.05, Table 6.3.3). Table 6.3.4 demonstrates that the proportion of 
patients prescribed with ~1 antibiotic drug and ~1 drug injection 
prescribed for the insured was lower than for the noninsured (p-
value<O. 05) . 
In general, drug use for all diseases/conditions for the insured was more 
rational than for the noninsured by looking at the mean of the proportion 
of items of generic names and essential drugs, and the proportion of ~1 
antibiotic and injection prescribed. 
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Table 6.3.1 
status Proportion(%) of patients by diseases/conditions & insurance 
Disease 
/Conditions 
Insured 
(N=l,017) Noninsured (N = 828) 
Total 
(N =1,845) 
-------------------
-----------------------------------------------------URI 
GI DISEASE 
SURGERY & TRAUMA 
ARTHRITIS 
NERO-PSYCHIC DISEASE 
SKIN DISEASE 
LRI 
EYE, NOSE, EAR, TOOTH 
HPT 
OB-GYN DISEASE 
ENDOCRINE DISEASE 
NO DIAGNOSIS 
OTHER MEDICAL CONDITION 
UTD 
28.7 
15.1 
14.0 
9.3 
8.7 
6.1 
5.6 
3.9 
2.2 
1.8 
1.4 
1.4 
1.0 
0.8 
11.6 21.0 
12.7 14.0 
21.0 17.1 
3.3 6.6 
4.8 6.9 
2.6 4.5 
6.0 5.8 
3.7 3.8 
0.7 1.5 
17.9 9.0 
1.7 1.5 
1.3 5.8 
0.7 0.9 
2.2 1.4 
======================================================================== 
Note LRI=Lower Respiratory Tract Infection 
Table 6.3.2 Mean total number of items of drugs and price by insurance 
status 
Insured Noninsured P-value* 
-----------------------------------------------------
1.Total items 
2.Price,Baht 
2.8(1.3) 
172.8(70.2) 
2.6(1.6) 
280.,0(232.2) 
0.00 
0.00 
===================================================== 
Note: * = T-Test (Pool Variance Estimated), (---) = (SD) 
Table 6.3.3 Mean proportion (%) of items of generic name and essential 
drugs prescribed in a prescription, by insurance status 
-Generic name 
-Essential 
Insured 
38.0-(24.6) 
68.2(32.7} 
Noninsured 
25.2(32.3) 
63.3(28.3) 
P-value** 
0.000 
0.000 
===================================================== 
Note: * = Number of items of generic name prescribed in a prescription x 100 
Total items of drugs prescribed in a prescription 
** = T-Test(Pool Variance Estimated), ----(---) = %(SD) 
Table 6.3.4 Proportion (%) of patients prescribed ~1 antibiotic drug and 
injection by the insured (N=1017}/noninsured (N=828) 
Insured Noninsured P-value* 
------------------------------------------------------
Antibiotic drug 
Injected medicine 
40.5 
7.0 
47.6 
25.0 
0.00 
0.00 
====================================================== 
Note * = Chi Square Test with Yates Correction (2 tail) 
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6.3.2 Prescription analysis of 4 tracers 
- General prescription analysis URI, arthritis, UTD, and HPT were chosen 
as tracers according to the reasons described in chapter 3. The mean of 
number of items of drugs/encounter for the insured with URI and HPT was 
lower than the noninsured; and mean price charged for the URI, arthritis, 
and HPT patients for the insured was lower than the noninsured (P_ 
valuecO.OS) (table 6.3.5). The proportion of items of generic name or 
essential drugs prescribed in a prescription for the insured was higher 
than for the noninsured with URI (P-valuecO. OS, table 6.3.6). However the 
proportion of items of generic names or essential drugs prescribed in a 
prescription for the insured was higher than the noninsured wi th arthri tis, 
UTD, and HPT although there were no significant statistical differences. 
For antibiotics used in the 4 tracers, the proportion of patients who were 
prescribed >1 antibiotic was lower for the insured than the noninsured only 
in URI patients (P-valuecO. 05) (table 6.3.7). Since there is no indication 
to prescribe antibiotics for arthritis and HPT patients yet antibiotics 
were prescribed for both groups with these diseases, this indicates that 
the antibiotics were used irrationally. For medicines given by injection, 
the proportion of >1 drug being given parenterally was lower in the insured 
than in the noninsured with URI, arthritis, and HPT (P-value<O.OS, table 
6.3.8). There was no reason for injectable medicines to be used routinely 
in the 4 diseases: table 6.3.8 indicates that there was irrational drugs 
injection for both groups. However the proportion of patients prescribed 
>1 antibiotic or an injection for the insured was lower than the noninsured 
in all tracers although there was no significant statistical difference. 
In general, the result from 4 tracers shows the same pattern as that for 
all cases except the mean number of items of drugs used (of the tracers, 
the insured received less than the noninsured). It is likely that the 
price/cost of the insured was kept down by limiting number of items of 
drugs prescribed. As the payment system of MEDSEC was a capitation with 
an incentive bonus method related to the number of outpatient visits and 
there was a maximum guideline of OP charge/visit of 170 Baht, in the 
opinion of MEDSEC staff, these factors influenced the behaviour of health 
workers to make more patients return to see doctors more frequently so they 
could split a prescription to be ~2 prescriptions and then charge the 
MEDSEC office consequently. The limitation of number of items of drugs 
prescribed in the "split" prescription might affect the adequacy of 
treatment of a particular patient. 
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Table 6.3.5 Mean number of items of drugs/encounter and price for tracer 
conditions, by insurance status 
URI Arthritis UTD HPT 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total items Insured 3.4(1.1) 2.8(1.1) 2.8(0.7) 2.3(1.3) 
Noninsured 3.9(1.1) 3.1(1.2) 2.3(1.3) 4.0(1.3) 
P-value* 0.00 0.15 0.35 0.01 
Price (Baht) Insured 173.8(49.1) 205.1(93.8) 263.0(132.3) 178.2(68.6) 
Noninsured 261.5(96.8) 317.3(218.0) 272.1(121.2) 361.7(190.9) 
P-value* 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 
========================================================================= 
Note * = T-Test (Pool Variance Estimated), ---(-----) = Number (SD) 
Table 6.3.6 Mean proportion (%) of items of generic names and essential 
drugs prescribed in a prescription for tracer conditions, by insurance 
status 
URI Arthritis UTD HPT 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generic name Insured 42.1*(21.8) 22.7(21.3) 25.8(23.1) 35.9(26.5) 
Noninsured 32.0(22.5} 17.7(25.4) 22.2(30.5) 16.9(30.0) 
P-value** 0.00 0.31 0.77 0.15 
Essential drug Insured 76.3(30.2) 39.2(23.8) 59.8(43.9) 65.8(38.6) 
Noninsured 55.7(22.4) 38.1(29.6) 58.9(23.3) 65.0(18.1) 
P-value** 0.00 0.84 0.95 0.96 
========================================================================= 
Note * = The same as in table 6.3.3 
** = T-Test(Pool Variance Estimated}, - - - (- - - - -) = % (SD) 
Table 6.3. 7 Proportion (%) of patients prescribed .2:.1 antibiotic for tracer 
conditions, by insurance status 
Diseases Insured Noninsured P-value 
---------------------------------------------------
1. URI(290,95} 79.0 93.7 0.002* 
2. Arthritis (94,27) 2.1 11.1 0.07** 
3. UTD(8,18) 75.0 83.3 0.63** 
4. HPT(22,6) 4.5 33.3 1.00** 
=================================================== 
Note - * = Chi Square Test with Yates Correction (2 tail) 
_** = Fisher Exact Test (2 tail) 
_( ____ , ____ ) = (Total Number of the insured, noninsured) 
Table 6.3.8 proportion (%) of patients prescribed.2:.1 dose of injection of 
drugs for tracer conditions, by insurance status 
Diseases Insured Noninsured P-value 
---------------------------------------------------
1. URI 10.7 27.4 0.001* 
2. Arthritis 1.1 29.6 0.000** 
3. UTD 12.5 22.2 1.00** 
4 . HPT 9.1 16.7 
0.000** 
;:~:=:=:==:=~~:=;~:;:=;::~=::~~=;:~::=~:;;::~:::=~2 tail) 
_** = Fisher Exact Test (2 tail) 
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- URI 
In the individual analyses of 4 tracers, all drugs were recorded by their 
generic name, because many different brand names were used in hospitals. 
The prices of individual drugs could therefore not be compared. 
In patients with URI, the proportion with ,2.1 dose of amoxycillin or 
lincomycin prescribed (which are specific drugs for the treatment of 
secondary bacterial infection) of the insured was lower than the noninsured 
(P-value<O.05, table 6.3.9). Table 6.3.10 shows that the mean number of 
tablets for the majority of specific treatment drugs prescribed for the 
insured were lower than for the noninsured (P-value<O. OS). These are: 
amoxycillin, erythromycin, penicillin v· , and symptomatic/supportive 
treatment drugs: paracetamol, antihistamine, cough- suppressor, and lozenge. 
From the standard treatment schedules for URI prepared by the Thai FDA (FDA 
of Thailand, 1988a), the main recommendation is to treat URI by 
symptomatic/supportive care such as rehydration, rest, antipyretic drug, 
antiemetic drug, expectorant, anticough drug, lozenge, and antihistamine. 
Antibiotics are only needed when there is secondary bacterial infection 
which can be detected by prolonged symptoms. 
In this substudy, the proportion of prescription with certain antibiotics 
such as amoxycillin and lincomycin prescribed to the noninsured was higher 
than for the insured but the proportion of ,2.1 dose of symptomatic treatment 
drugs prescribed to the noninsured/insured was not different. This 
indicates that the specificity of drug used for URI patient of the insured 
was better than the noninsured. However when comparisons are made of the 
dose of a particular medicine, the insured received less doses of a 
particular drug (including antibiotics) than the noninsured. This confirms 
that the price/cost of the insured was likely kept down by limitation in 
the dose of a particular drug prescribed. Unfortunately, no data were 
available to confirm that the courses of treatment were split between 
several prescriptions. Some antibiotics prescribed to both the insured or 
noninsured - cloxacillin, lexinor, doxycycline, lincomycin, and kanamycin -
are not appropriate. This indicates the poor quality of care provided to 
both groups. 
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Table 6:3.9 Proportion (%) of URI patients prescribed a particular drug 
by the ~nsured (N=278)/noninsured (N=94). 
Drugs 
Number Proportion(%) P-value 
Insured Noninsured Insured Noninsured 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.Specific treatment drugs*** 
-Amoxycillin(250mg) 145 63 52.2 67.0 0.02* 
-Cloxacillin (250mg) 10 7 3.6 7.4 0.21* 
-Erythromycin (250mg) 17 8 6.1 8.5 0.57* 
-Ampicillin (250mg) 5 2 1.8 2.1 1.00* 
-Penicillin (125mg) 38 5 13.7 5.3 0.05* 
-Cotriamoxazole 11 0 4.0 0.0 0.07** 
-Lexinor(200mg) 2 1 0.8 1.1 1.00** 
-Doxycycline (250mg) 0 2 0.0 2.1 0.06** 
-Lincomycin 22 18 7.9 19.1 0.00* 
-Kanamycin 2 0 0.7 0.0 1.00** 
2.Symptomatic/supportive 
treatment drugs 
-Paracetamol(500mg) 212 77 76.3 81.9 0.32* 
-Antihistamine 123 49 44.2 52.1 0.23* 
-Cough-suppressor 109 39 39.2 41.5 0.79* 
-Expectorant 61 17 21.9 18.1 0.52* 
-Lozenge 40 18 14.4 19.1 0.35* 
======================================================================= 
Note: * = Chi Square Test with Yates Correction (2 tail) 
** = Fisher Exact test (2 tail) 
*** = Used only for secondary bacterial infection 
Table 6.3.10 Mean number of tablets/dose for URI patients by insurance 
status 
Drugs Mean (SD) P-value 
Insured Noninsured * 
------------------------------------------------------
1.Specific treatment drugs 
-Amoxycillin 11.8{2.5) 14.4{3.8) 0.00 
-Cloxacillin 9.6(1.3) 12.0(3.7) 0.07 
-Erythromycin 13.1(3.5) 18.5(5.2) 0.01 
-Ampicillin 11.6(0.9) 11.0(1.4) 0.51 
-Penicillin V 13.4(2.9) 17.4(2.4) 0.01 
-Cotriamoxazole 11.9(0.6) 0.0(0.0) 
-Lexinor 9.0(4.2) 20.0{0.0) 
-Doxycycline O.O{O.O) 10.0{0.0) 
2.Symptomatic/supportive 
treatment drug 
-Paracetamol 14.2(4.5) 17.0(4.2) 0.00 
-Antihistamine 11.5(3.4) 13.4{4.9) 0.00 
-Cough-suppressor 11.1(2.0) 12.4(2.3) 0.00 
-Expectorant 11.4(2.0) 12.6 (3.2) 0.07 
-Lozenge 9.6(3.7) 13.7{6.5) 0.00 
====================================================== 
Note: * = T-test (Pooled Variance Estimate), (---) = (SD) 
total number by each drug prescribed in table 6.3.9 
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- Arthritis 
Most of the drugs were prescribed similarly to the insured/noninsured 
except diflunisal. This was prescribed less frequently to the insured than 
the noninsured (P-value<0.05, table 6.3.11). Considering the doses (table 
6.3.12), the average number of tablets for specific drugs were similar when 
compared between the insured/noninsured except for piroxicam, paracetamol, 
and calcium where the insured were prescribed less than the noninsured (P_ 
value < 0 .05) . 
From standard treatment schedules for arthritis developed by the Thai FDA 
(FDA of Thailand, 1988b), the main recommendation is to treat arthritis by 
use of the nonsteriodal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS), such as ASA, 
ibuprofen, naproxen, ketoprofen, indomethacin, diclofenac, piroxicam etc .. 
The potency of any NSAID is dependent on the response to a particular NSAID 
by an individual patient. Sometimes pain killers such as paracetamol and 
codeine are needed to relieve symptoms. Physical therapy such as heat 
treatment, gentle joint exercise and joint rest, are essential to prevent 
excess joint movement or to decrease excess joint pressure. Antibiotics 
are only needed in rare cases of secondary bacterial infection. In this 
substudy, the drugs prescribed to the insured/noninsured were NSAIDS and 
paracetamol which were the same as recommended in the gold standard. 
Antibiotics were infrequently prescribed for either the insured or 
noninsured. Some drugs prescribed to both the insured or noninsured are 
not indicated: vitamins and diazepam. This indicates the poor quality of 
aspects of care provided to both groups. However, when comparisons are 
made of the dose of a particular medicine, the insured received less doses 
of a particular drug than the noninsured. This shows that the price/cost 
of the insured was likely to be kept down by limiting the drugs prescribed, 
and the dose of a particular drug prescribed for both specific and 
symptomatic/supportive treatment drugs. Nevertheless more expensive 
(/course) drugs such as diclofenac were more prescribed than equally 
effective but cheaper NSAIDS. This was significantly more typical among 
the noninsured (table 6.3.13). 
- UTD 
All drugs prescribed were similar between the insured/noninsured (P-
value<O.05, table 6.3.14), in addition, the doses (table 6.3.15) were also 
similar between the insured/noninsured (P-value<O. OS). Leelarasamee (1994) 
recommends that to treat UTD, it is important that the correct antibiotic 
sensitive to the causative agent is prescribed. Some antibiotics 
prescribed are not appropriate: tetracycline (to the insured) and 
metronidazole (to the insured/noninsured). This indicates the poor use of 
antibiotics. In this substudy, the drugs prescribed and the mean dose of 
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drug prescribed, especially antibiotics for the insured/noninsured, were 
not different. This indicates that in UTD, there was no difference in 
treatment between the insured/noninsured. However as the sample size was 
very small, this result does not exclude real differences. 
Table 6.3.22 Proportion (%) of arthritis patients prescribed a particular 
drug by the insured (N=93)/noninsured (N=26). 
Drugs Number Proportion(%) P-value 
Insured Noninsured Insured Noninsured 
1.Specific treatment drugs 
-Diclofenac 43 25 46.2 57.7 0.42* 
-Ibuprofen 23 6 24.0 23.2 0.36** 
-Indomethacin 20 2 20.8 7.7 1.00** 
-piroxicam 27 4 28.3 15.4 1.00** 
-Diflunisal 0 4 0.0 15.4 0.00** 
-ASA 23 1 24.0 3.8 0.30** 
-Mefenamic acid 6 0 6.5 0.0 0.34** 
-Steroid 9 2 9.7 3.8 0.69** 
-Antibiotic 2 3 2.2 11.5 0.07** 
2.Symptomatic/supportive 
treatment drugs 
-polperisone HCI 22 8 22.6 30.8 0.55* 
-Paracetamol S5 25 59.2 57.7 1.00* 
-Antacid 7 3 7.5 11.5 0.45** 
-Serrapeptase 9 2 9.7 3.8 0.69** 
-Calcium 8 2 8.6 7.7 1.00** 
3.0ther 
-Vitamins 9 3 9.7 11.5 0.72** 
-Diazepam 23 3 14.0 11.5 1.00** 
===================================================================== 
Note * = Chi Square with Yates Correction (2 tail) 
** = Fisher Exact test (2 tail) 
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Table 6.3. ~2 Mean number of tablets/dose for arthritis patients by insurance status 
Drugs Mean (SO) 
Insured Noninsured 
P-value 
* 
-----------------------------------------------------------1.Specific treatment drugs 
-Oiclofenac 1.3.3(3.7) 14.8(2.0) 0.14 
-Ibuprofen 1.1..6(4.3} 14.7(7.8) 0.28 
-Indomethacin ~2.6(2.5) 12.5(3.5) 0.96 
-Piroxicam 9.9(1.4) 12.3(2.6) 0.02 
-ASA 1.4.8(6.1) 20.0(0.0) 
-Diflunisal 0.0(0.0) 9.8(4.5} 
-Mefenamic acid 1.0.0(0.0) 0.0(0.0) 
-Steroid 9.9(2.3) 15.0(0.0) 
2.Symptomatic/supportive 
treatment drugs 
-Polperisone RCI 1.2.4(3.2) 13.1(5.0} 0.63 
-Paracetamol 1.2.0{3.5) 17.7(7.5) 0.00 
-Antacid 1.4.9{2.7) 21.7(7.6) 0.06 
-Serrapeptase 1.2.1(3.4) 10.0(0.0) 
-Calcium 1.4.3(1..2) 22.5(10.6) 0.03 
3.0ther 
-Vitamins ~3.3(3.3) 17.3(4.6) 0.13 
-Diazepam 1.0.8(4.7) 8.7(5.5) 0.51 
=========================================================== 
Note * = T-test (Pooled Variance Estimate), (---) = (SO) 
total number by each drug prescribed in table 6.3.11 
Table 6.3.1.3 Mean cost (Baht) of NSAIOS/prescription of arthritis patients 
by insurance status 
Mean cost** 
Drugs Cost/tablet* Cost/3 days Insured Noninsured 
-Diclofenac 0.26 3.12 3.45 3.84 
-Ibuprofen 0.26 3.12 3.02 3.81 
-Indomethacin 0.~9 2.28 2.39 2.38 
-Piroxicam 0.22 0.66 2.19 2.70 
-ASA 0.10 2.40 1.48 2.00 
-Diflunisal 4.50 27.00 0.00 44.10 
-Mefenamic acid 0.30 2.70 3.00 0.00 
========================================================================= 
Note: * Cost from Ram-Inthra hospital 
** Mean cost = cost/tablet x mean dose 
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Table 6.3.14 Proportion (~) of UTD' , by the insured (N-8)/ ,0 patlents prescrlbed a particular drug 
- nonlnsured (N=17). 
Drugs Number, Proportion(%) P-value 
__________________ Insured Nonlnsured Insured Noninsured * 
1.Specific treatme~~-~~~~----------------------------------------------
-Cotriamoxazole 3 10 
-Tetracycline (250mg) 0 1 37.5 
-Kanamycin 1 1 0.0 
-Lexinor(200mg) 3 3 12.5 
-Metronidazole 1 2 37.5 
2.Symptomatic/supportive 12.5 
treatment drugs 
58.8 
5.9 
5.9 
17.6 
11.8 
0,41 
1.00 
1.00 
0.34 
1.00 
-Antispasmodic 5 8 
-Phenazopyridine HCI 4 3 62.5 47.1 0.67 :::~:~~:::~:~:~~::~====:======---~---------~~:~ ~~:~ ~:~~ 
Note * = Fisher Exact test (;-t~ii)--------=========================== 
Table 6.3.15 Mean number of tablets/l'nJ'ectl'ons d f U ' per ose or TD patlents by insurance status 
Drugs Mean (SD) P-value 
Insured Noninsured 
* 
---------------------------------------------------------
1.Specific treatment drugs 
-Cotriamoxazole 14.0(1.7) 
-Tetracycline 0.0(0.0) 
-Kanamycin 2.0(0.0) 
-Lexinor 14.7(4.6) 
-Metronidazole 12.0(0.0) 
2.Symptomatic/supportive 
treatment drugs 
-Antispasmodic 
-Phenazopyridine HCI 
-Paracetamol 
14.2(5.5) 
15.0(0.0) 
12.0(0.0) 
18.4(6.5) 
10.0(0.0) 
2.0(0.0) 
22.7(6.8) 
8.0(5.7) 
13.3(3.3) 
9.3(3.1) 
18.8(2.5) 
0.28 
0.17 
0.70 
========================================================= 
Note 
- HPT 
* = T-test (Pooled Variance Estimate), (---) = (SD) 
total number by each drug prescribed in table 6.3.14 
Most drugs and doses used were similar between the insured/noninsured 
except that the proportion using diazepam for the insured was lower than 
the noninsured (P-value<O. 05 I table 6.3.17). Considering the dose of drugs 
prescribed (table 6.3.17), most of the doses of drugs used were similar 
between the insured/noninsured except for paracetamol and diazepam where 
the insured were less likely to be prescribed than the noninsured (p-
value<O. 05) . 
Using the recommendations prepared by the Thai FDA as the "gold standard" 
for treatment of HPT (FDA of Thailand, 1988c), then treatment can be 
classified in 4 steps. Patients should be treated in a stepwise fashion. 
The higher step is needed if the hypertension does not respond to drugs 
used. The first step is to use only hydochlorothiazide (HCTZ). If a 
patient has allergic effect with HCTZ, furosemide is an alternative drug. 
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The second step is to use reserpine, 
prazosin, or hydralazine. The dose 
patient's response to a particular 
or methyldopa, or a betablocker, or 
and drug of choice depends on the 
drug. The third step is to use 
guanethidine, or calcium antagonists, or angiotensin converting enzyme 
inhibitor, or minoxidil. The fourth step is to be referred and treated by 
a cardiovascular specialist doctor. In this substudy, drugs used for the 
insured/noninsured were drugs which were similar to those recommended by 
FDA except diazepam. Some other drugs prescribed to either the insured or 
noninsured are not indicated: vitamins and paracetamol. This indicates 
unnecessary prescribing in both groups. However when the doses of a 
particular medicine prescribed are compared, the insured received less dose 
of a particular drug than the noninsured, particularly for 
symptomatic/supportive treatment drugs. This confirmed again that the 
price/cost of the insured was likely to be kept down by limiting of the 
dose of some symptomatic/supportive treatment drugs prescribed. This 
limitation of drugs prescribed did not affect the cure from disease and is 
an indication of more rational drug therapy for the insured patients. 
However the sample size of the noninsured was small and the implications 
from this result should be carefully considered. 
Table 6.3.16 Proportion (%) of HPT patients prescribed a particular drug 
by the insured (N=23)/noninsured (N=5). 
Drugs Number Proportion(%) P-value 
Insured Noninsured * Insured Noninsured 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1..Specific treatment drugs 
-Hydrochlorothiazide 8 4 34.8 80.0 0.13 
-Furosemide 1 1 4.3 20.0 0.33 
-Isosorbide dinitrate 3 1 13.0 20.0 1.00 
-Prazosin 3 1 13.0 20.0 1.00 
-Clonidine HCl 3 0 13.0 0.0 1.00 
-Clopamide 4 0 
-Digoxin 5 0 
17.4 0.0 1.00 
21.7 0.0 0.55 
2.0ther 
- Vi tamins 1 1 4.3 20.0 0.33 
-Paracetamol 6 2 26.4 40.0 0.61 
-Diazepam 7 5 30.4 100.0 0.01 
======================================================================== 
Note * = Fisher Exact test (2 tail) 
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Table 6.3.17 
status 
Mean number of tablets/dose for HPT patients by insurance 
Drugs Mean (SD) 
Insured Noninsured 
P-value 
* 
---------------------------------------------------------
1.Specific treatment drugs 
Hydrochlorothiazide 15.9(11.0) 
Furosemide 12.0(0.0) 
Isosorbide dinitrate 12.0(6.9) 
Prazosin 7.0(0.0) 
Clonidine HCI 10.7(1.2) 
clopamide 9.0(2.4) 
Digoxin 15.4(11.5) 
2.0ther 
Vitamins 
Paracetamol 
Diazepam 
12.0(0.0) 
11.0(1.1) 
8.5(3.5) 
10.0(4.1) 
6.0(0.0) 
15.0(0.0) 
15.0(0.0) 
0.0(0.0) 
0.0(0.0) 
0.0(0.0) 
15.0(0.0) 
17.5(3.5) 
15.4(5.3) 
0.34 
0.00 
0.02 
========================================================= 
Note * = T-test (Pooled Variance Estimate), (---) = (SD) 
total number by each drug prescribed in table 6.3.16 
6.3.3 Summary 
URI was the most common disease among the insured. For all cases, in 
general, the insured were better treated than the noninsured in terms of 
the proportion of items of generic name or essential drugs prescribed in 
a prescription and proportion of prescriptions with ~1 dose of antibiotic 
and injection. From the price and proportion of patients prescribed ~1 
dose of antibiotic and injection, it was likely that the price/cost of the 
insured was kept down by limiting the use of antibiotics and injections. 
However too frequent use of antibiotics and inj ections in a specific 
disease/condition that is not essential causes problems of irrational drug 
use. URI, arthritis, UTD, and HPT were chosen for tracer analysis. In 
general the result from these 4 tracers shows the same pattern as for all 
cases. 
From the dose of drugs prescribed and price charged for URI, arthritis, and 
HPT, it was confirmed again that the price/cost of the insured was ,likely 
to be lower because of limitation of doses of drugs prescribed. As the 
payment system of MEDSEC was capitation method by considering the highest 
number of outpatient visits, facilities tended to require more visits by 
asking the insured patients to see doctors more frequently and then a 
prescription could be split and charged more than once. This might affect 
the adequacy of treatment of the patient. Nonetheless some drugs such as 
diazepam, vitamins, paracetamol, and some antibiotics prescribed to the 
insured/noninsured in the analysis of tracers are not appropriate. It is 
likely that poor quality of treatment was provided to some 
insured/noninsured inpatients. 
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6.4 Analysis of inpatient treatments of the insured/noninsured of MEDSEC 
hospitals 
The objective is to analyze the process aspect of the quality of inpatient 
treatment by analyzing medical records at MEDSEC hospitals, and to 
investigate issues related to outcome of medical treatment for 1 disease 
by postal questionnaire, with comparison between insured/non insured of 
MEDSEC network. The hypothesis of this substudy is that insured inpatients 
of a private network have received less effective treatment than noninsured 
inpatients due to the effect of payment method in the comparison groups. 
The result is presented in 2 parts: general analysis of medical records and 
analysis of 2 tracers, diarrhoea and appendicitis. 
6.4.1 General analysis of medical record 
The records of 807 inpatients admitted to 4 selected hospital during July-
October 1994 were analyzed: 363 were the insured and 444 were noninsured; 
280, 248, 195, and 84 were admitted at Rama-Suksawat, Ram-Inthra, 
Wipawadi-Rangsit, and Wichan-Yut hospitals respectively. 
Using the inpatient casemix classification of the MOPH of Thailand adapted 
from ICDI0, the casemix was classified. The highest proportion of patients 
admitted was for diarrhoea (17.5%), followed by skin disease (12.4%), other 
intestinal disease (12.1%), other accident (8.2%), musculo-skeleton disease 
(7.9%), URI (7.6%) etc. (table 6.4.1). Classifying the casemix by 
hospitals, the proportions of casemix distribution compared between 
hospitals was generally similar. 
Table 6.4.1 Inpatient admittance by diseases/conditions & insurance status 
Proportion(%) 
Diseases 
/Conditions 
Insured Noninsured 
(N=363) (N=444) 
Total 
(N=8 07) 
-----------------------------
---------------------------
Appendicitis 
Diarrhoea 
Other intestinal disease 
URI 
LRI 
Eye, Ear disease. 
Cardiovascular d~sease 
Skin disease 
Musculo-skeleton disease 
OB-GYN 
Car accident 
Other accident 
Other disease 
5.2 
22.6 
12.9 
8.3 
1.4 
3.0 
5.8 
7.4 
8.8 
5.8 
7.2 
6.1 
5.5 
5.2 
13.3 
11.5 
7.0 
0.7 
2.9 
3.4 
16.4 
7.2 
9.0 
4.5 
9.9 
9.0 
----------
--------------------------------
Total 45.0 55.0 
5.2 
17.5 
12.1 
7.6 
1.0 
3.0 
4.5 
12.4 
7.9 
7.6 
5.7 
8.2 
7.4 
-----------
100.0 
===================================== 
=================== 
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The mean IP charges for the insured were lower than for the noninsured both 
for all cases and by groups of disease/condition (P-value<O. OS, table 
6.4.2, 6.4.3). The mean charge was similar between 4 hospitals by diseases 
/conditions both overall and by the insured/noninsured. Since there were 
no differences in casemix and charge, the samples from 4 hospitals were 
pooled. The reason why the mean charge for the insured was lower than that 
for the noninsured is likely to be because a maximum allowable charge by 
disease/condition is set for the insured. 
6.4.2 Analysis of medical records 2 tracers 
- Diarrhoea 
The records of 126 inpatients with diarrhoea were analyzed; 72 were the 
insured and 54 were the noninsured; 38, 36, 32, and 20 were from 
Rama-Suksawat, Ram-Inthra, Wipawadi-Rangsit, and Wichan-Yut hospitals 
respectively. All cases were treated until recovery. None were referred. 
Tables 6.4.4-6.4.6 indicate that there was no difference in age, 
signs/symptoms 
examination by 
difference in 
of diarrhoea, severity, stool feature, and laboratory 
the insured/noninsured (P-value~O. 05) . There was no 
these variables by hospital both overall and by the 
insured/noninsured. Stool culture was not done in all cases. This is 
rational for diarrhoea cases because stool culture is not recommended 
routinely. 
Table 6.4.2 Average charge (Baht) for inpatient by insurance status 
Insured 
Noninsured 
Total 
Number 
363 
444 
807 
SD 
4727.9 
5036.3 
5067.6 
Min. 
240.0 
2210.0 
240.0 
Max. 
33640.0 
24600.0 
Mean 
4058.0 
6677.5 
33640.0 5499.2 
P-value* 
0.00 
======================================================================= 
Note: * = T-test pooled variance estimated 
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Table 6.4.3 Average price (Baht) for inpatient by disease/condition & 
insurance status 
Diseases/conditions Insured Noninsured P-value* 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendicitis (NI=19,N2=23) 
Diarrhoea (N1=82,N2=59) 
Other intestinal disease (N1=47,N2=51) 
URI (NI=30,N2=31) 
LRI(N1=5,N2=3) 
Eye, Ear disease(NI=11,N2=12) 
Cardiovascular disease (N1=21,N2=15) 
Skin disease (Nl=27,N2=73) 
Musculo-skeleton disease(NI=32,N2=32) 
OB-GYN (NI=21,N2=40) 
Car accident (N1=26,N2=20) 
Other accident (N1=22,N2=44) 
Other disease(NI=20,N2=40) 
14105.3(2081.8) 
2218.9(1701.8) 
3219.7(2729.6) 
2506.7(1790.9) 
4606.0(2787.1) 
1415.9(1540.5) 
2828.6(2703.3) 
2548.8(2923.4) 
3532.8(2834.1) 
6748.7(6469.9) 
6730.4(7202.2) 
6224.1(8044.4) 
3190.0(3007.9) 
19969.4(1390.8) 
3500.9(1283.1) 
5021.7(3698.8) 
4187.3(1653.7) 
8833.3 (793.9) 
2567.6(824.1) 
5833.1(2174.7) 
4395.4(4023.5) 
6313.7(3096.5) 
9681.3 (4036.8) 
12924.5(3269.1) 
9158.8(3646.7) 
4907.0(2514.6) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.04 
0.02 
Total (NI=363,N2=444) 4058.0(4727.9) 6677.5(5036.3) 0.00 
============================================================================== 
Note: * = T-test pooled variance estimated, ----(----) = mean(SD) 
NI, N2 = Number of the insured, and noninsured 
Table 6.4.4 
status 
Characteristics of inpatients with diarrhoea by insurance 
Mean (SD) 
Variable Insured Noninsured P-value* 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. History 
-Age (year) (Nl=70,N2=54) 
-Duration between diarrhoea 
29.1(7.8) 
1.0(0.4) 
and hospitalization (day) (N1=72,N2=54) 
-No of stool in 24 hours (Nl=70,N2=54) 5.2(2.9) 
-LOS (Days) (N1=72,N2=54) 2.0(0.7) 
28.5(7.6) 
0.7(1.5) 
5.3(3.8) 
2.2(0.9) 
0.66 
0.10 
0.96 
0.28 
2. Physical Exam 
-Temperature ( °C) (Nl=72,N2=54) 37.1(0.8) 37.1(0.7) 0.48 
-Pulse Rate/Min. (N1=72,N2=54) 83.4(8.4) 85.1(16.5) 0.44 
-Respiratory Rate/Min. (N1=72,N2=54) 20.6(1.6) 20.4(1.7) 0.61 
======================================================================== 
Note: * = T-test pooled variance estimated, 
N1, N2 = Number of the insured, and noninsured 
Table 6.4.5 Stools feature of diarrhoea patients by insurance status 
Feature Insured 
(N=70) 
Proportion(%) 
Noninsured 
(N=54) 
Total 
(N=124) 
P-value* 
-~~~~~---------------~~~~-------~;~;--------~~~~-----;~~~-----
Watery 37.1 46.3 41.1 
Loose+Watery 1.4 1.9 1.6 
0.0 1.9 0.8 MucouS 
--------------------------------------------------------------
100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 
;~~::==:=:==~~i:;~:;:=~:;~=:i~~=;:~:=~~;;:~~i~~=(;=~:i~:~)=== 
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Table 6.4.6 
status Items carried out for patients wl.'th d' h l.arr oea by l.nsurance 
Variable 
Proportion{%") 
Insured Noninsured P-value 
(N=72) (N=54) 
----------------------------------------
--------------------1. History 
-Temperature ~38° c 87.5 85.2 0.91* 
<38 0 c 12.5 
-Abdominal Pain, Yes 9.7 
14.8 
3.7 0.34* 
-Abdominal Cramp, Yes 70.8 85.2 0.09* 
-Dyspepsia, Yes 1.4 3.7 0.56** 
-Vomiting, Yes 61.1 59.3 0.98* 
2. Physical Examination 
-Blood Pressure, Shock 4.2 1.9 0.63** 
Normal 95.8 98.1 
3. Laboratory 
-Stool Examination Done 13.9 5.6 0,22* 
-Stool Culture Done 0.0 0.0 
============================================================ 
Note: * = Chi-square test with Yate Correction (2 tailed) 
** = Fisher exact test (2 tailed) 
There was no difference in drugs used in the treatment for patients with 
diarrhoea between the 4 hospitals both overall and by the 
insured/noninsured. The insured received fewer items of drugs including 
ORS, kaopectin, and tetracycline than the noninsured (table 6.4,7) i but the 
proportion used of the drugs - antispasmodic and lexinor - was higher for 
the insured than for the noninsured (P-value<0.05). For antibiotic drugs 
used in inpatients in Thailand, the most effective antibiotic is lexinor 
(table 5A.4.1, annex 5) and the treatment/course is cheaper than other 
antibiotics. For antispasmodic drugs, it was used to relieve abdominal 
pain. So it is likely that the treatments were more effective for the 
insured than for the noninsured. Since the payment for inpatients in the 
network are FFS with maximum limitation, while there was no maximum 
limitation for the noninsured, it was likely that the price/cost of the 
insured was kept down by limiting the use of ORS, kaopectin, and 
tetracycline. 
Applying the rating scale for effectiveness of drugs prescribed suggested 
by 7 medical specialists and the cost of drugs used at Ram-Inthra hospital 
(table SA.4.1-SA.4.2, annex 5), the total drug cost/day and the drug cost 
of non, low, moderate, and high effectiveness drugs used/day for patients 
with diarrhoea were calculated. The mean cost/day of highly effective and 
ineffective drugs used for the insured was lower than for the noninsured, 
and the proportion of cost-effective drugs used for the insured was higher 
than the noninsured (P-value<0.05, table 6.4.8). This indicates that the 
treatment of the insured was more cost-effective than of the noninsured, 
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Table 6.4.7 Proportion of patients with diarrhoea by drug prescribed & insurance status 
Drugs Insured 
(N=72) 
Noninsured 
(N=54) 
P-value 
-------------------------------------------------------
-ORS, Yes 43.1 83.3 0.00* 
-IV, Yes 97.2 100.0 0.51** 
-Anti-emetic, Yes 55.6 44.4 0.29* 
-Antispasmodic, Yes 66.7 31.5 0.00* 
-Paracetamol, Yes 19.4 16.7 0.87* 
-Cimetidine, Yes 6.9 7.4 1.00* 
-Kaopectin, Yes 23.6 51.9 0.00* 
-Imodium, Yes 45.8 48.1 0.93* 
-Antiflatulent, Yes 18.1 16.7 1.00* 
-Vitamin, Yes 1.4 7.4 0.16** 
-Lexinor, Yes 59.7 35.2 0.01* 
-Cotrimoxazole Yes 11.1 13.0 0.97* 
-Gentamicin, Yes 1.4 3.7 0.58** 
-Tetracycline, Yes 1.4 29.6 0.00* 
-Metronidazole, Yes 1.4 3.7 0.80* 
-Ampicillin, Yes 1.4 1.9 1.00** 
-Doxycycline Yes 1.4 0.0 1.00** 
-Amoxycillin, Yes 0.0 1.9 0.43** 
===================================================== 
Note: * = Chi-square test with Yate Correction (2 tailed) 
** = Fisher exact test (2 tailed) 
Table 6.4.8 Mean of total cost/day; mean of cost/day of high, moderate, 
low effective, and ineffective drugs prescribed to patients with diarrhoea 
by insurance status 
Insured 
(N=72) 
Noninsured P-value 
(N=54) * 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Total cost/day 92.3(16.1) 96.1(5.9) 0.10 
-Cost/day of high effective drug 82.0(14.4) 87.3(2.8) 0.01 
-Cost/day of high & moderate 89.4(15.5) 91.4(6.1) 0.36 
effective drug 
-Cost/day of high, moderate, and 90.4(15.7) 92.9(6.0) 0.27 
low effective drug 
-Cost/day of ineffective drug 1.9(2.7) 3.2(3.1) 0.01 
-Proportion of cost-effective drugs used** 98.0(2.7) 96.7(3.1) 0.01 
========================================================================= 
Note: * = T-test pooled variance estimated, ----(----) = mean (SD) 
** = Cost/day of high, moderate, and low effective drug x 100 
Total cost/day 
- Appendicitis 
The records of 41 inpatients with appendicitis were analyzed; 18 were the 
insured and 23 noninsured; 11, 13, 13, and 4 were from Rama-Suksawat, 
Ram-Inthra, Wipawadi-Rangsit, and Wichan-Yut hospitals respectively. 
Tables 6.4.9-6.4.10 indicate that patient's age, temperature, LOS, time 
between admission and surgery, and sex distribution between the 
insured/noninsured were similar (P-value>0.05). There was also no 
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difference in these variables by hospital both overall and by the 
insured/noninsured. Table 6.4.9 illustrates that the appendicitis patients 
had no complication because the average of LOS of the insured and 
noninsured was similar and short (4.6 days) and the mean time between 
admission and surgery was also short (5.7 and 6.8 hour). As mentioned in 
chapter 3, appendicitis is relatively easy to diagnose because it has 
definite signs/symptoms and there is a well-defined and standard treatment, 
therefore the medical condition of the insured/non insured for this substudy 
were comparable. 
Most of the other characteristics of appendicitis patients were similar 
except the proportion who had been asked history of diarrhoea, had a 
pathological examination, and had a record of the surgical operation notes 
which were higher for the insured than the noninsured (P-value<0.05, Table 
6.4.10). All of which indicate a better quality of care with regard to the 
adequacy of completion of these process indicators. 
A rating scale related to the process of care for acute appendicitis 
mentioned in section 3.8.5. was applied. According to the classification 
of the 5 points rating scale (0-5 score), less important (0 score) and more 
important (5 score) process items relevant to the quality of treatment of 
patients (table SA.4.3, annex 5), means scores of process activities of 
appendicitis patients were calculated. The mean score of having diarrhoea 
history asked, having pathological section examined, and total score of all 
variables was higher for the insured than for the noninsured (table 
6.4.11) . An important reason affecting the result is that the medical 
records of insured inpatients were generally more complete than for the 
noninsured. This is because facilities have to attach a copy of the 
complete inpatient record to send to the MEDSEC office to request payment 
of the fee while for the noninsured they do not have to. This regulation 
clearly encourages a good quality process of care. It helps ensure that 
certain variables such as history taking records, physical exam records, 
laboratory investigated reports, complete nurse note, anaesthetic note, and 
a note of the surgical operation, are more complete for the insured than 
the noninsured. 
Table 6.4.9 Characteristics of patients with appendicitis by insurance 
status 
Variable Insured 
(N=18) 
Mean (SD) 
Noninsured 
(N=23) 
P-value* 
-----------------------------------------------------------
-Age (year) 
-Temperature ( °C) 
-LOS (day) 
-Time between admission 
and surgery(hour) 
27.2(7.2} 
37.3(0.5) 
4.6(1.8} 
6.8(5.0) 
23.8(5.1) 
37.4(0.5) 
4.6(1.8) 
5.7(4.2) 
0.08 
0.50 
0.87 
0.45 
=========================================================== 
Note: * = T-test pooled variance estimated 
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Table 6.4.10 
status Characteristics of patients with appendicitis by insurance 
Variable 
Proportion (%) 
Insured Noninsured P-value 
(N=18) (N=23) 
------------------------
--------------------------------
-Sex, 
-Vomiting, 
-Diarrhoea, 
Male 
Female 
Ask 
Ask 
-Abdominal pain, Ask 
-Temperature, ~38 DC 
<38 DC 
-Abdomen palp, Done 
-Rectal Exam, Done 
-CBC Exam, Done 
-Urine Analysis, Done 
-Patho. Exam, Sent 
-Nurse note, Complete 
33.3 
66.7 
55.6 
33.3 
100.0 
27.8 
72.2 
100.0 
38.9 
100.0 
61.1 
44.4 
55.6 
-Anaesthetic note,Done 100.0 
-Surgical note, Done 100.0 
39.1 
60.9 
39.1 
4.3 
100.0 
30.4 
69.6 
100.0 
21.7 
87.0 
82.6 
4.3 
78.3 
100.0 
34.8 
0.96* 
0.46* 
0.04* 
1.00* 
0.39* 
0.24** 
0.24* 
0.01** 
0.23* 
0.00* 
======================================================== 
Note: * = Chi-square test with Yate Correction (2 tailed) 
** = Fisher exact test (2 tailed) 
Table 6.4.11 Mean scores for process activities recorded for inpatients 
with appendicitis by insurance status 
Variable Insured 
(N=18 ) 
Noninsured P-value* 
(N=23) 
-------------------------------------------------------
-Vomiting 
-Diarrhoea 
-Abdominal pain 
-Temperature 
-Abdominal palpation 
-Rectal Exam 
-CBC Exam 
-Urine Analysis 
-Pathological Section 
-Nurse Note 
-Anaesthetic Note 
-Surgical Note 
-LOS 
-Time Between 
Admission & Surgery 
1.3(1.5) 
0.9(1.0) 
5.0(0.0} 
2.0(0.0) 
5.0(0.0) 
1.7(1.5} 
4.0(0.0) 
1.8(1.5} 
2.2(2.6) 
1.1(1.0) 
5.0(0.0) 
5.0(0.0) 
3.3{1.0} 
3.9(1.3) 
2.2(1.3) 
0.2(1.6) 
5.0{0.0) 
2.0{0.0) 
5.0{0.0) 
0.7(1.3) 
3.5{1.4) 
2.5(1.2) 
0.2(1.0) 
1.6{0.8) 
5.0(0.0) 
1.7(2.4) 
3.6(0.9) 
4.1{1.1) 
0.06 
0.01 
0.24 
0.13 
0.00 
0.13 
0.43 
0.51 
-------------------------------------------------------
Total Score 41.8(3.6) 37.2(4.8) 0.00 
======================================================= 
Note: * = T-test pooled variance estimated, ----{----) = mean(SD) 
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In order to evaluate treatment of appendicitis, an indication of their 
outcome of treatment was sought by mailing a postal questionnaire to every 
patient included in the sample several weeks after discharge from 
hospitals. Twenty eight out of 41 questionnaires were completed and 
returned; some workers had left their job and some companies had closed. 
Analysis of these questionnaires indicate that the mean of age, sex, number 
of days before they felt healthy after discharge, and the number of days 
before returning to work after discharge of the insured/noninsured were 
similar (table 6.4.12-6.4.13). Importantly table 6.4.13 also illustrates 
that the proportion having fever, infected wound, and anorexia/vomiting 
after discharge was lower for the insured than the non insured (P-
value<O.05) . 
Giving a score of 1 for each symptom which occurred within 1 month after 
discharge, the total score of symptoms for both groups was calculated. The 
mean score of symptoms for the insured was lower than for the non insured 
(P-value<O.05, table 6.14). Although symptoms of complications for the 
insured were less than for the noninsured, interpretation of the result 
should be very cautious due to the small sample sizes (14 numbers of the 
insured, 14 noninsured). However the proportion (%) who perceived the 
quality of medical services was not different by the insured/noninsured 
(table 6.4.15). 
Table 6.4.12 Characteristics of patients with appendicitis by insured 
(N=14)/noninsured (N=14) (data from mailed questionnaire) 
Mean (SD) 
variables Insured Noninsured P-value* 
------------------------
-------------------------------------------
-Age (years) 
-Healthy after discharge(day) 
-Back to work after discharge(day) 
24.8(4.5) 27.0{8.0) 
55.2(43.7) 56.8{49.3) 
16.0{5.3) 57.5{74.4) 
0.38 
0.93 
0.05 
=========================================== ;~~:7=:==:=;:~:;~=;~~i:d variance estimated 
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Table 6.4.13 G~nder and symptoms occurring within 1 month after discharge 
for patients w1th appendicitis, from mailed questionnaire, by insurance 
status 
Pro}2ortion {%} 
Variables Insured Noninsured P-value 
(N=14) (N=14) 
------------------------
-------------------------------
-Sex, Male 35.7 28.6 1.00* 
Female 64.3 71.4 
-Fever, Yes 0.0 50.0 0.00** 
-Micturition, Yes 18.2 18.2 1.00** 
-Infected wound, Yes 0.0 38.5 0.02** 
- Cough (sputum) , Yes 28.6 16.7 0.65** 
-Anorexia/vomit, Yes 0.0 33.3 0.03** 
-Abdominal pain, Yes 23.1 66.7 0.07* 
-Diarrhoea/dysentery, Yes 7.1 8.3 1.00** 
-Hiccough, Yes 7.7 9.1 1.00** 
======================================================= 
Note: * = Chi-square test with Yate Correction (2 tailed) 
** = Fisher exact test (2 tailed) 
Table 6.4.14 Mean score of symptoms occurring within 1 month after 
discharge for patients with appendicitis, from mailed questionnaire, by 
insurance status 
Number SD Min. Max. Mean P-value* 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Insured 
Noninsured 
10 
11 
0.6 
1.7 
0.00 
0.00 
2.0 
5.0 
0.8 
2.1 
0.04 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 21 1.4 0.00 5.0 1.5 
=================================================================== 
Note: Given 1 score for 1 symptom occurred 
Table 6.4.15 Patients' perceptions of quality of hospital care for 
appendicitis by insurance status, from mailed questionnaire 
Proportion (%) 
Perception Insured Noninsured P-value* (N=14) (N==14) 
--------------------------------------------------------
-Very good, disease cure 
-Not good, not cure 
-Don't know 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
85.8 
7.1 
7.1 
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0.34 
6.4.3 Summary 
The 
the 
was 
most common diagnosis for inpatients of the study hospitals, both among 
insured and all cases, was diarrhoea. The mean charge for the insured 
lower than for the noninsured both for all cases and by separate 
diseases /conditions. This is likely to be because there was a limitation 
to the maximum charge by disease/condition only for the insured. 
The inpatient records, 126 diarrhoea and 41 appendicitis, for 2 tracers 
were analyzed. For diarrhoea, facilities tend to use more effective drugs 
such as lexinor and antispasmodic with the insured more than the 
noninsured. It was likely that the price/cost of the insured was kept down 
by limiting use of ORS, kaopectin, and tetracycline. Applying the rating 
scale of effectiveness of drugs used and the cost of drugs used, the 
treatment for the insured was more cost-effective than for the noninsured. 
For appendicitis, the proportion who had been asked history of diarrhoea, 
had a pathological examination, and had a record of the surgical operation 
notes were higher for the insured than the noninsured. All of these 
indicate a better quality of treatment regarding the adequacy of completion 
of the process indicators. The important reason influencing the result is 
that the medical records of insured inpatients were generally more complete 
than for the noninsured due to the request of MEDSEC to attach a completed 
copy of the records of the insured. This regulation explicitly encourages 
good quality processes of treatment. The result from the postal 
questionnaire shows that the mean score of complication symptoms of the 
insured was lower than the noninsured. This indicates that the inpatient 
cares for the insured was better than for the noninsured. However 
interpretation of the result should be cautious since the sample size was 
small. Nevertheless the proportion (%) of perception of patients with 
appendicitis regarding quality of medical care was not different by 
insurance status. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and policy recommendation 
This chapter is in 3 sections. The first section discusses the 
methodology. The second section discusses the main findings from chapters 
4-6. Moreover, supplementary data to illustrate more the findings are 
discussed. The last section identifies the policy recommendations for 
health care provider networks. 
7.1 Methodology 
7.1.1 Comparison groups 
The main aim of this study was to evaluate the MEDSEC network. To 
accomplish a reliable result, comparison groups were applied for specific 
substudies. In the evaluation of satisfaction of inpatients, there was 
only 1 sample hospital for the Nopparat network. Since Nopparat hospital 
was the only hospital in the network providing secondary/tertiary care, 
this limited the result from this substudy. Application of the conclusions 
from this substudy should be cautious. 
7.1.2 Administering of postal questionnaire 
In structural evaluation, mailed questionnaires were sent to only 50% of 
the facilities because of budgetary limitations. Since the response rate 
was usually poor, to maximise returns, a letter from the director of the 
related network was sent to request facility managers to answer faithfully 
because the answers would be used for monitoring the structure of that 
particular facility. If the structural quality of facilities was over 
estimated, it might cause problems in the next evaluation and then the 
facility might be withdrawn from the network. Using this technique, 100% 
of completed questionnaires were returned. 
For evaluation of inpatient satisfaction, due to poor response (30%) to 
postal questionnaires in Thailand, a postal questionnaire was not used 
although this is the most effective means for satisfaction study, instead, 
interviews were conducted with the inpatients on the last day of admission. 
Using interviews, it is likely that the insured tended to answer more 
positively when they were in the hospital. As this method was used in both 
networks, the positive effect was influenced across all samples, therefore 
the comparison in this case is relevant. However, interpretation and 
application of degree of satisfaction should be carefully made. 
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In the analysis of inpatient treatment, the outcome of treatment of 
appendicitis patients was investigated by using postal questionnaires. 
During data collection, some companies were closed and some patients 
changed their working place and horne. This caused the sample size to be 
too small (28). Hence the comparison was limited. 
7.1.3 Casemix of prescribing and inpatient treatment evaluation 
In these 2 substudies the proportions of patients by diseases/conditions 
were different between the insured/noninsured. This unexpected data skewed 
the results of comparison. However the tracer analysis method was applied 
to control this bias. In general, the result from the tracer analysis was 
sound and useful. 
7.1.4 Memory recall and perception of patients' satisfaction 
Regarding the assessment of satisfaction of the insured from the interviews 
according to whether the insured were happier when they were with MEDSEC 
than they were before (section 5.3), there was a limitation of memory 
recall and perception of satisfaction of the insured. However in section 
6.2, the satisfaction of the inpatients of MEDSEC/Nopparat networks were 
compared. The interpretation and application of this result provides 
useful additional information to that from section 5.3. 
7.1.5 Tracer analysis 
In the analysis of drug prescriptions and inpatient treatment, a tracer 
analysis was applied. All tracers were selected by using criteria 
described by Kessner et ale (1973). Unfortunately, the samples of some 
tracers analyzed (UTI and HPT in drug prescription analysis, and 
appendicitis in inpatient treatment) were too small for comparison and 
affected the result. 
7.1.6 Validity of secondary data 
The secondary data about the MEDSEC network consisted of the financial 
control reports of the network, which were summarised from monthly payment 
records to all parties. For Nopparat network, the secondary data were 
collected from yearly published reports of the network which were accurate 
and reliable. The validity of these data was credible. 
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7.2 Main findings 
7.2.1 Organization of MEDSEC network 
The referral system and administrative organization of the MEDSEC network 
was divided into 4 subnetworks. This arrangement had advantages since, in 
Bangkok, the movement of ambulance vehicles to refer patients is restricted 
by poor traffic. A subnetwork office can be a subcentre for the MEDSEC 
office to manage quality assurance of facilities. Since the bonus system 
base was mainly calculated by subnetwork, subnetworks try to be fund 
holders of firms so they can receive the surplus of bonus at the end of the 
year. To achieve the surplus of bonus for a firm, subnetworks have to 
control clinics and small hospitals in the subnetworks to prevent 
overcharging, overinvestigating, and overtreating of patients by review the 
prescriptions and medical records in terms of quality of care and charge. 
The subnetworks tend to reject the charge that there are higher than the 
maximum OP charge rates and the IP standard charge rates. Further 
discussion about charge and payment is presented in section 7.2.2. To be 
a fund holder, subnetworks have to encourage the facilities to provide 
services with satisfactory care to the insured so as to maintain their 
clients and consequently to accomplish the highest number of visits. It 
is likely that the organizational structure encourages facilities to 
provide care as much as possible. The evidence of competing tendencies to 
keep down the charge and to satisfy the clients are discussed in section 
7.2.4. The audit of prescriptions and IP records, and the evidence of 
competing tendency to lower the charge of the facilities in the subnetworks 
probably promote the cost-effectiveness of care. However there might be 
some disadvantages of this arrangement due to more administrative cost and 
activities. This might then reduce the budget for service fees which will 
probably influence the quality of care if there is not an adequate budget 
to pay for expensive costs. 
In MEDSEC, some of the marketing and propaganda activities were proposed 
to increase the knowledge of the insured. These activities probably were 
done ineffectively. This is because the insured still lack knowledge. The 
lack of knowledge will be discussed in section 7.2.3. This shows that the 
organization and management of MEDSEC network in health education and 
public relation concerning knowledge and information was inadequately 
performed, although the propaganda to attract more subscribers was probably 
performed well. This was supported by the increasing number of insured in 
the MEDSEC network during the past few years. 
Standards for enrolment of qualified main contractors have been set. For 
provider networks, there was no standard for qualification which would 
assure quality of care. The provider networks were organized by some main 
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contractors and facilities without any regulation to assure the quality of 
care. This is a danger of the service delivered to the insured. In MEDSEC 
network, there was only minimum requirement about infrastructure: staff, 
equipment, and premises to qualify providers. The infrastructure of MEDSEC 
network will be discussed in section 7.2.4. 
In terms of managed care models, MEDSEC office and Nopparat hospital acted 
as purchaser agencies. The MEDSEC office performed some activities which 
are similar to those in successful managed care (Enthoven 1988, 1993). 
Such activities include: proposing the payment system in the network, 
administering the budget allocated from SSO and paying facilities, 
standardizing the quality of care between facilities by medical record 
auditing, and introducing procompetitive actions by payment mechanism 
through a bonus system. Some of these activities will also be discussed 
in sections 7.2.2-7.2.4. Some activities have been performed poorly such 
as surveillance of the performance of facilities, managing quality 
assurance, initiating and managing the risk fund, and managing subsidies 
available for emergency or high cost fees. Few infrastructural 
qualifications were required for facilities to enrol with the network, and 
there was little auditing of prescribing and inpatient records to control 
the performance and quality of care in the network. Regarding the risk 
fund, it was initiated but absorbed by the administrative costs of the 
MEDSEC office. For emergency and high cost fees, the MEDSEC office faced 
an irritating process of reimbursement for high cost diseases because the 
MEDSEC office was not legally recognized by SSO. This results in 
ineffective performance of this task by the MEDSEC office. In emergency 
and accident cases, the insured can pay and seek care from other providers 
which are not their main contractors. The expenses of the first 72 hours 
of treatment can be reclaimed from the SSO by the patients. If the period 
of admission exceeds 72 hours and the patient does not inform his main 
contractor, then he is liable for any costs. If he informs and is refused 
treatment at his main contractor, then any costs in excess of the original 
72 hour treatment have to be paid by his main contractor. Since there are 
>1 main contractors in MEDSEC network, the MEDSEC office - as a cooperative 
centre for referral system - possibly responds inadequately to refer 
inpatients. Hence the patients were then improperly referred back to the 
network. This affected the loss of the profit of facilities. Some of the 
other reasons why the important activities for a good purchaser have not 
been or have been poorly performed are because they were not assigned to 
be performed by the network office, and there was no financial motivation 
payment for ensuring good purchaser acti vi ties. However, important 
activities that MEDSEC network didn't perform but which are crucial are: 
preventing patients from discrimination; and collaboration between the 
network office, SSO, employer, and the insured to initiate rules of 
interaction and responsibility between the insured and providers. This 
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covers how the network facilities should provide care, how the insured 
receive care, what the r I f SS d 
o e 0 0 an employers are in controlling the 
quality of care of the networks. Since the payment system under SSA is 
capitation, there is a risk that main contractors tend to discriminate 
against patients so as to earn more profit from less use of care. Although 
in the MEDSEC network there are mechanisms to encourage provision of care, 
the discrimination is likely to occur. Therefore in a provider network, 
procedures for preventing patient discrimination are still necessary. 
7.2.2 Payment system, charge rate, and utilization rate (from secondary 
data collection) 
The MEDSEC payment system to general hospitals is on an FFS basis with a 
standard rate which is the average charge for both simple and complicated 
cases. It is very difficult to pay for all patients with and without 
complication by the same rate. In complicated cases, facilities always 
apply to be reimbursed more than the standard rate; for easy cases they 
charge at the standard rate. This causes conflict between MEDSEC IP 
aUditing personnel and facility managers. This FFS payment basis also 
caused serious problems of delay of monthly payments to facilities, because 
of time taken to approve the nonstandard inpatient fee bills. 
The FFS method is one of the possible factors affecting the charge rate, 
LOS/admission, and average charge/day of general hospitals making them 
higher than those of clinics and small hospitals in the MEDSEC network 
(table 7.1). Hence the proportion of total fee paying to general hospitals 
was the highest proportion compared to clinics/small hospitals in the 
network. Moreover the charge rate, LOS/admission, and charge/day of 
general hospitals and proportion of paying to general hospitals was 
increased every year, while for clinics and small hospitals it was 
decreased. This shows that the MEDSEC general hospitals made the most of 
the profit. If the bonus of the network is negative, the smaller groups 
will face loss of business while general hospitals do not. General 
hospitals also have bargaining power from being main contractors, to 
influence the use of FFS method for general hospitals. This is because if 
the MEDSEC network does not comply with the request to use this payment 
system, the general hospitals (main contractors) may not contract with 
MEDSEC in the next year. This will affect the quota of the insured 
allocated to MEDSEC in the next year. 
The expected bonus from providing services with a low price charged to the 
MEDSEC office is likely to act as an incentive for subnetworks. According 
to the director of MEDSEC, the providers under subnetworks, 
clinics/polyclinics and small hospitals, tended not to overcharge, 
overinvestigate, or overtreat. Generally, this financial incentive creates 
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a competitive environment within the network. However, because of the 
problems of traffic in Bangkok, geographical alignment of the subnetworks, 
and the distance between clinics/polyclinics (~3 kilometres), the 
competition is limited. According to the director of MEDSEC, for the 
general hospital, because payment system is only on FFS basis, there is 
likely to be overtreatment, overinvestigation, and overcharging. In the 
MEDSEC network, however, there was a medical record auditing mechanism to 
control the quality of medical care. So the unreasonable treatments were 
regulated to a certain degree. Nonetheless small hospitals tended not to 
refer patients to general hospitals which charge a higher price. This 
indicates that price competition between general hospitals is promoted. 
The utilization rate of the insured of MEDSEC/Nopparat was generally 
increasing every year (Table 7.1). The utilization rates of the MEDSEC 
network between 1992-1994 (1.24-1.69 visit/person/year) were lower than 
that indicated by the utilization survey of the workers of November 1994-
January 1995 (2.15 visit/person/year). The possible reason why they are 
different is because the samples are different (all workers for 1992-1994 
and workers from 4 firms for 1994-1995). The utilization rate of the 
insured of Nopparat was slightly less than MEDSEC networks probably because 
Nopparat network was established 18 months after the MEDSEC network. If 
they had been running for the same period of time, the utilization rate may 
possibly be nearly the same. 
146 
Table 7.1 Summary of main findings on utilization rate (from 
MEDSEC/Nopparat networks secondary data collection), and payment system 
Study issue 
Charge rate 
Charge rate & 
referred 
behaviour of 
facilities 
Proportion of 
payment to 
facilities 
and bonus 
Utilization 
rate 
Method 
Secondary data 
collection 
from MEDSEC 
Interview with 
directors of 
MEDSEC general 
hospitals 
Secondary data 
collection 
from MEDSEC 
network 
Secondary data 
collection 
from MEDSEC & 
Nopparat 
network 
Main finding 
-OP charge/visit of MEDSEC network was 
decreasing every year 
~IP charge/worker and /day of small hospitals 
1ncreased from 1992-1993, and then decreased 
~IP cha:ge/worker of general hospitals was 
1ncreas1ng every year 
-IP charge/worker and /day of general 
hospitals were higher than of small hospitals 
-stage of referred patients from clinics was 
not.serious, from small hospitals was very 
ser10US* 
-clinics/small hospitals refer patients to a 
cheaper general price list general hospital* 
-budget paying to general hospitals shared 
the highest proportion compared to other 
groups 
-proportion of paying to general hospital 
increased but to clinics/small hospitals 
decreased 
-bonus was critically decreased from 1.97 
million Baht(1993) to be 3,167 Baht(1994) 
-OP utilization rates of MEDSEC & Nopparat 
networks were increasing every year 
-op utilization rate of MEDSEC was higher 
than of Nopparat networks, and of the main 
contractors in Samutprakarn 
-IP utilization rate of small hospitals 
increased from 1992-1993, and then decreased 
-LOS/admission of small hospitals was 
increasing every year 
-IP utilization of general hospitals was 
increasing every year 
-LOS/admission of general hospitals was 
higher than of small hospitals 
Note: * The d1rectors of general hosp1tals vlewpo1nt 
7.2.3 Knowledge, health seeking behaviour, utilization rate (data from 
structured interview with workers) , and satisfaction with MEDSEC facilities 
The self perceived illness rate was 8.18 episode/person/year (Table 7.2). 
This was 2.8 times higher than the self perceived illness of the insured 
in a study by Tangcharoensathien et ale (1993) in Samutprakarn, Thailand, 
2.4 times higher than the self perceived illness of 15-39 years old of Cote 
d'Ivoire in 1985 (3. 336/person/year), 1.9 times higher than the self 
perceived illness of the 15-39 years old of Ghana in 1987-1988 
(4.32/person/year), and 1.7 times higher than the self perceived illness 
of the 15-39 years old of Peru in 1985-1986 (4. 68/person/year) (Christopher 
et ale 1992). A possible reason why self perceived illness of this group 
is higher than in other studies is because this study was conducted during 
winter when an outbreaks of common colds were likely in a close factory 
environment. Table 7.2 demonstrations that the proportion of the insured 
seeking OP treatment from the MEDSEC facilities (26. 3%) was slightly higher 
than of the study of Tangcharoensathien et ale (1993) which was 22.0%. The 
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OP utilization rate (2.15 visit/person/year) was 1.7 times that of the OP 
utilization rate (1.27 visit/person/year) of private main contractors in 
Samutprakarn in 1992-1993 (Kamolrattanak 1 t 1 1993) u , ea., . The likely 
reason is because in MEDSEC, there were more small facilities to provide 
care than in Samutprakarn where there was no provider network. Moreover 
the 2 studies were not in the same areas, over the same period of time, or 
using the same groups of samples. Higher utilization rates for the MEDSEC 
than for Samutprakarn groups may also be due to the more recent date of 
MEDSEC study. 
The proportion of admission to MEDSEC hospitals in this study was 63% of 
all admission, very similar to the 64% shown in 1993 (Tangcharoensathien 
et al.), although there were fewer MEDSEC main contractors/worker than in 
the study by Tangcharoensathien et al. (1993) where the main contractor 
were, in fact, closer to the workers' firms. This is likely to be because 
MEDSEC has a good referral system. These proportions however, are still 
very low. This indicates that some insured were not satisfied with both 
groups and consequently sought care from other facilities. Looking at the 
IP illness rate of MEDSEC insured (0.256 times/person/year) and the 
admission rate (MEDSEC hospitals, 0.161 times/person/year), some insured 
didn't receive inpatient care from MEDSEC. The possible reason is because 
the MEDSEC network had only 3 general hospitals (main contractors) which 
were not near the homes or working places of all the insured. The insured 
may not like the hospitals or feel inconvenienced by receiving care from 
hospitals that were far from their home or working place. Compared with 
the Samutprakarn study, the IP admission rate of MEDSEC (0.161 
times/person/year) is higher than that of private facilities in 
Samutprakarn (0.034 times/person/year) (Kamolrattanakul et al., 1993). It 
is likely that the insured of MEDSEC had higher accessibility than those 
of Samutprakarn. 
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~a~17 7.~ Summary of main .findings on knowledge, health seeking behaviour, 
t l~zat~on rate, and sat~sfaction with MEDSEC facilities 
Study issue 
Knowledge 
of the 
insured 
Health 
seeking 
behaviour & 
utilization 
rate 
Satisfac-
tion of the 
insured 
Factors 
affecting 
utilization 
rate 
Employer 
view on 
network 
Method 
Interview 
with 
workers 
Interview 
with 
workers 
Interview 
with 
workers 
Interview 
with 
workers 
In-depth 
interview 
with 
employers 
Main finding 
-~O+% of the workers didn't know about uncovered 
d~seases/conditions, free of charge emergency 
care, and benefits under SSA 
-22-50% of the workers didn't know about their 
mai~ 7o~tractor name, working hour of MEDSEC 
fac~l~t~es, and reimbursement fee from emergency 
care 
-12.5% of the workers didn't know that they have 
to present Social Security card 
-OP illness rate=8.18 episodes/person/year. 
-op seeking treatment from MEDSEC facilities 
=26.3% 
-op utilization rate(MEDSEC)=2.15 
visits/person/year 
-IP illness rate=0.256 times/person/year. 
-admission rate to MEDSEC hospitals=0.161 
times/person/year 
-IP seeking treatment from MEDSEC hospitals=63% 
-likely that the sick insured went back home then 
sought care 
-the insured were more satisfied with MEDSEC than 
dissatisfied with 6 aspects 
-the insured were more satisfied with MEDSEC than 
public facilities for all 6 variables 
-93.9% would like to choose their main contractor 
-most important factors influencing the OP model 
is knowledge variables followed by firm variables, 
and manual producer variable which is associated 
with the income and working hour/day of the 
workers 
-most important factors influencing the IP model 
is firm variables followed by nature of job and 
educational status of the workers, knowledge about 
emergency service, and graduation from primary 
school 
-the power of OP models is 83.68%, IP 81.89%. 
-the main contractor to be chosen should be a 
network having more facilities and more 
specialized hospitals, having facilities near to 
firm and worker's home, and having service after 
working hour of workers. 
-an employer mentioned that after choosing MEDSEC, 
the absenteeism of the worker has dropped about 
30% due to availability of MEDSEC services after 
working hour 
Lack of knowledge of the insured about social insurance is one of the 
causes of low utilization rate (Tangcharoensathien et al., 1993). Table 
7.2 presents the factors that influence the utilization rate of the 
insured. The firm variables influence the probability of seeking care in 
both IP and OP models, but they affect the IP model more than the OP model. 
This is possibly because of the inconvenience to inpatients of travelling 
in Bangkok, and because the distance between the firms and MEDSEC 
facilities is further than for OP. Since the proportion of the insured 
lacking knowledge is generally high, it influences the probabilities of 
seeking care from MEDSEC facilities remarkably in the OP model. The OP 
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model shows that being manual producer, which is associated with lower 
income and working hour/day, influences the probability of seeking care. 
In the IP model, it is confirmed that socioeconomic variables especially 
the characteristics of job and graduation from primary school, and also 
satisfaction with cleanliness of MEDSEC affects the model. For knowledge 
about diseases/conditions uncovered, free of charge emergency care, and 
reimbursement fee from emergency care, the regulations have been changed 
every year. Sometimes, they have been changed twice a year. This causes 
considerable misunderstanding between providers and the insured. 
Results of the study by Tangcharoensathien et ale (1993) indicate that the 
proportion of the insured lacking knowledge about diseases/conditions 
covered by the scheme was >50%, about free of charge emergency care was 
>50%, reimbursement fee from emergency care was 87%, benefits under SSA was 
about 44-62%, and their main contractor name was 11%. Surprisingly the 
knowledge of the insured in this study was only slightly better than those 
in the study of Tangcharoensathien et ale (1993), although they have 
proposed a policy intervention to improve the knowledge of the insured by 
various means such as educating the insured through labour unions, the 
employers, the representatives of the employees, and the main contractors. 
Moreover, though there were a lot of activities regarding health education 
and public relations that MEDSEC network office and facilities have 
undertaken to improve the lack of knowledge of the insured, it is still 
inadequate to tackle the problems. This is possibly because there was no 
incentive for the network to improve knowledge since the lower the use of 
the insured, the higher the profit; nor is there incentive for other 
related parties such as facilities, managers of firms, or employer's 
unions, to provide sufficient health education to the insured. 
For all 6 aspects: accessibility, waiting time, perception on medical 
quality of care, reception, cleanliness, and friendliness of personnel; 
although the insured were more satisfied with MEDSEC than dissatisfied and 
MEDSEC also had the highest number of facilities compared to other network; 
the insured were still less satisfied with accessibility to services 
compared to the other aspects. The possible reason was because some 
districts of Bangkok, especially in the centre, had no MEDSEC network 
facility and the traffic of Bangkok was very heavy. So the insured in the 
districts that had no facilities tended to seek care from clinics in their 
firms which were run by firms themselves. Increase of facilities in all 
districts that are near to homes of the insured is necessary. Supporting 
this view is the evidence that the sick insured tended to go back home and 
then sought care. This indicates that the workers preferred to seek care 
from facilities near to their homes. It was also confirmed that the 
employers preferred the network which had facilities near to worker I s 
home/office. For the preference of selection of the main contractor, most 
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of the insured favoured selection of the main contractor by themselves. 
Employers favoured the network having both more facilities and more 
specialists in the hospitals. They preferred facilities that provided 
services after working hours of the insured. This is because the firms can 
increase profits by suffering less absenteeism of the insured by ensuring 
their health or not having to receive care from facilities during working 
hours. 
7.2.4 Quality of care evaluation 
Infrastructure of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
It is important to have facilities in a district to increase the 
accessibility to medical care for the insured working or living in that 
particular district. Using the indicator of the number of additional 
workers to add a facility to a district, as in MEDSEC network, is more 
effective than using the additional firms as an indicator as in Nopparat 
network. This is because the number of workers in firms varies a lot, and 
if the method of selecting the main contractor changes to be by the insured 
themselves, the number of firms in a district having workers selecting a 
main contractor will be more dispersed. 
For the outpatient cluster, the mean numbers of personnel at clinics during 
16.30-6.00 hours (after working hours), and the mean numbers of outpatient 
rooms and examination beds in MEDSEC were higher than in Nopparat network. 
This might indicate that MEDSEC network is able to serve the insured during 
the peak hours and after working hours better than Nopparat network. One 
reason why the characteristics of structural aspects, such as emergency 
services, emergency instruments, and personnel related to emergency 
services of smaller facilities, were generally better at MEDSEC than at 
Nopparat, is because the opening time/day of MEDSEC facilities was longer 
than in Nopparat, especially as they open after the working hours of the 
insured. 
In the clinics, structures concerning emergency care and services after 
working hours (such as having complete simple and emergency services of 
laboratory and X-ray services available) were important to provide 
sufficient and necessary care. This is not only because the insured need 
to receive care at convenient times but also to receive a good quality of 
care at facilities. From this study, MEDSEC network had better structures 
concerning services after working hours, and concerning laboratory test and 
X-ray service while Nopparat network had shorter reporting time of simple 
laboratory tests (table 7.3). Each network should therefore strengthen its 
weaker structures. 
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For 10-30 bed hospitals, both networks had nearly the same structure. Some 
variables that showed differences were the specialized doctors, pharmacy 
and laboratory sections (table 7.3). According to the recommendation of 
the MOPH, there should be 4 basic specialist doctors in a 30 bed hospital. 
In this substudy, most of MEDSEC network's small hospitals had 4 basic 
specialist doctors, plastic surgeon, and orthopaedics doctors. But for 
Nopparat network the general surgeon, plastic surgeon, and orthopaedics 
doctors were fewer than MEDSEC network. It is necessary to have an 
orthopaedics doctor in small hospitals because injury from work of the 
insured are common and often emergencies. Most of the conditions needing 
plastic surgeon are not emergencies. Patients who need plastic surgery can 
be referred to general hospitals. Therefore plastic surgery doctors are 
not definitely needed in small hospital. For pharmacy and laboratory 
service sections, it is necessary to have such activities and variables 
mentioned in the substudy for facilities to render good medical care. 
Although in both networks, there were private clinics and small hospitals, 
the infrastructure of the clinics of MEDSEC were better than in the 
Nopparat network. For small hospitals, they were similar. This indicates 
that the MEDSEC network was more careful in selecting clinics to join the 
network than the Nopparat network was. 
In ~100 bed hospitals, number of personnel and services provided during 
after working hours are crucial. The MEDSEC network had a better structure 
than the Nopparat network for this. However, the Nopparat hospital had 
some better structures such as number of personnel (in general), building, 
and instruments (table 7.3) which were essential for services provided 
after working hours of the insured and for emergency treatment. For 
pharmacy and laboratory activity, as ~100 beds hospitals are tertiary care, 
it is critically required to have a complete range of activities listed in 
these 2 sections. 
Nopparat network is a publicly-organised network and the government pays 
the salary of pharmacists from a global budget to operate a wide range of 
pharmacy related tasks such as community drug funds, pharmacy health 
education, hospital drug stock control, simple drug production (IV fluid, 
gastrointestinal mixture etc.), IP drug quality control etc.. This enables 
Nopparat to have more pharmacists than MEDSEC network. It is notable that 
75% of the large hospitals of MEDSEC had no pharmacist although it is a 
legal requirement to have a pharmacist in this size of hospital. One half 
of the larger MEDSEC hospitals had no system for labelling the expiry date 
on drugs though it is vitally essential due to FDA regulation. MEDSEC 
network was found to have fewer drug stocks, because private hospitals tend 
not to bear the burden from dead stock. They try to purchase drugs from 
a drug company as they really need them. 
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Table 7.3 
networks Summary of main findings on evaluation of infrastructure of the 
Study issue 
Distribu-
tion & 
coverage of 
MEDSEC/ 
Nopparat 
network 
facilities 
Structure 
of clinics 
Structure 
of 10-30 
beds 
facilities 
Structure 
of ~100 
beds 
facilities 
Structure 
of all 
facilities 
Method 
Secondary 
data 
collection 
from MEDSEC & 
Nopparat 
networks 
Mailed 
questionnaire 
Mailed 
questionnaire 
Mailed 
questionnaire 
Mailed 
questionnaire 
Main finding 
-in.MEDSEC network, 2 districts of Bangkok 
h~v~n~ >3,000 workers had no facility, and 3 
d~str~cts had >5,000 workers/facility 
-~n Nopparat network, facilities were 
dis~ributed.in 7 districts of east Bangkok 
hav~ng the ~nsured from ~10 firms/district 
-indicator to increase 1 additional 
facility/district was 5,000 additional insured 
for MEDSEC, and some additional firms selecting 
Nopparat network compared to previous year for 
Nopparat network 
structure that MEDSEC network had better: 
-mean numbers of personnel during 16.30-21.30 
and 21.30-6.00 hour, OB-GYN doctor, OP room and 
physical examination bed, X-ray personnel, x-
ray machine, and age of X-ray machine set 
-proportion having urine analysis, urea and 
electrolyte, malaria slide test, and emergency 
X-ray service 
structure that Nopparat network had better: 
-proportion of facility about time consumed 
to report simple test within hour, having 
pharmacist, and having drug stock system 
structure that MEDSEC network had better: 
-mean number of general surgery, plastic 
surgery, orthopaedics specialist doctorsj and 
age of X-ray machine set 
structure that Nopparat network had better: 
-proportion having emergency laboratory 
services section 
structure that MEDSEC network had better: 
-mean number of personnel during 16.30-21.30 
hour, toilet, and age of X-ray machines 
structure that Nopparat network had better: 
-mean numbers of OP rooms, GP and specialist 
examination rooms, physical examination beds, 
Dr-patient desks, otolaryngoscope, 
ophthalmoscope, ambulance, years after 
redecorate/build of OP, personnel and 
specialist doctors except the mean number of 
personnel during 16.30-21.30 hour, X-ray 
personnel, days of X-ray personnel trained, 
number of X-ray machine* 
-proportion having emergency X-ray service, 
having pharmacist, having expired date labelled 
on package 
structure that MEDSEC network had better: 
-proportion having emergency electricity 
sources, autoclave service in facilities, and 
complete emergency set in OR 
-mean of % of beds with BP of the second ward 
structure that Nopparat network had better: 
-most of IP information variables 
Satisfaction of inpatients of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
Although Nopparat hospital had a better infrastructure compared to other 
hospitals, the inpatients were still more satisfied with MEDSEC than 
Nopparat hospitals (table 7.4). This is likely to be due to over load of 
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duty and mechanism of payment to personnel of Nopparat hospital which 
didn't motivate personnel to provide satisfactory medical services to the 
insured. As the patients have a limited knowledge of technique of medical 
quality of care, using only assessment of satisfaction cannot conclude the 
definite difference of quality of care between networks. However the 
instrument used in this substudy, adapted from McIver (1992) of King Fund 
Centre, was pretested and adjusted, and then it was administered with very 
little restriction. This is because it is simple and suitable to both 
private and public hospitals. 
Table 7.4 Summary of main findings on evaluation of satisfaction of 
inpatients of 2 networks 
Study issue Main finding 
-Medical -more satisfied with MEDSEC than Nopparat 
treatment & care networks for all variables except feelings of 
embarrassment. 
-Information & -more satisfied with MEDSEC than Nopparat 
communication networks for all variables 
-Ward environment -more satisfied with MEDSEC than Nopparat 
& facility networks for all variables except service about 
keeping personal belonging 
-Discharge & -more satisfied with MEDSEC than Nopparat 
outcome networks for all variables except about written 
notice given for follow up appointment 
Prescribing analysis of facilities of MEDSEC 
The analysis used methodology and instruments adapted from WHO (1993) which 
is an effective evaluation method for quality assessment of one aspects of 
the processes of medical services. Table 7.5 shows the summary of the main 
findings of this substudy. URI was the most common disease among the 
insured or noninsured which was the same as the study of the insured by 
Kamolrattanakul et ale (1993) . The average number of drugs 
prescribed/ encounter of the insured/non insured were less than those 
recorded in Indonesia (Mean=3.3) and Nigeria (Mean=3.8) by Hogerzeil et 
ale (1993). 
The insured were prescribed a higher proportion of generic names and 
essential drugs than the noninsured. This indicated that the insured had 
been more cost-effectively treated. 
The average number of drugs prescribed to the insured in URI, which does 
not require drug treatment, was higher than of the noninsured (table 7.5). 
In the arthritis and UTD which are diseases that need medicine for proper 
treatment, there was no difference of the average number of drugs 
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prescribed between the insured/noninsured. This suggests that there was 
no limitation to the number of drugs prescribed for the insured patient if 
it was necessary. 
The injection of medicine and antibiotics prescribed are indicators used 
to measure whether there is any unnecessarily expensive treatment. This 
is because in developing countries, medicine is often overused with 
inj ections and antibiotic drugs prescribed for diseases that do not 
absolutely need them. It affects not only the health of the people but 
also the cost of services. Comparing the proportion of inj ections 
prescribed to the insured (7.0%) with the study of Hogerzeil et ale (1993), 
the proportion of ~1 dose of injection prescribed in 10 out of 11 countries 
was higher than in this study. The proportion of ~1 dose of injection of 
the insured (7%) was about 3 times lower than of the noninsured (25%). For 
antibiotics used, the proportion of ~1 dose of antibiotics drugs prescribed 
of the insured was lower than the noninsured. However in a particular 
tracer analysis, there were evidences of irrational prescription of 
antibiotics (in URI, UTD), injections (all tracers), vitamins (arthritis, 
HPT) , diazepam (arthritis, HPT) , and paracetamol (HPT) for both groups. 
The use of injections in all tracers is not necessary. It is potentially 
dangerous to give medicine parenterally and more expensive than appropriate 
oral medication. These indicate that there was poor outpatient care for 
some patients in both groups. 
In URI patients, indicated antibiotics were prescribed more specifically 
for the insured than the noninsured. For the insured, there was a 
guideline of maximum outpatient charge rates of about 170 Baht/visit. The 
mean charge of the insured was 172.8+70.2 Baht/visit which was lower than 
of the noninsured. It is likely that because of the effect of the payment 
mechanism for the insured by capitation base with guidelines and bonus 
incentives system of the network, the charged rate of the insured was 
possibly kept down by limiting injection and antibiotic use which resulted 
in more rational and cost-effective treatment. 
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Table 7.5 Summary of ma;n f' d' 
of MEDSEC ~ ~n ~ngs on prescribing analysis of facilities 
Study issue 
-General 
analysis 
-URI 
patient 
-Arthritis 
patient 
-~D 
patient* 
Main finding 
-URI was the most common disease 
-treatment for the insured was more rational than the 
nonin~ured in terms of the higher proportion of 
gener~c.name and essential drugs prescribed, and lower 
propor~~on of ~1 dose of antibiotic and injection 
prescr~bed 
-irrational prescription of antibiotics and injection 
to both groups 
-price/cost of the insured was likely to be kept down 
(lower than the noninsured) by limiting drugs used 
:specificity of drug used for URI patient of the 
~ns~r7d ~as better than the non insured by looking at 
ant~b~ot~c and s~ptomatic treatment drugs prescribed 
-the ~nsured rece~ved lower dose of a particular drug 
than the noninsured 
-irrational prescription of cloxacillin, lexinor, 
doxycycline, lincomycin, and kanamycin to both groups 
-items of necessary drugs prescribed to the 
insured/noninsured were similar 
-proportion of ~1 dose and the dose of a particular 
essential drugs prescribed for the insured were less 
than the noninsured 
-irrational prescription of vitamins & diazepam to 
both groups 
-more expensive/course NSAIDS (diclofenac) prescribed 
to both groups 
-proportion of ~1 dose of drugs used and mean of dose 
of drugs used were similar between both groups 
-irrational prescription of tetracycline & 
metronidazole to both groups 
-HPT -drugs prescribed for both groups generally the same 
patient* as recommended in the gold standard 
-the insured received fewer items and doses of 
symptomatic/supportive drugs than the noninsured 
-irrational prescription of vitamins & paracetamol to 
both groups 
Note: * small sample s~zes 
In arthritis patients, more expensive NSAIDS were a more likely to be 
prescribed than equally effective but cheaper drugs. This was remarkably 
more common among the noninsured. This indicates that the patients were 
unlikely to be treated cost-effectively. 
From the items and dose of drug prescribed and price charged for URI, 
arthritis, and HPT, it was confirmed that the price/cost of the insured was 
likely to be kept down by limiting items and doses of drugs prescribed for 
the insured more than for the noninsured. It is unclear about the causal 
factors affecting this limitation of drugs used. However, it is likely to 
be due to either underdosing or multiple visits and splitting a 
prescription to be >1 prescription. This is the danger of the payment 
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mechanism of MEDSEC which has to be modified for better efficiency of 
treatment since it might affect the adequacy of treatment in some cases. 
Inpatient treatment of the insured/noninsured of MEDSEC hospitals 
This substudy used explicit criteria adapted from general text books and 
agreed by a panel of medical experts during the process of data collection, 
which was easy to administer and might be helpful for measuring the quality 
of care for inpatients in other settings. Table 7.6 shows the summary of 
the main findings of this substudy. Diarrhoea was the most common disease 
among the insured which was the same as in the study of the insured by 
Kamolrattanakul et al. (1993). The mean charge of the insured was lower 
than the noninsured. It is likely that the charged rate of the insured was 
possibly kept down because of the effect of the capitation based payment 
mechanism for the insured with a standard mean charge by 
diseases/conditions for small hospitals and bonus incentive system of the 
network. 
In the analysis of diarrhoea, facilities tended to use more effective and 
short acting drugs with the insured than wi th the noninsured. The 
facilities didn't only want to satisfy the insured to select the network 
in the next year but also wanted to be a fund holder. This is because if 
the insured are satisfied with facilities, they will receive care from that 
facility more than others. Then that facility will have highest number of 
outpatient visits and will be considered as a fund holder for that 
particular firm and will then gain profit from the surplus bonus. From 
explicit criteria of treatment of diarrhoea, treatment of the insured was 
more cost-effective than the noninsured. This is probably because private 
facilities run as private companies and have a profit-motive to run the 
business: the budget to pay for the insured is limited due to the 
capitation payment basis, so they have to operate more cost-effectively to 
maintain their profit. However as the payment system is capitation with 
bonus incentive system, it was likely that price/cost of the insured was 
kept down by limiting some drugs used such as ORS, kaopectin, and 
tetracycline. This might be a danger because the insured patients may 
possibly receive inadequate treatment. For appendicitis patients, it 
indicates that treatment of the insured was better than of the noninsured, 
by looking at the proportion of patients having complicating symptoms. 
However, because of too small a sample size in the evaluation of outcome 
of appendicitis treatment, conclusions cannot be confidently drawn from 
this substudy. 
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Table 7.6 Summary of main findings on analysis of inpatient treatment of 
MEDSEC hospitals 
Analysis of 
-Overall 
treatment 
-Diarrhoea 
-Appendicitis 
Main finding 
-diarrhoea was the most common disease h 
insured and all cases among t e 
-mean charge of the insured was lower than the 
noninsured both for all cases and by 
diseases/conditions 
-facilities tend to use more effective and short 
acting drugs with the insured than the noninsured to 
satisfy the insured 
-price/cost of the insured was kept down by limiting 
drugs prescribed 
-treatment for the insured was more cost-effective 
than the noninsured 
-treatment of the insured was more effective than 
the non insured 
-from evaluating outcome of appendicitis treatment*, 
mean score of complication symptoms of the insured 
was lower than the noninsured** 
-patients' perception of quality of medical 
treatment of the insured & noninsured (%) was not 
different** 
Note: * 
** 
Data from postal questlonnalre 
small sample size (28) 
7.3 Policy recommendations 
The ultimate aim of this study is to identify health policy recommendations 
regarding health care provider networks which would improve the physical 
accessibility of the insured, patient's satisfaction, quality of care, and 
the payment mechanism within a network. This section presents policy 
recommendation aspects regarding provider networks that are drawn from the 
main findings. 
7.3.1 Functions of network office 
To introduce a better purchaser in the provider network, all activities 
concerning successful managed care models, whether performed by MEDSEC or 
not, should be proposed to be performed by the network office. The 
provider network should undertake both administrative and quality of care 
activities. Administrative activities consist of: network collaboration 
with the SSO, the employer, and the insured to initiate rules of 
interaction and responsibility between the insured and providers; proposal 
of the payment system in the network; administration of the budget 
allocated from the SSO and paying facilities; managing subsidies available 
for emergency or high cost fees to the insured or facilities; initiating 
and managing the risk fund; and introducing procompetitive actions by 
payment mechanism. Quality of care activities that should be done by the 
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network office are'. manag1' l't 
ng qua 1 y assurance; surveillance of the 
performance of facilities; standardizing the quality of care between 
facilities by analyzing drug prescription or medical record auditing; and 
preventing patient discrimination. However some of these activities were 
not attractive without financial motivation and assignment. Therefore, 
some interventions that should be proposed are assigning these tasks under 
legal agreement to provider networks, and giving additional credit to a 
good performing network. This additional credit will then be added to 
other credit of good performing of quality of care. The network with the 
higher credit from being a good network, either in terms of good 
performance of the network office or facilities, should be paid more than 
the others. 
7.3.2 Structure of the network 
Since there was no standard setting of structure and function of facilities 
in the network or network office, the quality of services rendered by 
facilities in provider networks cannot be monitored and promoted. To have 
an effective provider network, standard structure of facilities and network 
office should be introduced. In the initial regulation for coverage, it 
should be necessary to have a facility in a district serving a minimum 
number of the insured. It is valuable to use this indicator to add a 
facility as in MEDSEC network. As MEDSEC network had operated for the 
insured for ~3 years and the insured were more satisfied than dissatisfied 
with the network, it is worthwhile to start using the indicator to add a 
facility as in MEDSEC (1 facility/district to serve primary care for 5,000 
workers) . 
The network should meet standard requirements of structural variables of 
6 clusters as mentioned in section 6.1.3. This standard should be set by 
SSO policy makers by using the central distribution and other statistical 
figures presented in section 6.1. However some crucial variables that 
should be proposed are the opening period of the facilities after working 
hours of the insured, emergency services, pharmacy section activities, and 
laboratory and X-ray services. Some specific structural findings that are 
significantly needed should be classified by number of beds of facilities. 
For no bed facilities, it is necessary to serve the insured after working 
hours, have simple laboratory test available, and have emergency X-ray 
services available. In 10-30 bed hospitals, there should be 4 basic 
specialists and orthopaedics doctors, emergency laboratory tests and X-ray 
services, and a pharmacist and important pharmacy section services. For 
~100 bed hospitals, basic structures to be proposed are: having standard 
number of personnel, premises, and instruments that were essential for 
services after working hours of the insured and for emergency treatment; 
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and having a complete range of activities listed in pharmacy and laboratory 
sections. 
7.3.3 Monitoring system 
In the substudy of infrastructure, a postal questionnaire was administered 
together with a letter from the director of the related network to both 
public/private facilities. The response to questions was extraordinarily 
well completed (100% replied). So adaption of this instrument and method 
either to be used as monitoring by the network or for a survey of SSO, 
might be of value. This study presents the central distribution of 
continuous data, proportion of discrete data, and other essential 
statistics of 6 clusters of structure of facilities which might be needed 
for policy makers to use for setting up the initial standard for good 
structure of a provider network. However the minimum standard set of data 
for monitoring infrastructure of facility should consist of: opening period 
of the facilities after working hours of the insured, emergency services, 
pharmacy section activities, and laboratory and X-ray services. This 
minimum standard setting should be classified by the categories of clinics, 
and 10-30 and ~100 bed facilities. 
In the quality control, self monitoring by the network office is more 
effective than external quality assessment by SSO in terms of cost, 
appropriateness, and reliability of the result. The network office can 
closely monitor the facilities in the network because it has authority to 
control facilities. The monitoring system performed by the network office 
would be cheaper than by SSO because it is simple and easy to be 
administered in a close and smaller system. This decentralized quality 
monitoring system by network offices is also appropriate because the 
network offices know the quality of care of a particular facility to some 
extent. They can simply detect the unrepresentative data or skewed data 
of quality of care of a facility. Actions to control quality can be 
achieved through payment systems. As facilities in the network are paid 
by the network office, if the facilities do not provide good quality of 
care, they would not be well paid. However if the monitoring is conducted 
by SSO, the network office might try to hide their defects. 
Satisfaction with services of the insured should be investigated by 
applying the instrument used in section 6.2 adapted from McIver (1992) of 
King Fund Centre, which was pretested and adjusted, used with a very little 
constraint, and proved simple and suitable to both private/public 
hospitals. Investigation should be conducted by the network office and 
then the results should be reported to SSO. In medical quality monitoring, 
information about overtreatment or undertreatment in relation to outcome 
of treatment should also be monitored. Outpatient prescribing analysis of 
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some relevant tracers should be done by the network office and then 
reported to SSO. Some essential variables such as total items, dose, 
generic name, essential drugs list, antibiotics, and injections should be 
applied in the prescribing analysis process. For inpatient medical record 
analysis, the explicit criteria adapted from analyzing diarrhoea and 
appendicitis inpatient treatments, should be applied to monitor the quality 
of care of the insured of the network by the network office and then 
reported to SSO. Results of the quality assurance sent to SSO might be 
used to pay additional budget for a good network which provides service as 
a minimum requirement of quality of care to the insured. 
7.3.4 Government facility role 
In this study, the insured of MEDSEC network were more satisfied with 
private than public networks, although the infrastructure of Nopparat, a 
public hospital, was better than MEDSEC hospitals. To compete with a 
private network, the public sector should be autonomous from inefficient 
bureaucratic regulation and constraints by being given 'self-governing' 
authority (Punnarunothai, 1993). Self-governing hospitals are supposed to 
work with more flexible decisions and be more responsive to patient needs. 
A self-governing public hospital is able to respond to problems quickly. 
Moreover it is able to manage financial constraints more easily. Therefore 
self-governing hospitals should be encouraged for public hospitals that are 
suitable to be purchasers in social insurance. However, in general public 
hospitals, there is poor quality of care due to lack of profit incentives 
to ensure quality of care. Standardizing quality of care of general public 
hospitals is necessary. To ensure good management and effective quality 
of care for all patients, there should be some criteria that the public 
general hospitals should meet. 
7.3.5 Referral system 
Since in a provider network, the level of care of facilities vary from no 
bed facilities to specialist hospitals, a systematic referral system is 
needed to provide the best care with lowest cost. To initiate a perfect 
subcontract network in urban areas, both direct and indirect, there should 
be 3 levels of facilities: primary (clinics/polyclinics), secondary (small 
hospitals), and tertiary (general/specialized hospitals) care. Smaller 
facilities consume less budget in terms of either capital or running costs 
than bigger facilities. However in urban areas, it is very difficult to 
classify the function of small hospitals from a general hospital and 
function of general hospitals from a specialized hospital. In Bangkok 
where the existing public hospitals are mainly general or specialized 
hospitals, they are able to provide either secondary or tertiary care. The 
cost-effectiveness of having new small hospitals to provide facilities at 
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3 levels of care is doubtful. Th f . ere ore lt is not necessary to initiate 
any new small hospitals to make up 3 levels care. In Bangkok where 
movement of patient ambulance vehicles for referring patients is limited 
by heavy traffic, a geographical subnetwork for referral systems is 
required. Grouping of primary, secondary, and tertiary care facilities in 
the near-by area is appropriate and useful in this situation. 
7.3.6 Payment system of network 
Payment system is one of the forceful factors that encourages efficiency 
and controls cost. 
and disadvantages. 
In any particular payment system, there are advantages 
Apart from quality assurance which is expected to be 
powerful in providing good quality of care, an appropriate payment system 
of networks should be also proposed to control quality of care. Initial 
approval of payment system is essential. Networks should propose their 
payment system to SSO before being admitted as provider networks. SSO 
should consider which payment in the network is able to encourage adequate 
treatment to the insured in terms of both quantity and quality of care. 
The payment system should promote competition. To achieve a perfect 
provider network, the payment system should encourage efficiency, quality, 
and contain cost. However, patients may not understand the implications 
of services: they may perceive their availability as evidence of excellent 
products (Hilsenrath, 1991). Some evidence of excellent products perceived 
by the patients are: more convenient location of providers, short waiting 
time, cleanliness of premise, friendliness of personnel, and good 
reception. In capitation, facilities compete for patients on aspects that 
patients can recognize. The other aspects of quality of care such as 
medical treatments might be neglected. Nonetheless it is not so harmful 
to encourage facilities to compete on the nonprice competition 
characteristics as long as total cost is contained and technical quality 
is adequately maintained. 
Since the illness and the medical cost are uncertain, within a provider 
network where the capitation method is applied as in MEDSEC network, the 
budgets for paying for high cost patients are more worried. This is 
because facilities which are fund holders of a small group of the insured 
might face higher risk of loss than others if there is burden of high cost 
diseases paid. However to solve the uncertain risk of burden from huge 
medical fees, and to assure the insured adequate and prompt treatment, risk 
funds should be initiated and organised to be one of the important part of 
the payment mechanism. Network offices should submit details of their risk 
fund payment system to SSO to be approved before being admitted as a 
provider network. Monitoring and presenting of these funds by regular 
reporting from network office to SSO, is crucially needed. 
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Since fixed capitation (700 Baht/worker/year) was applied in 1991, the OP 
utilization rate has increased from about 1 visit/person/year in 1991 to 
about 2 in 1994. The general inflation rate of Thailand is about 5% every 
year (Bank of Thailand, 1994), and the private market price is increasing 
every year. An annually increased capitation payment should therefore be 
proposed and applied to main contractors both with or without network. 
However if it is to be proposed, it needs to have encouraging 
characteristics to increase quality and quantity of medical care such as 
by using the utilization rate and admission rate, having facilities 
available near to the insured home, and having standard for the necessary 
structure of facilities. Nevertheless, since 1995, 2 additional payments 
have been in place to promote higher quantity of care. This additional 
payment is applied to all main contractors either having or not having a 
provider network. There should be some additional payment mechanism to 
promote quality of care by using data such as structure of the network 
mentioned in section 7.3.2, and data from monitoring system mentioned in 
section 7.3.3, to pay for the good network. 
Competition is meant to reduce excess cost. Competition between providers 
of health care could be a useful mechanism to improve effectiveness of care 
and lower cost. Contracting clinics or small hospitals with reasonable 
financial incentives and suitable monitoring systems as in MEDSEC network 
showed good outcome in terms of satisfaction of the insured. However there 
was some danger from this payment system because small hospitals tended to 
keep some patients to save their expected bonus. Hence the level of 
sickness of some patients referred from small hospitals to general 
hospitals was very serious. Prevention of this serious disadvantage such 
as by a medical record audit method with financial penalties or incentives 
should be ensured by the network office. 
Since MEDSEC general and specialized hospitals were paid by the FFS method, 
they consumed the highest proportion of the budget. This was a serious 
burden to the network. Special payment schedules for these hospitals such 
as DRGs (Dowling 1979) should be introduced. For networks in general, 
there should be a cost effective schedule of payment to general or 
specialized hospitals. 
Allocating quotas of the insured to a main contractor (50,000 workers/100 
beds) is one of the constraints limiting the development of the provider 
network. In the provider network where there were many facilities to 
'd although a lot of facilities had <100 beds, the allocated provl. e care, 
quota of the insured to the network was still strictly regulated to 
50,000/100 beds for each qualified main contractor. This allocation 
criteria should be changed to consider the characteristics of each level 
of facilities: the number of primary care facilities, a good referral 
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system to higher care facilities , and the quality of care of all level of 
facilities in the network. 
7.3.7 Knowledge and attitude of the insured 
It is important to reduce the lack of knowledge of the insured because it 
influences their health seeking behaviour. One intervention to achieve 
this problems is health education which should be accomplished by many 
means such as: 
-by provider facilities and provider network office 
-through related parties: labour union, the employers, and the 
representative of the employees 
-by mobile SSO counselling team 
-through public media such as radio, television, newspaper I and 
special SSO newspaper and printed matter. 
SSO should spend more of its budget on health education and public 
relations to encourage a better understanding among the insured about 
social insurance. SSO might not have enough personnel to undertake 
educational media, therefore, contracting with private specialist companies 
would be the appropriate and effective action. 
Problems associated with the knowledge of the insured about their main 
contractor's name and about preference of selecting a main contractor, 
would be diminished if the insured are allowed to select main contractor 
by themselves. However, the insured should be educated on how to select 
their best main contractor. Therefore SSO should educate how to choose the 
best main contractor and introduce a system of selection of main contractor 
by the insured in all provinces. This will also increase the satisfaction 
of accessibility to care because the insured tend to choose their main 
contractor and receive care from facilities that are close to their homes 
or offices. 
Regulations about diseases/conditions uncovered, free of charge emergency 
care, and reimbursement of fees for emergency care, have been changed every 
year, therefore, a master plan to control this change over time is needed. 
SSO should have a master medium term (5 years) plan for the regulation of 
these 3 issues proposed by year and try not to change this plan during the 
proposed period. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and future research needs 
8.1 Conclusion 
The primary concern of this study was to evaluate the MEDSEC network. The 
results show the relevance of the evaluation and accomplish the objectives 
of examining the organization, payment system, utilization, and factors 
affecting utilization by those insured of MEDSEC; and assessing the quality 
of care of MEDSEC compared with the publicly-organized, Nopparat network. 
There are advantages to the payment system of MEDSEC, which is FFS under 
capitation basis with bonus profit system. The insured were more satisfied 
with the MEDSEC network than with the other. The evaluation of 
infrastructure substudy provides useful information for setting the 
standard structure of the network and for monitoring the structural quality 
of facilities. The quality of care provided for the insured was generally 
better than for the noninsured of MEDSEC facilities. Evidence of better 
quality was shown in the analysis of prescriptions, both overall and 
specifically for particular diagnoses/conditions, and in the tracer 
analysis both regarding process indicators (ie. items noted in the 
inpatient records) for different groups of patients and outcome indicators 
(ie. complications - symptoms/signs) of appendicitis patient. However, 
there were some disadvantages for the insured in the MEDSEC network 
concerning fewer items and doses of drugs used/encounter, which might cause 
inadequacy in treatment. 
The workers have difficulty perceiving relevant information to understand 
the regulations and process of providing care, and this leads to lower 
utilization of care. An effective provider network and effective health 
education should be introduced to combat this. 
In this study most of the substudies are useful and can be used to develop 
policy recommendations, with the exception of the evaluation of inpatient 
satisfaction. Health policy recommendations regarding health care provider 
networks are identified concerning the functions of a good provider network 
office, the monitoring of a network's quality of care, the payment system 
of networks, and actions to improve the knowledge of the insured concerning 
the regulations on access to care. To promote a good provider network, 
harmonious patterns of provider network functions and collaboration between 
parties (network office, facilities, consumers, and SSO) should be 
encouraged, which include: the functions of a network office adapted from 
the successful managed care models, cost-effective third party payment and 
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administrative system, primary health care and good referral system, and 
the principle of using local existing facilities in a competitive 
environment. 
8.2 Generalization of the result 
Since the MEDSEC/Nopparat networks were situated the in Bangkok, 
characteristics of the insured and facilities involved were urban 
dominated. Thus, to generalize and apply the policy implication on 
provider networks to the whole kingdom requires caution. This is because 
in other provinces, the selected main contractor is usually situated near 
to either the living or working places of workers. If the main contractor 
is not close to the firm or the worker's home, or the firm is situated in 
remote area, an extended outpatient service and relevant referral system 
should possibly be proposed to substitute for the full range of the 
provider network. This might be more cost-effective than to have the 
complete provider network system. 
Zschock (1982) suggested that to increase efficiency in the provision of 
care, primary care emphasis should be proposed in social insurance. In 
provinces of Thailand, there are many private clinics providing primary 
care, especially after-work hours of the insured, and the main contractors 
- mostly public general hospitals - are in urban settings and generally 
provide primary care only during the insured's working hours. To maximize 
the benefits to the insured in urban areas, private clinics should be 
included in the provider network. Nevertheless, in some 12 regional, maj or 
provinces, where the urban community dominates, perhaps the proposed 
regulation of the full range of the provider network can be applied. 
In developing countries, there are problems of low coverage, medical care 
provision to include access to the private sector, equity in access to 
services, and cost control. This study shows the possibility of organizing 
a private provider network to increase the accessibility of the insured to 
medical care, especially to private providers. Moreover, as the payment 
system is by capitation method, the increase in cost is controlled. This 
experience of the private provider network, which is similar to HMOs, shows 
the strengths which might be applied to other developing countries. 
However, to generalize this result and implications, countries need to 
consider important characteristics of their own health care delivery 
systems, especially whether facilities are dominated by either private or 
public ownership, or by either general practitioner or specialized 
facilities. This is because the private sector operates more flexibly, 
with business profit consciousness, while the public sector has greater 
restrictions with less profit awareness. For the dominance of facilities 
in terms of levels of care, countries should consider having primary care 
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for a first contact, and having a good referral system to refer patients 
needing higher care. Moreover, characteristics of the insured in terms of 
socioeconomic status ar I . 
e a so l.mportant in deciding how the provider 
network should operate. This is because low educational status of the 
insured causes problems of . d t d· ml.sun ers an l.ng of service processes and 
benefits given, which decreases the insured's utilization of care. 
8.3 Future research needs 
From this study, aspects arising that are unclear and need further research 
are: the model of quality of care assurance rendered by a network office, 
causal factors affecting the number of items/doses of drugs prescribed _ 
whether underdosing or multiple visits, sui table provider network for 
nonurban provinces of Thailand, and the range of care to be provided by 
primary care facilities. Studies needed for policy recommendations are: 
the suitable number of insured and/or other groups covered by a primary 
care provider, the gold standard for infrastructure of facility and 
provider networks, an appropriate model of self-governing hospitals, DRG 
schedule and computer module for the DRG method. 
The state of the art concerning quality of care assurance of general 
providers in Thailand is limited especially for the provider network 
facilities. As mentioned in section 7.3.3, it is important to have self 
monitoring of the quality of care provided by facilities in the network; 
the method and minimum set of activities for monitoring quality assurance 
within the network by the network office need to be studied. 
In prescribing, the price/cost of the insured was likely to be kept down 
by prescribing fewer items/doses of drugs for the insured than for the 
noninsured. This is likely to occur either by underdosing or by multiple 
visits. For multiple visits, it possibly arises through primary facilities 
wanting to split a prescription, and then charging MEDSEC office more than 
once. However, from this study, it is still not clear what are the causal 
factors affecting the limitation of items/doses of drugs prescribed to the 
insured. Research into the causal factors affecting the number of 
items/doses of drugs prescribed, whether by underdosing or multiple visits, 
is needed. 
As mentioned in section 8.2, in nonurban provinces, an appropriate provider 
network model is needed to promote cost-effectiveness of medical care. 
Research concerning a suitable provider network for such provinces should 
be undertaken and proposals put to sso. 
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In the referral system, clinics have been proposed as a primary facility 
in the health delivery system network to tackle the poor accessibility of 
the insured. In the primary care facility, it serves not only the insured 
but also the general population. There are no studies about the highest 
number of clients to be taken care of by clinics with the highest quality 
of care. Studies about the number of the insured and/or the other groups 
covered by a primary care provider should be undertaken. However, the 
range of care to be provided should also be studied. This is because in 
Thailand, there is no standard list of care that ensures clinics are able 
to provide acceptable quality. In some developed countries, they have 
primary care teams to provide a wider range of primary care. In the UK, 
for example, the primary care team includes medical doctors, practice 
nurses, psychiatric nurses, social workers, health visitors, home nurses, 
dieticians etc.. The services are offered for general medical 
diseases/conditions, minor surgery, vaccination, blood sampling, eye 
syringing, family planning, cervical smear and other routine screening 
tests, antenatal clinics, baby clinics, diabetic clinics, psychiatric 
treatment, counselling for personal problems, home visits, home nursing 
care etc .. 
In this study, opting out of self-governing hospitals has been proposed to 
create competition with the private network. Since the state of the art 
about self-governing hospitals in Thailand is very limited, a study to 
describe an appropriate model of self-governing hospitals for Thailand is 
worthwhile. 
In the payment system of MEDSEC network, general and specialized hospitals 
were paid by FFS method, and they spent the highest proportion of the 
budget. Special payment schedules - ego DRGs - should be studied to 
reduce these problems. As the IP records and data at MEDSEC office for 
general/specialized hospitals of MEDSEC network are quite complete, a study 
of DRG schedules and computer modules for the DRG payment should be 
promptly undertaken. The resulting schedule and model should be able to 
be generalized to all networks. 
168 
Reference 
Abel-Smith, B., et ale (1.984) Ct' . os contalnment ln health care, Bedford 
square Press, London. 
Abel-Smith, B. (1.988) The Rise and Decline of the Early HMOs: Some 
International Experiences, The Milbank Quarterly, 6(4), 694-79. 
Akin, J. (1.987) Health insurance in Developing Countries: prospective for 
risk-sharing, Washington, D.C., World Bank. 
Akin, J., Birdsall, N., and De Ferranti, D. (1987) Financing Health 
Services in Developing Countries, Washington, World Bank. 
Altenstetter, C. (1987) An end to a Consensus on Health Care in the Federal 
Republic of Germany?, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 12(3), 
505-536. 
Armitage, P., and Berry, G. (1987) Statistical Method in Medical Research, 
Blackwell Science Publications, Oxford, UK. 
Bank of Thailand(1.994), Annual report of Bank of Thailand, Bangkok (in 
Thai) . 
Bardsley, A., Coles, J. and Jenkins, L., eds. (1987) DRGs and health care, 
London: King's Fund. 
Bradbury, RC., Golec, JR., and Stearns, FE. (1991) Comparing hospital 
length of stay in independent practice association HMOs and traditional 
insurance programs, Inquiry, 28(1), 87-93. 
Bradbury, RC., 
efficiency in 
Golec, JR., Sterns, FE. Jr. (1993) Comparing surgical 
independent practice association HMOS and traditional 
insurance programs, Health Services Management Research, 6(2), 99-108. 
Broomberg, J., Price, MR. (1990) The impact of the fee-for-service 
reimbursement system on the utilisation of health services, Part I. A 
review of the determinants of doctors' practice patterns, South Africa 
Medical Journal, 78(3), 1.30-2. 
J (1.994) A d raft auestionnaire for evaluation contracting out Broomberg, . -
hospitals. 
1.69 
Burkett, GL. (1.982) Variations in physician utilization patterns in a 
capitation payment IPA-HMO, Medical Care, 20(11), 1128-39. 
Callahan, EJ., Bertakis, KD. (1993) A comparison of physician-patient 
interaction at fee-for-service and HMO sites, Family Practitioner Research 
Journal, 1.3(2), 1.71.-8. 
Cartwright, A. (1.983) Health surveys in practice and in potential: a 
critical review of their scope and methods, King Edward's Hospital Fund for 
London, London. 
Christopher JL. et ale (1.992) Adult Morbidity: Limited Data and 
Methodological Uncertainty, in Feachem, RG. et al., The Health of Adults 
in the Developing World, Oxford University Press. 
Culyer, AJ., Donaldson, C., Gerard, K. (1988a) Alternatives of fundinq of 
health services in the UK, working paper No.2 on alternative delivery and 
funding of health services, The Institute of Health services Management, 
UK .. 
Culyer, AJ., Donaldson, C., Gerard, K. (1988b) Financing aspects of health 
services: drawing on exPerience, working paper NO.3 on al ternati ve deli very 
and funding of health services, The Institute of Health services 
Management, UK .. 
Culyer, AJ., and Brazier JE. (1988) Working Paper No.4, Alternative for 
organising the provision of health services in the UK, a paper for the IHSM 
Working Party on Alternative Delivery and Fund for Health Care, University 
of York. 
Diarrhoeal survey form of Communicable Disease Control Department, 
Thailand, 1.994. 
Donabedian, A., (1.980) The Definition of quality and approaches to its 
assessment, Ann Arbor, MI: Health Administration Press, 27. 
Donabedian, A. (1.988a) Quality Assessment and Assurance: Unity of Purpose, 
Diversity of Mean, Inquiry, 25 (spring), 173-192. 
Donabedian, A. (1988b) The Quality of care: How can it be assessed?, Jama, 
260(1.2), 1.743-1748. 
A (1.981.) Criteria, Norms and standards of quality: What Do Donabedian, . 
They Mean?, American Journal of Public Health, 71(4), 409-412. 
170 
Donaldson, C. and Gerard, K. (1993) Economics of health care financing the 
visible hand, The Macmillan Press, London, UK. 
Dowling, WL. (1979) Prospective Reimbursement of Hospitals, in Weeks et al. 
(eds), Financing of Health Care, Ann Arbor, Health Administration Press, 
249-266. 
Eichhon, S. (1984) Health Services in the Federal Republic of Germany, in 
Raffel, M.W. (ed), Comparative Health systems, University Park, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 258-285. 
Enthoven, A. (1988) Managed competition of alternative delivery systems, 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 13(2), 305-321. 
Enthoven, A. (1993) The history and principles of managed competition, 
Health Affairs, 12 (Supplement), 24-48. 
Evan, RG. (1989) The Canadian Health Care system: the other part of North 
America is rather different, Document presented in international symposium 
on health care systems, Taipei, Taiwan. 
Feldman, R., and Dowd, B. (1986) Is there a competitive market for hospital 
services? Journal of Health Economics, 5(3), 277-92. 
Food and Drugs Administration of Thailand (FDA, 1988a) Standard treatment 
for upper respiratory tract infection, the Specialist Committee for 
Standard Treatment, FDA, Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) (in Thai) . 
Food and Drugs Administration of Thailand (FDA, 1988b) Standard treatment 
for arthritis disease, the Specialist Committee for Standard Treatment, 
FDA, MOPH (in Thai) . 
Food and Drugs Administration of Thailand (FDA, 1988c) Standard treatment 
for hypertension disease, the Specialist Committee for Standard Treatment, 
FDA, MOPH (in Thai) . 
Fox, HE., Wicks, LB., Newacheck, PW. (1993) Health maintenance 
organizations and children with special health needs. A suitable match?, 
American Journal Diseases of Children, 147(5), 546-52. 
Glaser WA. (1987) Unit of payment, in Paying the hospital: the 
orqanization, dynamics, and effect of differing financial arrangements, 
Jossey-Bass publishers, London. 
171 
Groenewegen, PPTI. (1991) Substitution of primary care and specialist care: 
a regional analysis in Denmark, Social Science Medicine, 33(4), 471-6. 
Gross, R., Benbassat, J., Niral, N., Cohen, M. (1992) Quality of care in 
decentralized primary care clinics: a conceptual framework, International 
Journal of Health Planning and Management, 7(4), 271-86. 
Hastings, JEF., Mott, FD., Barclay, A., Hewitt, D (1973) Prepaid group 
practice in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario: Part1: Analysis of utilization 
records, Medical Care, 11(2), 91-103. 
Health Services Research Group (1992) A guide to direct measures of patient 
satisfaction in clinical practice, Canadian Medical Association Journal, 
146(10), 1727-1731. 
Hilsenrath, P. (1991) Monopolistic competition and the health care sector, 
Health Services Management Research, 4(2), 82-88. 
Hiramatsu, S. (1990) Member satisfaction in a staff-model health maintenance 
organization, American Journal of Hospital Pharmacy, 47(10), 2270-3. 
Hogarth, J. (1963) The payment of the general practitioner, Oxford, 
Pergamon Press. 
Hogerzeil, HV., et al. (1993) Field tests for rational drug use in twelve 
developing countries, Lancet, 342, 1408-1410. 
Hoinville, G., Roger, J., and associates (1989) Questionnaire construction 
in Survey Research Practice, Gower Publishing Company Limited, England. 
Holloway, PJ., Lennon, MA., Mellor, AC., Coventry, P., Worthington, HV. 
(1990) The capitation study. 1. Does capitation encourage "supervised 
neglect"?, British Dental Journal, 168(3), 119-21. 
Hulks et al. (1970) Scale for the measurement of attitudes towards 
physicians and primary medical care, Medical Care, 8, 429-436. 
Jenkins, L., McKee, M., Sanderson, H. (1990) DRGs: A Guide to Grouping and 
Interpretation, London:CASPE Research. 
AN D d B Morris, NE., Lurie, N. (1989) Differences in Johnson, . , ow, . , 
inpatient resource use by type of health plan, Inquiry, 26(3), 388-98. 
172 
Kamolrattanakul, P., et ale (1993) Service provision to insured workers by 
contracted hospitals in Samutprakarn in 1992, Health Insurance Monograph 
Series Number 7, MOPH. 
Kane, NM (1995), Costs, productivity and financial outcomes of managed 
care, in Saltman, RB., Otter, CV. (editors), Implementing planned markets 
in health care, balancing social and economic responsibility, Open 
University Press, UK., 113-133. 
Kessner, DM., Kalk, CE., Singer, J. (1973) Assessing health quality-the 
case for tracers, New England Journal of Medicine, 288(4), 189-194. 
Knox, R. (1993) Germany: one nation with health care for all, Faulkner&Gray, 
Inc., New York Health Care Information Center, Washington, D.C .. 
Kroeger, A (1983) Health Interview Surveys in Developing Countries: A 
review of Methods and Results, International of Epidemiology, 12(4) 465-
481. 
Langwell, KL., and Rossiter, L., et ale (1987) Early experience of health 
maintenance organizations under Medicare competition demonstrations, Health 
Care Financing Review, 8(3), 37-55. 
Langwell, KM. (1990) Structure and performance of health maintenance 
organizations: a review, Health Care Financing Review, 12(1), 71-79. 
Leal de Araujo, L. (1973) Extension of social security to rural workers in 
Mexico, International Labour Review, 108(4), 295-312. 
Leelarasamee, A (1994) principle of antimicrobial drug used, Prescribers' 
Journal, 9(1), Jan-Mar 1994, FDA, MOPH (in Thai). 
Lipsitz, DJ., Nagler, HJ., Giannelli, A. (1993) A physician incentive 
compensation program in a staff model HMO, HMO Practice, 7(2), 82-7. 
L J G e n DG and Woodfield A (1989) Healthy Competition, The ogan, . , r e, . , , . 
Centre for Independent studies, Australia. 
Luft, HS. (1978) How do health-maintenance organizations achieve their 
savings?, New England Journal of Medicine, 298(24), 1336-1343. 
Luft, HS. (1986) Health Maintenance organizations: 
Dimensions of 
Performance, New Brunswick, N J, Transaction Books. 
173 
MacKenzie, E.J., Steinwachs, D.M., Ramzy, A.I., Ashworth, J.W. 3d., 
Shankar, B. (1991) Trauma case mix and hospital payment: the potential for 
refining DRGs, Health Services Research, 26(1), 5-26. 
Mahidol University (1988) Morbidity and mortality Differential (in Thai) . 
Manning, WG., Leibowiztz, A., Goldberg, GA., et al. (1984) A controlled 
trial of the effect of a prepaid group practice on use of services, New 
England Journal of Medicine, 310(23), 1505-1510. 
Marrison, EM., Luft HS. (1990) Health maintenance organization environments 
in the 1980s and beyond, Health Care Financing Review, 12, 81-89. 
McIver, S. (1992) Obtaining the views of inpatients and users of casualty 
departments, King's Fund Centre, London. 
McLaughlin, CG. (1988) Market responses to HMOs: price competition or 
rivalry?, Inquiry, 25(2): 207-18. 
McMahon, L.F. Jr., Hayward, R.A., Bernard, A.M., Rosevear, J.S., Weissfeld, 
L.A. (1992) APACHE-L: a new severity of illness adjuster for inpatient 
medical care, Medical Care, 30(5), 445-52. 
MEDSEC (1994) Draft report for annual meeting of executive committee of 
MEDSEC, February, 1994 (in Thai) . 
MEDSEC (1995) Draft report for annual meeting of executive committee of 
MEDSEC, March, 1995 (in Thai) . 
Mills, A. (1983) Economic aspects of health insurance in Lee,K., And 
Mills, A., The Economics of Health in Developing Countries, Oxford 
University Press. 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) (1992), A report of social insurance 
activities in 1991-1992, Office of Health Insurance, MOPH, Bangkok, 
Thailand (in Thai). 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) (1993), A report of social insurance 
activities in 1993, Office of Health Insurance, MOPH, Bangkok, Thailand (in 
Thai) . 
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) (1994), A report of social insurance 
activities in 1994, Office of Health Insurance, MOPH, Bangkok, Thailand (in 
Thai) . 
174 
Miranda, E., Scarpaci, JL., Irarrazaval, I. (1995) A decade of HMOs in 
Chile: market behaviour, consumer chol.·ce a d th t t H I h d I n e s a e, ea t an Pace, 
Elsevier Science Ltd., 1(1), 51-59. 
Moore, RA., Moore, C., Lindley, C. (1992) Hospital-based HMO: an outpatient 
study, Psychiatric Hospital, 23(3-4), 79-82. 
Morrisey, MA. (1993) Hospital pricing: cost shifting and competition, EBRI 
(Employee Benefit Research Institute) Issue Brief, 137, 1-17. 
Munoz, E., Barrau, L., Goldstein, J., Benacquista, T., Mulloy, K., Wise, 
L. (1988a) Health care financing policy for hospitalized nephology 
patients, American Journal of Kidney Disease, 12(6), 504-9. 
Munoz, E., Zahtz, G., Goldstein, J., Benacquista, T., Mulloy, K., Wise, L. 
(1988b) Surgonomics. Health care financing policy for hospitalized 
otolaryngology patients, Archive of Otolaryngology Head Neck Surgery, 
114(11), 1317-20. 
Munoz, E., Greenberg, R., Chalfin, D., Bank, S., Mulloy, K., Wise, L. 
(1988c) Hospital costs, resource characteristics, and the dynamics of death 
for hospitalized gastroenterology patients, American Journal of 
Gastroenterology, 83(9), 957-62. 
Munoz, E., Seltzer, V., Goldstein. J., Benacquista, T., Mulloy. K., Wise, 
L. (1989a) The equity of diagnostic related group "All Payer" hospital 
payment and gynaecology diagnostic related groups, Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology, 74(6), 831-7. 
Munoz, E., Rosner, F., Chalfin, D., Goldstein. J., Margolis, I., Wise, L. 
(1989b) Age, resource consumption, and outcome for medical patients at an 
academic medical center, Archive of Internal Medicine, 149(9), 1946-50. 
Munoz, E., Barrios, E., Johnson, H., Goldstein, J., Mulloy, K., Chalfin. 
D. (1989c) Wise, L., Race and diagnostic related group prospective hospital 
payment for medical patients, Journal of National Medical Association, 
81 (8), 844-8. 
Munoz, E., Goldstein. J., Lory, M.H., Brewster, J.G., Johnson, H., Kahn, 
B.A., Wise, L. (1990) Hospital readmissions, otolaryngology, and the 
diagnosis related group hospital payment system, Archive of Otolaryngology 
Head Neck Surgery, 116(6), 708-13. 
175 
Munoz, E., Chalfin, D., Goldstein, J., Cohen, J.R., Birnbaum, E., Wise, L. 
(1991) Hospital costs, resource characteristics, and the dynamics of death 
for general surgery patients, Surgery Annual, 23 Pt I, 137-46. 
Mushlin, AI., Appel, FA. (1980) Testing an outcome-based quality assurance 
strategy in primary care, Medical Care, 18 (5 supplement), 1-100. 
Nchinda, TC. (1977) A household study of illness prevalence and health care 
performances in a rural district of Cameroon. International Journal of 
Epidemiology, 6(3), 235-41. 
Newhouse, JP., Schwartz, WB, Williams, AP., and Witsberger, C. (1985) Are 
Fee-for-service costs increasing faster than HMO costs, Medical Care, 
23 (8), 960-966. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1993) The 
reform of health care: A Comparative analysis of Seven OECD Countries, 
Paris. 
Phijaisanit, W., et ale (1985) Investor-Owned and Not-for-Profit Hospitals: 
A comparison Study in Bangkok, Journal of Medical Association of Thailand, 
68(6), 293-287. 
Pindyck, RS. and Rubinfeld, DL. (1981) Model of quality choice, in 
Econometric models and economic forcasts, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Singapore. 
Punnarunothai, S. (1993) Equity in health: the need for and the use of 
public and private health services in urban area in Thailand, PhD Thesis, 
UK. 
Rains, AJ., Ritchie, HD. (1977) Bailey and love's Short Practice of 
surgery, H.K. Lewis and Co.Ltd, UK .. 
Reinhardt, UE. (1993) The German Health System: Providing Equitable, 
Universal Access to Health Care and Controlling Its Costs, Paper prepared 
for the Senior Policy Seminar On Health Financing In China, Beij ing, 
Peoples Republic of China. 
Richards, T. (1986) HMOs: America today, Britain tomorrow? Even the rich 
can't afford it, British Medical Journal, 292(6515), 257-259. 
Rodrigues, J. (1987) The international scene, in Bardsley, Coles and 
Jenkins, (eds) , DRGs and Health Care, London: King's Fund, 61-73. 
176 
Roemer, MI. (1969) The organisation of medical care under social security, 
International Labour Organization, Geneva. 
Roemer, MI. (1987) Health system financing by social security, 
International Journal of Health Planning and Management, 2, 109-124. 
Romano, PM. (1993) Managed care accreditation: the process and early 
findings, Journal of Health Care Quality, 15(6), 12-6, quiz 16. 
Ron, A., Abel-Smith, B., Tamburi, G. (1990) Health Insurance in Developing 
country: The Social Security Approach, International Labour Office, 
Switzerland. 
Ross, D., Vaughan, P. (1984) Health Interview Surveys in Developing 
Countries: A Methodological Review with Recommendations for Future Surveys, 
EPC Publication Number 4, winter, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London, UK. 
Ross-Degnan, D, et al (1992) A strategy for promoting improved 
pharmaceutical use: the international network for rational use of drug, 
Social Science Medicine, 35(11), 1329-1341. 
Scarpaci, JL. (1987) HMO promotion and the privatization of health care in 
Chile, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 12(3), 551-67. 
Scott, PRo (1977) An Aid to clinical Surgery, Churchill Livingstone, 
Edinburgh, London, and New York. 
Sheils, JF., Lewin, LS., and Haught, RA. (1993) Potential Public 
Expenditures Under Managed Competition, Health Affairs, Supplement, 229-
242. 
Shimmura, K. (1988) Effects of different remuneration methods on general 
medical practice: a comparison of capitation and fee-for-service payment, 
International Journal of Health Planning and Management, 3(4), 245-58. 
Singkaew, S. (1991) Policy options for health insurance in Thailand, PhD 
Thesis, University of London. 
Social Security Office (1995), Minute of the second SSO committee meeting 
of 1995, (in Thai). 
177 
Tangcharoensathien, V., Kamolrattanakul, P., Supachutikul, A. et al. (1993) 
Health seeking behaviour of the insured workers in Samutprakan in 1992, 
Health Insurance Monograph Series Number 6, Health Policy and Plan Bureau, 
Ministry of public Health, Bangkok, Thailand (in Thai) . 
Thompson, J., Edwards, K. (l99l) Using indicators to assess quality of 
hospital services in Papua New Guinea, International Journal of Health 
Planning and Management, 6, 309-324. 
Tollman, S., Schopper, D., and Torres, A. (1990) Health maintenance 
organizations in developing countries: what can we expect?, Health Policy 
and Planning, 5(2), l49-l60. 
United States General Accounting Office (US GAO) (1993a) Medicaid: States 
Turn to Managed Care to Improve Access and Control Costs, US GAO, 
Washington, D.C .. 
United States General Accounting Office (US GAO) (1993b) 1993 German Health 
Reforms: New Cost Control Initiatives, Report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, U.S.Senate, US GAO, Washington, D.C .. 
US Department of Health and Human Services (1986) Social Security 
Programmes Throughout the World-l985, Research Report NO.60, Washington, 
D.C., Social Security Administrative. 
Varkevisser, CM., Pathmanathan, I., Brownlee, A. (1991) Data Analysis and 
Report Writing: Designing and Conducting Health Systems Research Projects, 
Health Systems Research Training Series Volume 2, IDRC and WHO. 
ViverOS-Long, A. (l986) Changes in Health Financing: the Chilean 
Experience, Social Science and Medicine, 22(3), 379-385. 
Von-Korff, M., Marshall, J. (l992) High cost HMO enrollees, Analysis of one 
physician's panel, HMO Practice, 6(l}, 20-5. 
Ware, JE., Brook, RH., Rogers, WH., et al. (l986) Comparison of health 
outcomes at a health maintenance organisation with those of fee-for-service 
care, Lancet, l(8488), lOl7-l022. 
WHO (l993) How to investigate drug use in health facilities, selected drug 
use indicators, WHO/DAP/93.l, Geneva. 
Wyszewianski, L. (1988) Quality of 
challenges, Inquiry, 25(l), 13-22. 
care: 
178 
past achievements and future 
Zschock, DK. (1982) General review of problems of medical care delivery 
under social security in developing countries, International social 
security review, 1(82), 3-15. 
179 
Annex 1 
Instruments for the study 
Form No.1 
Ministry of Public Health 
Samsan Road, Bangkok 10200 Telephone 2821886 
THE RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING:A CASE 
STUDY OF A PRIVATE HEALTH PROVIDER NETWORK IN THAILAND 
PURCHASER VIEWPOINT 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
with the manager of MEDSEC and staff 
Introduction to the manager of the MEDSEC and staff 
This study is to evaluate a private health provider network, MEDSEC 
network. The aim of this study is to identify health policy 
recommendations about health care provider networks in social 
insurance in Thailand which would improve the accessibility to care of 
the insured, their satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system 
within a private network. The main, general objective of this study 
is to evaluate MEDSEC network in terms of organization, payment 
system, quality of care, and behaviour and utilization rate of the. 
insured. The study is contained in four substudies: 
-operating system, financial management, and charge rate for 
medical care of MEDSEC; and the utilization rate of MEDSEC and 
Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers about MEDSEC 
-heal th seeking behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and 
satisfaction of the insured with the services of MEDSEC 
facilities. 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This in-depth interview with you and your staff, and secondary data 
collection from your office is part of this study. The specific 
objectives of this study are to identify how MEDSEC network was set up 
and how it has grown over time, the payment system to providers of 
MEDSECi and to examine the utilization rate of MEDSEC and Nopparat 
networks. 
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Form NO.1 
Questions 
1.Historical development of MEDSEC 
1.1 How was MEDSEC set up? 
1.2 Who are the initiators? 
1.3 Who are the planners? 
1.4 Who paid for the first capitation budget? 
1.5 How has it grown? 
2.What is the marketing and propaganda system to employers? 
3.What is the marketing and propaganda system to providers? 
4.Is the amount of capitation payment (700 Baht) adequate? 
s.Is there any incentive payment system to employers and doctors? If 
yes, how does it work? 
6.What are the current contractual relationships within the network? 
(ASPECTS OF INTEREST: VIEW ON SATISFACTION OF MEMBERS IN THE 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, HOW MANY PROVIDERS WITHDREW FROM THE NETWORK 
LAST YEAR, VIEW ON THE FUTURE TREND OF MEMBERSHIP WITHIN MEDSEC, WHAT 
ARE THE SOCIAL ACTIVITIES BETWEEN PROVIDERS) 
5.What are the recent details of the payment system between MEDSEC 
and sub-networks, between sub-network and providers in the sub-
network, between MEDSEC and general hospitals? Is there any 
limitation of fee-for-service payment to general hospital, to sub-
network? Can MEDSEC pay providers at the agreed time? 
6.Do you check providers before they are allowed to join network? 
7.Is there any criteria on the minimum buildings, equipment, 
standards, available staff to recruit providers? 
8.What is the quality control mechanism of the service with general 
hospitals, small hospitals, clinics/polyclinics? 
9.What are the mechanisms to cope with unexpectedly high 
reimbursement for some diseases? 
10.How do first and second level providers decide where to refer 
patients? 
11.Does price charged by general hospitals affect the decision of 
small hospitals to refer patients? If yes, what is the evidence(SUCH 
AS DECREASED NUMBER OF INPATIENTS PER MONTH OF THE HOSPITAL WITH 
HIGHER PRICES CHARGED)? 
12.How do patients decide which provider to go to? 
13.What aspect of services do patients value? 
14.Is there any effect of non-price competition such as good 
reception, cleanliness, convenience, friendly personnel between 
providers in the same level of care? If yes, what is the evidence 
(SUCH AS DECREASED NUMBER OF OUT-PATIENTS VISITS PER MONTH OF THE 
PROVIDERS WITH COMPLAINTS OF POOR SERVICE FROM THE INSURED)? 
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Form NO.1 
Secondary data collection 
from the MEDSEC office checklist 
Sources of information 
l.monthly report of MEDSEC office to the executive committee of 
MEDSEC 
2.monthly report of payment to providers 
3.yearly report of balance of payment and income 
4. all the minutes of meeting in the MEDSEC Office and of the 
executive committee. 
I.How effective is the marketing and propaganda system? 
2.Is there any incentive payment system to the employers and doctors? 
If yes, how is it organized? 
3.What is the recent detail of the payment system? 
4.Did any sub-network return any money to balance the account of any 
firm last year (in case the balance of capitation of that firm is 
negative)? How many of them? How much was the amount in Baht? 
S.Is there any financial risk to MEDSEC? 
6.What is the utilization rate and charge rate of the insured within 
the various providers in the network? 
7.What are the quality control procedures of services? 
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Form No. 2 
Ministry of Public Health 
Samsan Road, Bangkok 10200 Telephone 2821886 
THE RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING:A CASE 
STUDY OF A PRIVATE HEALTH PROVIDER NETWORK IN THAILAND 
PROVIDER VIEWPOINT 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDELINE WITH 
The manager of providers 
Selection of providers 
1.Four clinics/polyclinics(one from each sub-network). 
2.Four small hospitals (one from each sub-network). 
3.0ne general hospital(by simple random sampling technique) 
Introduction to the manager of the providers 
This study is to evaluate a private health provider network, MEDSEC 
network. The aim of this study is to identify health policy 
recommendations about health care provider networks ln social 
insurance in Thailand which would improve the accessibility to care of 
the insured, their satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system 
within a private network. The main, general objective of this study 
is to evaluate MEDSEC network in terms of organization, payment 
system, quality of care, and behaviour and utilization rate of the 
insured. The study is contained in four substudies: 
-operating system, financial management, and charge rate for 
medical care of MEDSEC; and the utilization rate of MEDSEC and 
Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers about MEDSEC 
-heal th seeking 
satisfaction of 
facilities. 
behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and 
the insured with the services of MEDSEC 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This in-depth interview with you is a part of this study. And the 
specific objective of this study is to identify the provider 
t k t d h l·t has grown over perspective of how MEDSEC ne wor was se up an ow 
time, and the payment system to MEDSEC providers. 
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Form No. 2 
Questions 
1.How does the network encourage employers to register with it? 
2.Why did you decide to be involved with MEDSEC? 
3.Could you explain the terms of the contract in the agreement between 
MEDSEC and you? (ASPECTS OF INTEREST: DETAIL OF PAYMENT AGREEMENT; 
QUALIFICATION OF PROVIDERS IN EVERY LEVEL; REGULATION IN THE CONTRACT 
BETWEEN SUB-NETWORK AND PROVIDERS IN THE SUB-NETWORK; PENALTIES IN A. 
PARTICULAR SITUATION SUCH AS REFUSING TO TREAT WORKERS, NOT TO PAY 
PROVIDERS IN THE SUB-NETWORK; HOW MUCH OF THE INSTALMENT) 
4.What would you like to change in the agreement? How is it to be 
changed? 
5.Could you explain the payment system of MEDSEC? 
6.What are the advantages and disadvantages of the payment system to 
you? 
7.How do you charge for the insured? Is it higher, lower or the same 
price as other patients? 
8.Do you know whether the income and expenditure regarding the insured 
is balanced or not? How much is the difference? 
9.How is the stage of sickness at which the patients is referred 
decided? What is the reason for referral? 
10.Is there any difference in price charged between higher care 
hospitals? 
11.Does the price of higher level care hospital affect your decision 
to refer a patient? 
12.Is there any effect of non-price competition such as good. 
reception, cleanliness, convenience, friendly personnel between 
providers in the same level care as your facilities? 
13.How is the accessibility for the insured to receive care? 
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EMPLOYEES VIEWPOINT 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
IDENTIFICATION OF STUDY FIRMS 
Applying a mUlti-stage sampling technique, four firms (one firm from 
each subnetwork) will be selected. Two firms must in the past have had 
a public provider as a main contractor. The selected firms should have 
about ~OO-450 workers in a particular firm. 
Introduction guide 
The aim of this study is to identify health policy recommendations 
about health care provider networks in social insurance in Thailand 
which would improve the accessibility to care of the insured, their 
satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system within a private 
network. The main, general objective of this study is to evaluate 
MEDSEC network in terms of organization, payment system, quality of 
care, and behaviour and utilization rate of the insured. The study is 
contained in four substudies: 
-operating system, financial management, and charge rate for 
medical care of MEDSEC; and the utilization rate of MEDSEC and 
Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers about MEDSEC 
-health seeking behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and 
satisfaction of the insured with the services of MEDSEC 
facilities. 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This structured interview with you and other employees is part of this 
study. The specific objectives of this study is to examine the health 
seeking behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and satisfaction of the 
insured of MEDSEC network. 
(~-4) (5-6) 
Identification Code [___ ___ ] Month ...... ~994 [ ] 
of the firm and worker 
Name of the firm and address . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
Worker's name ............................ . 
In terviewer' s Name ....................... . 
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1.. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Age in years 
Sex 
Marital status 
Educational status 
Col./ 
Code 
(7-8) 
(9 ) 
Male 1 
Female 2 
(10) 
Single 1 
Married 2 
Divorced 3 
Widow 4 
Separated 5 
(11 ) 
Primary school 1 
Secondary school 2 
Vocational education 3 
Certificated education 4 
Bachelor degree 5 
Master or doctorate degree 6 
Where are you staying(Home)? (12-14) 
5. 1 Subdistrict ..................... . 
5.2 District 
5.3 Province 
Income per month from this firm (BAHT/MONTH) 
(INCLUDE ALL ALLOWANCE) 
Other income from other sources (not from the 
firm) /month(BAHT/MONTH) 
What is your duty in this firm 
(15-19) 
(20-24) 
(25) 
Administrator or manager 1 
Secretary 2 
Product producer by using machine 3 
Product producer by manual labour 4 
Other 5 
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9. 
10. 
11. 
Balance of your income and expenditure 
Enough with saving 
Enough but no saving 
Col./ 
Code 
(26 ) 
1 
2 
Not enough but no debt 3 
Not enough with debt 4 
How many hours do you work in a week(IN 
HOURS) 
Normally, when do you work? 
(27-28) 
(29) 
Day time 1 
Night time 2 
Day and night time alternatively 3 
12. Is there any medical service on the work 
site for the workers when you are sick in (30) 
A 
o 
the firm? Yes 
No 
I don't know 5 
13. Who provides the medical services in the 
firm? (30) 
Nurse 1 
Medical doctor 2 
Nurse and/or medical doctor 3 
Other 4 
14. Do you know about the Social Security Act? (31 ) 
Yes 1 
No 0 
15. Do you know your registered providers (32) 
Yes A 
No o 
16. What is the name of your registered main 
contractor? (32) 
Correct name of main contractor 1 
Incorrect name of main contractor 0 
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17. What are the facilities you know of that you 
are entitled to go to free of charge?(LIST 
THE NAMES) 
. . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
18. Who informs you about the registered 
providers? 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
19. As the main contractor was selected by the 
employer, would you prefer to select the 
main contractor by yourself? 
Col./ 
Code 
(33) 
Yes 1 
No 0 
20. What are the working hours of your 
registered providers under the Social 
Security Act when you can obtain services? 
21. 
(NUMBER IN HOURS) (34) 
Correct answer(24 HOUR/DAY, EVERY PROVIDER) 1 
Not correct answer 2 
I don't know 0 
Are there any disease or conditions that are 
not covered by social insurance? (35) 
Yes A 
No o 
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Col./ 
Code 
22. What are these diseases and conditions (LIST 
AT LEAST 4 DISEASES AND/OR CONDITIONS)? 
23. 
- . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (35) 
Correct, at least 4 diseases/conditions 4 
Correct, 3 diseases/conditions 3 
Correct, 2 diseases/conditions 2 
Correct, 1 disease /condition 1 
Do you have a social security card? (36) 
Yes 1 
No o 
24. Do you have to use it when you need to 
receive care from your registered provider? (37) 
Yes 1 
No 0 
25. In case of emergency or accident, where can 
you receive care free of charge? (38) 
From registered providers only 0 
Any providers 1 
I don't know 2 
No free of charge providers 3 
26. In case of emergency or accident, if you 
have paid the treatment fee, can you have it 
reimbursed? (39) 
Yes 1 
No 2 
I don't know 0 
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Col./ 
Code 
27. Do you know how many benefits are covered 
under the Social Security Act? What are 
they? 
(4 BENEFITS=UNRELATED TO WORK ILLNESS CARE, 
MATERNITY, DEATH BENEFIT, AND DISABILITY 
BENEFIT) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (40) 
Yes (CORRECT ANSWER) 1 
No(INCORRECT ANSWER) 0 
28. Between 1 Nov. 1993 to 31 October 1994, were 
29. 
you admitted to a hospital? (41) 
Yes, ......... times 
No 0 
1st time seek care from 
lInd time seek care from ................. . 
IIIrd time seek care from ................ . 
IVth time seek care from ................ . 
Vth time seek care from .................. . 
VIth time seek care from ................ . 
During 1 to 31 October 1994, were you 
ill (not needed admission to a hospital)? (42) 
Yes, one episode l 1 
Yes, two episodes 2 
Yes, three episodes 
Yes, four episodes 
Yes, disabled 
No, good health 
3 
4 
5 
o 
skip 
to 
Q51 
Q51 
Q51 
1 Episode= illness (condition or disease) occurred, not consider how 
many times patient visit to facilities. 
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30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
QUESTION REGARDING THE FIRST EPISODE 
At the first episode, last month, 
-What was the symptom? . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
-What was the cause of the symptom? . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
At the first episode, last month, where were 
you when you first felt sick? 
Col./ 
Code 
(43 ) 
At home 1 
At the working place 2 
Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. (WHERE) 3 
At the first episode, last month, where did 
you go to seek care? 
From home 
From work place 
From other .............. (NAME) 
At the first episode, last month, what did 
you do when you were sick? (ANSWER CAN BE 
MORE THAN ONE CHOICE, NUMBER THE ORDER OF 
(44 ) 
1 
2 
3 
CARE SEEKING BEHAVIOUR) (45) 
self prescribed drug 1 
workplace clinic 
other private clinics 
other hospitals 
MEDSEC network 
providers (NAMES) ......................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2 
3 
4 
5 
34. Why did you not seek services from the 
registered facilities? (46) 
Emergency sickness 1 
Not satisfied with services rendered 2 
Difficulty in access due to traffic problem 3 
Other .......................... (REASON) 4 
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Col./ 
Code 
35. If you did not get services from MEDSEC 
network, did you pay?, how much did you pay? (47-50) 
Yes, ......... Baht 
No o 
36. If you have paid according to Q35, were you 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
reimbursed from the Social Security Fund? (51-54) 
Yes, ........ BAHT 
No 0 
QUESTION REGARDING THE SECOND EPISODE 
Were you sick for 2 times last month No 
If yes, What is the symptom of second 
episode? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-What is the cause of the symptom? . 
At the second episode, last month, where 
were you when you first felt sick? 
A 
(55) 
At home 1 
At the working place 2 
Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. (WHERE) 3 
At the second episode, last month, where did 
you go to seek care? From home 
(56) 
1 
From work place 2 
From other .............. (NAME) 3 
At the second episode, what did you do when 
you were sick? (ANSWER CAN BE >1 CHOICE, 
NUMBER THE ORDER OF CARE SEEKING BEHAVIOUR) (57) 
self prescribed drug 1 
workplace clinic 2 
other private clinics 
other hospitals 
MEDSEC network providers (NAMES) .......... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Col./ 
Code 
41. Why did you not seek services from the 
registered facilities? (58) 
Emergency sickness 1 
Not satisfied with services rendered 2 
Difficulty in access due to traffic problem 3 
Other .......................... (REASON) 4 
42. If you did not get services from MEDSEC 
network, did you pay?, how much did you pay? (59-62) 
Yes, ........ baht 
No o 
43. If you have paid according to Q42, were you 
44. 
45. 
reimbursed from the Social Security Fund? (63-66) 
Yes, ........... BAHT 
No 0 
QUESTION REGARDING THE THIRD EPISODE 
Were you sick for 3 times last month No 
If yes, what is the symptom of third 
episode? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-What is the cause of the symptom? 
. . . . . - . . . . . . . 
At the third episode, last month, where were 
you when you first felt sick? 
A 
(67 ) 
At home 1 
At the working place 2 
Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., (WHERE) 3 
46. At the third episode, last month, where did 
you go to seek care? (68) 
From home 1 
From work place 2 
From other .............. (NAME) 3 
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47. At the third episode, last month, what did 
you do when you were sick? {ANSWER CAN BE 
MORE THAN ONE CHOICE, NUMBER THE ORDER OF 
Col./ 
Code 
CARE SEEKING BEHAVIOUR) (69) 
self prescribed drug 1 
workplace clinic 2 
other private clinics 
other hospitals 
MEDSEC network providers (NAMES) ........... . 
. -......................................... . 
48. Why did you not seek services from the 
3 
4 
5 
registered facilities? (70) 
Emergency sickness 1 
Not satisfied with services rendered 2 
Difficulty in access due to traffic problem 3 
Other .......................... (REASON) 4 
49. If you did not get services from MEDSEC 
network, did you pay?, how much did you pay? 
Yes, ........ BAHT 
No 
50. If you have paid according to Q49, were you 
(71-74) 
o 
reimbursed from the Social Security Fund? (75-78) 
Yes, ........ BAHT 
No 0 
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Col./ skip 
Code to 
51. 
QUESTION REGARDING SATISFACTION 
Have you ever received health service from 
MEDSEC network? (79) 
Yes A 
No a 
52. How satisfied are you with the facilities in 
MEDSEC network from which you usually receive 
care in terms of waiting time? (79) 
Very much satisfied 1 
Very satisfied 2 
Fairly satisfied 3 
dissatisfied 4 
Very dissatisfied 5 
53. How satisfied are you with health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of quality 
of curative care? (80) 
Very much satisfied 1 
Very satisfied 2 
Fairly satisfied 3 
dissatisfied 4 
Very dissatisfied 5 
54. How satisfied are you with health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of good 
reception? (81) 
Very much satisfied 1 
Very satisfied 2 
Fairly satisfied 3 
dissatisfied 4 
Very dissatisfied 5 
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55. How satisfied are you with health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of 
friendly personnel? (82) 
Very much satisfied 1 
Very satisfied 2 
Fairly satisfied 3 
dissatisfied 4 
Very dissatisfied 5 
56. How satisfied are you with health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of 
cleanliness? (83) 
Very much satisfied 1 
Very satisfied 2 
Fairly satisfied 3 
dissatisfied 4 
Very dissatisfied 5 
57. How satisfied are you with the physical 
accessibility to the out patient care 
58. 
facilities in MEDSEC network? 
Very much satisfied 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
The last time you received service from the 
network, did you know from MEDSEC personnel 
what disease you had? (MEASURE INTERPERSONAL 
ASPECT OF CARE) 
Yes, (WHAT DISEASE) ...................... . 
(84) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(85) 
1 
No 0 
Never received service from network 2 
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59. How satisfied are you with the facilities in 
MEDSEC network in terms of waiting time 
compared to public facilities from which you 
usually receive care? (86) 
much more satisfied 1 
more satisfied 2 
the same 3 
less satisfied 4 
much less satisfied 5 
60. How satisfied are you with the health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of quality 
of curative care compared to public provision? (87) 
much more satisfied 1 
more satisfied 2 
the same 3 
less satisfied 4 
much less satisfied 5 
61. How satisfied are you with the health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of good 
reception compared to public facilities from 
which you usually receive care? (88) 
much more satisfied 1 
more satisfied 2 
the same 3 
less satisfied 4 
much less satisfied 5 
62. How satisfied are you with the health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of 
friendly personnel compared to public 
facilities from which you usually receive (89) 
care? much more satisfied 1 
more satisfied 2 
the same 3 
less satisfied 4 
much less satisfied 5 
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63. How satisfied are you with the health care 
provided by MEDSEC network in terms of 
cleanliness compared to public facilities from 
which you usually receive care? (90) 
much more satisfied 1 
more satisfied 2 
the same 3 
less satisfied 4 
much less satisfied 5 
64. How satisfied are you with the accessibility 
to the out patient care facilities in MEDSEC 
network compared to public provision? (91) 
much more satisfied 1 
more satisfied 2 
the same 3 
less satisfied 4 
much less satisfied 5 
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THE RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING:A CASE 
STUDY OF A PRIVATE HEALTH PROVIDER NETWORK IN THAILAND 
EMPLOYERS VIEWPOINT 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
With Employers 
Selection of the firms 
Applying a multi-stage sampling technique, four firms(one firm from 
each sub-network) will be selected. Two firms must in the past have 
had a public provider as a main contractor. The selected firms 
should have about 100-450 workers in a particular firm. 
Introduction to the employer 
The aim of this study is to identify health policy recommendations 
about health care provider networks in social insurance in Thailand 
which would improve the accessibility to care of the insured, their 
satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system within a private 
network. The main, general objective of this study is to evaluate 
MEDSEC network in terms of organization, payment system, quality of 
care, and behaviour and utilization rate of the insured. The study 
is contained in four substudies: 
-operating system, financial management, and charge rate for 
medical care of MEDSECi and the utilization rate of MEDSEC and 
Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers about 
MEDSEC 
-health seeking behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and 
satisfaction of the insured with the services of MEDSEC 
facilities. 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This in-depth interview with you and other three employers is part 
of this study. The specific objective of this study is to examine 
the knowledge and attitude of the manager of firms with MEDSEC, and 
satisfaction of the insured of MEDSEC network. 
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Questions 
1.How did you come to know about MEDSEC? 
2.How does MEDSEC perform the marketing approach to you? 
3.Why did you choose MEDSEC as a main contractor? 
4.Did you consider other main contractors before choosing MEDSEC? 
S.Is there any incentive payment from MEDSEC after you chose MEDSEC 
as a main contractor? 
6.What is your perception about services of providers in the 
network? 
7.What is the performance of the worker before/after the contract 
with MEDSEC(by looking at the rate of absenteeism of the workers}? 
B.Are the employees satisfied with the services provided by MEDSEC 
providers? 
9.Is there any medical service in your company for workers? 
If yes, for what period of time are services provided? 
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Ministry of Public Health 
Muang District, Nonthaburi 11100 
THE RESPONSE 
CONTRACTING:A 
OF THE PRIVATE 
CASE STUDY OF A 
NETWORK IN THAILAND 
Telephone 5918611 
SECTOR 
PRIVATE 
TO COMPETITIVE 
HEALTH PROVIDER 
INFRASTRUCTURE SURVEY 
Introduction guide 
This study is to evaluate a private health provider network, MEDSEC 
network. The aim of this study is to identify health policy 
recommendations about health care provider networks in social 
insurance in Thailand which would improve the accessibility to care of 
the insured, their satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system 
within a private network. The main, general objective of this study 
is to evaluate MEDSEC network in terms of organization, payment 
system, quality of care, and behaviour and utilization rate of the 
insured. The study is contained in four substudies: 
-operating system, financial management, and charge rate for 
medical care of MEDSECj and the utilization rate of MEDSEC and 
Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers about MEDSEC 
-heal th seeking 
satisfaction of 
facilities. 
behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and 
the insured with the services of MEDSEC 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This postal questionnaire is part of this study. The specific 
objective of this study is to evaluate the quality of care of MEDSEC 
and Nopparat networks by analysis and comparison of infrastructure of 
MEDSEC and Nopparat networks. 
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Identification Code [ ___ ] 
___ ___ Month. . . . . . . .. 1994 
Name of facility........................... .. . ..... 
. .. . . . .... 
If it is hospital, registered as ........... beds 
Operated ........... beds 
Venue 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..... . .......... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ................... . .. 
Tel: ............................... Fax 
••••••••••••••••••••• co • • • •• • 
Service time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ....... ...... . 
Name of the owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... . ... 
Administrative section 
1. The director of facility has completed formal 
courses at postgraduate level. 
Code 
Yes, name of courses... .... ... .... ........ 1 
No 0 
2. The first deputy director of facility has completed 
formal courses at postgraduate level. 
Yes, name of courses 1 
No 2 
No first deputy 3 
3. The second deputy director of facility has 
completed formal courses at postgraduate level. 
Yes, name of courses 1 
No 2 
No second deputy 3 
4. Frequency of management team meetings in a year 
................... times 
5. Is there any training plan or programme for senior 
management staff. 
No 0 
Yes, list 3 example programmes 1 
1 ............................................... .. 
2 ................................. . ... . ........ . 
3 ....................................... .. .... ., 
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6. Proportion of non-clinical staff receiving in-service 
training during the past twelve months. 
No training 1 
Yes, trained ................. % of total staff 2 
7. Is there any microcomputer? 
Yes, .......... sets operated 1 
No computer 2 
8. Is there any data collection in MIS? 
Yes No Don't know 
- Diagnosis data [ ] [ ] [ ] 
- Mortality [ ] [ ] [ ] 
- Complication [ ] [ ] [ ] 
- Financial information [ ] [ ] [ ] 
- Personal information [ ] [ ] [ ] 
9. Are there any patient details on data covered or 
summarised in file? 
Yes No 
1. Age, Sex [ ] [ ] 
2. Admission diagnosis [ ] [ ] 
3. Discharge diagnosis [ ] [ ] 
4. Admission date [ ] [ ] 
s. Discharge date [ ] [ ] 
10. Frequency of report compiled from data bank report to 
anyone concerned. 
weekly 1 
every two weeks 2 
Monthly 3 
every 3 months 4 
every 6 months 5 
yearly 6 
Irregular 7 
No report 8 
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11. Is there any water supply? 
Yes, no water shortages 1 
Yes, but shortage everyday for ............. minute 2 
Yes, but shortage sometimes 3 
12. Is there any backup electricity? 
Yes, using gasoline generator 1 
Yes, using battery 2 
Yes, using other source................. 3 
No backup electricity.................. 4 
13. Waste disposal system. 
Mix all waste in a bag 1 
Separated in correct colour bags 2 
Handled by professional waste disposal company 3 
Other (detai I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Out-patient section 
1. Number of staff between 8.00-16.30 O'clock. 
Doctor ............................... persons 
Register Nurse ....................... persons 
Technical Nurse ...................... persons 
Nurse -Aid ............................ persons 
Other (details) ....................... persons 
2. Number of staff between 16.30-21.30 o'clock. 
Doctor ............................... persons 
Register Nurse ....................... persons 
Technical Nurse ...................... persons 
Nurse-Aid ............................ persons 
Other (details) ....................... persons 
3. Number of staff between 21.30-6.00 o'clock. 
Doctor ............................... persons 
Register Nurse ....................... persons 
Technical Nurse .............. ······· . persons 
Nurse-Aid ............................ persons 
Other (details) ....................... persons 
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4. Number of specialist doctors both part time and full-
time. 
1. Medicine. · ...... 
· · · 
· ... · ... .persons 
· · · · · · 
2. Surgery .... 
· .. 
· 
· .. · . · . 
· · · · · · · · · · 
· . 
.persons 
3. Plastic Surgery ..... 
· . · . 
· · · · · · · · 
. persons 
· · 
4. Orthopaedic. 
· . · .. 
· · . · · . · 
· . 
· · · · · · · · 
.persons 
5. Paediatric .... 
· . 
· · · 
· . 
· · · 
· . 
· · 
· .. 
· · · 
. persons 
6. OB-GYN ........ 
· 
· . 
· · · · 
· . 
· · · · · · · · · · · 
.persons 
5. List special clinics. 
1 . 
· 
· . · . . . . . . . · . · . 
· · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
2 . · . . . . ......... 
· · · · · · · · 
· . · · 
· . 
· · 
· . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
3. 
· · 
· . · ..... 
. . . . · .. 
· 
· . 
· · · · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
4 .. 
· · . 
· ...... 
· · 
· .. 
· 
· . · .. 
· · · · . · · · 
· . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · 
5 .. 
· · 
· . . . . . . . . . · .. 
· · · · 
· . · . · . 
· 
· . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
6. · .. 
· 
· .. · . 
. . . . . . 
· 
· . 
· · · · 
· .. · . 
· · 
· .. 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
7 ... · .... 
· 
. .. · ... 
· 
· . 
· · · · 
· . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
8 .. 
· · · 
· .. · ... · .. · . · . 
· · . · . · 
· . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
9 ............. · ... · . · .. 
· 
· . · . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
10 .. · . . . . . . . . . 
· 
· . 
· · · 
· . 
· · · · · · · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
6. Number of OPD case /day 
· · · · · 
· . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · 
. persons 
Peak hour, 
· . 
· 
· . 
· · · 
· .. 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
.o'clock 
Number of OPD case at peak hour, 
· · · · · · · · 
.persons 
7. Number of OPD examination rooms, 
· · · · · · · · · · · · 
. rooms 
Number of OPD (GP) examination rooms, 
· · 
· . · . 
· · 
. rooms 
8. How many OPD(GP) examination rooms have these items 
of equipment. 
1. Examination bed, · .. · .. · .. · . 
· · · · · · · · · · · · 
. rooms 
2. Examination couch and chairs, · .. 
· · . · · · · 
. rooms 
3. Functioning otolaryngoscope, · . 
· · · · · · · · 
. rooms 
4. Functioning ophthalmoscope, 
· · · · · · · · · · · 
. rooms 
9. Check equipment criteria in the emergency 
trolley(list in a paper attached) 
· 
Complete set 1 
Not complete set 2 
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10. Is there any ambulance? 
Yes, ............................. cars 1 
No 2 
11. Status of rooms and floor, whether redecorated or not 
Yes when, ...................... months/years ago 
Never redecorated o 
12. Is there any refrigerator for drinking water 
service to patients and staff? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
13. Number of toilets, . ....................... toilets 
Laboratory and X-ray Section 
1. Check list of these tests. 
2. 
1.1 Urine microscopy 
1.2 Urea and Electrolyte analysis 
1.3 Serum glucose 
1.4 Pregnancy test 
1.5 CBC 
1.6 Malaria slide 
1.7 VDRL(WR or RPR) 
1.8 Cerebro-spinal fluid microscopy 
1.9 Widal serology 
1.10 Platelet count 
1.11 Stool microscopy 
1.12 Liver function test 
1.13 Cerebro-spinal fluid Chemistry 
1.14 Bacterial culture and sensitivity 
Is there any laboratory section? 
Yes No 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
Yes, owned by the owner of facility 1 
Yes, owned by other group 2 
No, send specimen to other laboratory 3 
other (mention) ............ .... 4 
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3. In case of no laboratory in facility, how long the 
result will be reported. 
There is a lab. in facility 1 
Reported by the same day 2 
Reported by the next day 3 
Reported by 2 days 4 
Reported by 3 days 5 
Reported by 4 days 6 
Reported by > 4 days 7 
4. How is the laboratory quality controlled? 
No, laboratory 0 
By people in the same facility 1 
By outside people 2 
By outside and inside facility people 3 
5. Is there any emergency laboratory service? 
6. Laboratory 
No 0 
Yes, 24 hours service 1 
Yes, on call and available within 1 hour 2 
Yes, on call and available within 2 hours 3 
Yes, on call and available after 2 hours 4 
response to urgent request 
No, 
Result response 
Result response 
Result response 
urgent 
within 
within 
after 
service o 
1 
2 
3 
2 hours 
3 hours 
3 hours 
Other 4 
(mention) .................... . 
7. Frequency of X-ray services by year, 
.......... requests. 
8. Number of X-ray staff during day time, ...... persons. 
9. In-service training of X-ray staff 
No o 
Yes, ................... days/year 
10. Number of X-ray machines, ..................... sets 
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11. Is there any Fluoroscopic Screening Machine? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
12. Is there any Ultrasound? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
13. Is there any urgent X-ray services? 
No 0 
Yes, result response within 2 hours 1 
Yes, result response after 2 hours 2 
Other (mention).............................. 3 
14. Age of X-ray machine. 
First Set, ............. years .......... months old 
Second Set, ............ years .......... months old 
Third Set, ............. years .......... months old 
Fourth Set, ............ years .......... months old 
15. The standard of X-ray room 
Yes, standard 1 
No, not standard 2 
Pharmacy Section 
1. At least 1 pharmacist working at day time 
Yes 
No, using other staff (mention) 
2. How long have staff in this section trained by year? 
.............. days. 
3. Item included on OPD medicine package labels? 
1. Name 
2. Dosage and other instructions 
3. Expire date 
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4. All prescriptions are routinely checked by pharmacy 
trained staff for accuracy, drug interactions etc. 
Yes, every-time 1 
Yes, sometime 2 
No 3 
5. Stock control system? 
Yes, formalised stock control system exists 1 
No 2 
6. Air conditioned storage of all drug stocks? 
No 0 
Yes, some stocks 1 
Yes, almost every stock 2 
Yes, every stock 3 
Operating and delivery room 
1. Number of operating rooms ............... theatres. 
2. Complete set of surgery equipment for all surgeries. 
Yes 1 
Not complete,in some operation doctor carries his own 
equipment 2 
Other (mention) , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
3. Number of delivery theatres, .................. rooms. 
4. Complete set of delivery equipment for all surgeries. 
Yes 1 
Not complete,in some operation doctors carry his own 2 
equipment 3 
Other (mention) , ............................. . 
5. Complete set of equipment in emergency trolley. (list 
in the paper attached) 
Yes, complete 1 
Incomplete 2 
Other (mention), ............................... 3 
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6. Is there any DC defibrillator in the surgery theatre? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
7. Autoclave service in facility 
No, using from other facility 1 
Yes, no 
Yes, weekly 
Yes, testing every 
Yes, testing every 
testing 
testing 
2 weeks 
3 weeks 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Yes, tasting every month 6 
8. Is there recovery room? 
9. In the recovery room, is there any equipment? 
1. One oxygen and suction outlet per bed 
2. ECG Monitor 
3. One baumanometer per bed 
4. Emergency trolley(complete set) 
S. Boyles Machine 
In-patient ward 
Yes 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
Yes 1 
No 2 
No 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
1. Space between beds ................... cm. 
2. Supplies and equipment in wards 
Total No Bed in Bed-screen in 
of beds common room common room 
(bed) (bed) (screen) 
Ward1 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · 
Ward2 
· · · · · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · · · · 
Ward3 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · · 
Ward4 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · 
· · · · 
· · · · · · · 
WardS 
· · · · · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · · · · 
Ward6 
· · · · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · 
· · 
· · · 
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Nurse 
Station 
(station) 
Form No. S 
3. Equipment in ward 
Emergency ECG DC 
Baumanometer trolley monitor defibrillator (Set) (Set) (Set) (Set) 
Wardl · . . . . 
· · 
· . · ....... · ... · .. 
· · . 
· .. 
· · · 
Ward2 · . . . 
· 
· . . . · . · ... · . · ....... · . · . · . · · 
Ward3 · . . . . · . · . · . · . · .. 
· · . · 
.. 
· 
. 
· · 
· . 
· · · · · 
Ward4 · . . . 
· 
· .. . 
· 
. .. · ... · . · . · .. 
· · · · · 
· . 
· · 
WardS · . . . . 
· 
· .. · . · . 
· · · · · 
. 
· 
. 
· 
· . 
· 
· . 
· · · · · · 
Ward6 
· 
... 
· · · 
· . 
· 
. 
· · 
· . 
· · · 
. 
· . 
· · 
. 
· · · · · · · · 
4. Number of toilets and hand washing point in wards 
Ward 1 
Ward 2 
Ward 3 
Ward 4 
Ward S 
Ward 6 
Hand washing 
point 
· · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · · 
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Toilet 
· · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · 
· · · · · · · · 
Code 
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Emergency trolley set list 
l. . Equipment 
- Functioning Laryngoscope 
Endotracheal tubes(one set of all sizes 6-10mm) 
- Oral airways(l.x No.2, No.3, No.4) 
- Ambubag and connector 
- Face masks (one set of all sizes} 
2. Drugs 
- Adrenalin 
- Atropine 
- Calcium chloride/gluconate 
- Dextrose 50% 
- Dobutamine/Dopamine/lsoprenaline 
- Furosemide 
- Hydrocortisone/Dexamethasone 
- Lignocaine 
- Mannitol 
- Naloxone 
- Sodium Bicarbonate 
3. IV fluids and other 
- Dextrose water 5% 
- Normal Saline 
- Ringers Lactate 
Paper attached 
(at least 2x1000 ml bags of anyone of above solutions) 
- Jelco and butterfly cannulas: 
(3 of at least two sizes (l.4g,16g,18g,20g) 
- Giving sets: 
(at least l.x60 and l.5 dpm infusion sets) 
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Ministry of Public Health 
Muang District, Nonthaburi 11100, Telephone 5918611 
THE RESPONSE OF 
CONTRACTING:A CASE 
NETWORK IN THAILAND 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
STUDY OF A PRIVATE 
TO COMPETITIVE 
HEALTH PROVIDER 
IN-PATIENT SATISFACTION 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
STUDY HOSPITAL SELECTION 
Four small hospitals, one from each sub-network of MEDSEC 
were selected. They are Ram-Intra, Rama-Suksawat, 
Wicharn-Yut, and Wipawadi-Rangsit hospitals. One general 
hospital of MEDSEC, Parkkret hospital; and one general 
hospital of Nopparat network, Nopparat hospital are 
selected by simple random sampling technique. 
IDENTIFICATION OF PATIENTS 
Study period starts 1 Jan 1995. All insured inpatients 
admitted to 6 hospitals will be interviewed by a nurse 
before discharge, to complete the number required of each 
hospital as follows: 
-Parkkret 40 cases 
-Rama-Suksawat 65 cases 
-Ram-Intra 65 cases 
-wicharn-Yut 65 cases 
-Wipawadi-Rangsit 65 cases 
-Nopparat 150 cases 
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Introduction guide 
This study is to evaluate a private health provider 
network, MEDSEC network. The aim of this study is to 
identify health policy recommendations about health care 
provider networks in social insurance in Thailand which 
would improve the accessibility to care of the insured, 
their satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system 
within a private network. The main, general objective of 
this study is to evaluate MEDSEC network in terms of 
organization, payment system, quality of care, and 
behaviour and utilization rate of the insured. 
is contained in four substudies: 
The study 
-operating system, financial management, and charge 
rate for medical care of MEDSEC; and the utilization 
rate of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers 
about MEDSEC 
-health-seeking behaviour, utilization rate, 
knowledge, and satisfaction of the insured with the 
services of MEDSEC facilities. 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This interview using a structured questionnaire is part of 
this study. The specific objective of this study is to 
evaluate the quality of care of networks by measuring the 
satisfaction of inpatients with MEDSEC and Nopparat 
hospitals. 
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Identification Code [ 
-] Month ...... 1994 
of the firm and worker 
Name of the firm and address 
Worker's name ............................. 
Interviewer's Name 
Code 
1 . Age in years 
2. Sex 
Male 1 
Female 2 
3. Marital status 
Single 1 
Married 2 
Divorced 3 
Widow 4 
Separated 5 
4. Educational status 
Primary school 1 
Secondary school 2 
vocational education 3 
Certificated education 4 
Bachelor degree 5 
Master or doctorate degree 6 
5. Where are you staying(Home)? 
5.1 Subdistrict ..................... . 
5.2 District ......................... 
5.3 Province ......................... 
6. When you arrived at the hospital, were you made to 
feel welcome? 
7. When you first arrived at the ward, did anyone 
greet you? 
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Yes 1 
No 2 
Yes 
No 
1 
2 
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Question about treatment and care 
8. Before coming to this hospital, have you been 
treated by any provider? If yes, please give detail 
................................................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
9. Treatment given are (drug, surgery, nursing care 
etc) 
1 ............................................. . 
2 •.••.••...•..•...•............................ 
3 ............................................. . 
4 •••••••••••••••••••••••....................... 
5 ............................................. . 
10. Did anyone tell you about ward rules and 
regulations and where to find things like the 
toilets and bathroom? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
11. Did anyone make sure that you knew what was going 
to happen to you? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
12. Was there consideration for your individual needs? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
13. Were you ever made to feel embarrassed? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
14. Did the doctors and nurses always respect your need 
for privacy? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
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lS. How long did it usually take staff to respond to 
your calls for assistance? (bell, voice, etc)? 
Code 
Very promptly(within few minutes) 1 
Quite fast(lO-lS minutes) 2 
SIOW(lS minutes or more) 3 
Don't' know 4 
l6. If you suffered pain, were you given something for 
it within what you consider to be a reasonable 
time? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
No pain 3 
l7. Are you happy about the treatment you have 
received? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
lB. Do you think that all the staff who helped in your 
treatment and care were good at their job? 
Excellent Very Good Fair Poor Don't 
good Know 
Doctors [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Nurses [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Paramedics [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
(X-ray,etc) 
Administra [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
-tion 
Porters [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Cleaners [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Questions about information and communication 
19. Do you feel that the nurses and doctors have told 
you enough about your treatment? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
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20. Did the nurses or doctors usually seem too busy to 
answer your questions? 
Doctors 
Nurses 
Yes, too busy 
[ ] 
[ ] 
No, OK. 
[ ] 
[ ] 
22. If you saw other staff (for example, physio-
therapists,x-ray staff,etc) did they explain what 
was going to happen to you? 
Yes, everyone 1 
No, some did not 2 
Not applicable 3 
22. Do you feel that your relatives were kept well 
informed about your condition? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
23. Were there times when your relative had questions 
but didn't know who to turn for answers? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Questions about ward environment and facilities 
24. How was the ward temperature? 
Good 1 
Not good 2 
25. Was the bed comfortable? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
26. Cleanliness of ward(Bath room, floor, desk, chair, 
bed etc. 
Good 1 
Not good 2 
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27. What were the meals like? Were they big/small 
enough, hot enough, tasty enough? 
Code 
Yes, they were fine 1 
No, they were poor because (please describe) 2 
No, meal provided 3 
28. Were you often disturbed while sleeping or resting? 
29. Did any of the ward rules bother you, for 
example, waking time, lights out, visiting time? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Yes, some of the rules bothered me, particularly 1 
............................................... 
No, the rules were fine 2 
30. Did you have a place where you could keep you 
personal belongings safe? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
31. Do you feel it was the right decision to discharge 
you on the day it occurred? 
32. If you were given medicine to take home are you 
clear about what it is for and when you must take 
it? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
33. Has someone explained to you how you can help 
yourself to get better now you are at home? 
219 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Form No. 6 
Code 
34. Have you been given written notice of the date,time 
and place of any follow up appointment? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
35. Do you feel that the treatment you received in 
hospital has improved your condition? 
Yes,I feel much better 1 
I'm not sure yet 2 
No, I feel worse 3 
220 
Form No.7 
Ministry of Public Health 
Samsan Road, Bangkok 10200 Telephone 2821886 
THE RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING:A CASE 
STUDY OF A PRIVATE HEALTH PROVIDER NETWORK IN THAILAND 
PRESCRIPTION ANALYSIS 
Selection of providers and prescription 
1.Providers selected are 4 small hospitals (1 from each subnetwork). 
2.Prescription selection 
-250 prescriptions of the insured & 250 prescriptions of the 
non insured from each selected provider will be analyzed. 
-the insured group are the OPs who are covered by social 
insurance between Jan. 1994-Jul 1994 selected by using multi-
stage cluster random sampling technique. 
-the noninsured group are OPs who are not covered by social 
insurance between Jan 1994-Jul 1994 selected by using multi-
stage cluster random sampling technique. 
-selected conditions/diseases have been chose by using tracer 
method and standard treatment carried out by the office of FDA 
of Thailand. 
-details of prescription analysis are made using selected 
tracers. 
Introduction to the manager of the providers 
This study is to evaluate a private health provider network, MEDSEC 
network. The aim of this study is to identify health policy 
recommendations about health care provider networks in social 
insurance in Thailand which would improve the accessibility to care of 
the insured, their satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system 
within a private network. The main, general objective of this study 
1S to evaluate MEDSEC network in terms of organization, payment 
system, quality of care, and behaviour and utilization rate of the 
insured. The study is contained in 4 substudies: 
-operating system, financial management, and charge rate for 
medical care of MEDSECi and the utilization rate of MEDSEC and 
Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers about MEDSEC 
-health seeking behaviour, utilization rate, knowledge, and 
satisfaction of the insured with the services of MEDSEC 
facilities. 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This prescribing analysis is part of this study. The specific 
objective of this study is to evaluate the quality of care of MEDSEC 
facilities by analysis of outpatient drug prescriptions of the insured 
and noninsured in MEDSEC facilities. 
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PRESCRIBING ANALYSIS FORM 
Name of facility ...................................... . 
Investigator: .......•.............. Date .............. . 
Type of patient [ ] insured [] non-insure 
Sjq Date Sex # #B~n- Antib Intec frss Diag-ofrx M/F Druq erlCS 0/1* 01 ruq nOS1S 
Total 
Note: * No=O, Yes=1 
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Ministry of Public Health 
Muang District, Nonthaburi 11100, Telephone 5918611 
THE RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO COMPETITIVE 
CONTRACTING: A CASE STUDY OF A PRIVATE HEALTH PROVIDER 
NETWORK IN THAILAND 
Evaluation of in-patient medical record 
Selection of providers and patient 
1. Selection of providers: 4 small hospitals (1 from each 
sub-network) 
2.Selection of patient records: 
2.1 All the in-patient records, insured and 
noninsured, between July-October 1995 will be analyzed' 
to identify the case mix by hospital, and charge by 
hospital and by disease/condition. 
2.2 Two disease/conditions which are appropriate 
tracers, appendicitis and diarrhoea, are identified. 
3.Analysis of patient record of two tracers: analysis of 
all patient records of two tracers between July-October 
1995 will be carried out by using criteria of good 
practise for these two tracers which are adapted from 
3.1 Bailey&Love's short practice of surgery(1977) for 
appendicitis 
3.2 Diarrhoeal survey form of Communicable Disease 
Control Department of Thailand(1994) for diarrhoea 
223 
Form No.8 
Introduction guide 
This study is to evaluate a 
network, MEDSEC network. The 
private health provider-
aim of this study is to 
identify health policy recommendations about health care 
provider networks in social insurance in Thailand which 
would improve the accessibility to care of the insured, 
their satisfaction, quality of care, and payment system 
within a private network. The main, general objective of 
this study is to evaluate MEDSEC network in terms of 
organization, payment system, quality of 
behaviour and utilization rate of the insured. 
is contained in four substudies: 
care, and 
The study 
-operating system, financial management, and charge 
rate for medical care of MEDSECi and the utilization 
rate of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
-knowledge and attitude of the facility's managers 
about MEDSEC 
-health seeking behaviour, utilization rate, 
knowledge, and satisfaction of the insured with the 
services of MEDSEC facilities. 
-evaluation of quality of care 
This substudy concerning evaluation of inpatient medical 
records is part of this study. The specific objective of 
this study is to analyze the process aspect of quality of 
medical care of inpatients from medical records of MEDSEC 
hospitals and to investigate outcome aspects of medical 
treatment of a disease by postal questionnaire between the 
insured and noninsured of MEDSEC network. 
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Evaluation for.m for Diarrhoeal Patient 
Name of Hospital [1] 
[3] 
Rama-Suksawat 
Wicharn-Yut 
1) General information 
-Age ........... Year 
-Length of stay ........ Day 
2) History 
-Onset ....... Time ..... O'clock 
[2] 
[4] 
Ram-Intra 
Wipawadi-Rangsit 
-Date of hospitalization ...... Time ..... O'clock 
-Number of stools in last 24 hour ........... . 
-Stool feature 
[ ] Loose 
[ ] Mucous 
[ ] watery 
[ ] Bloody 
[ ] Loose and watery 
[ ] Mucous and bloody 
-Number of urination in last 24 hour ......... . 
-Last urinated ...... hour before hospitalization 
-Sign and symptom 
[ ] Fever [ ] Abdominal pain 
[ ] Abdominal cramp [ ] Dyspepsia 
[ ] vomiting [ ] Others ...................... 
-Treatment before hospitalization 
[ ] To clinic [ ] Self prescribed 
[ ] To other hospital 
[ ] Other ......... ······· 
3) Physical examination 
- Weight ........... Kg, 
-Temp. . . . . . . . .. to ...... . 
-BP ................ mm Hg. 
-PRo • . • • . • • . . . . . .. /Min 
-RR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. /Min 
- Bowel sound ............. . 
-Dehydration ........... ··· 
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Evaluation for.m for Diarrhoeal Patient(continue) 
4 ) Laboratory 
Laboratory NO Yes Result 
-Ve +Ve(name) 
-Stool 
exam 
-Stool cis 
5) Diagnosis 
[ ] Acute Diarrhoea [ ] Dysentery 
[ ] Other ............. ··· 
6) Treatment 
[ ] ORS [ ] IV Fluid 
[ ] Antibiotic 
1 ................... . 
2 ......... ··········· 
3 • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4 ••••••.•..• •.·••···· 
[ ] Other Drug 
1 ........ ············ 
2 •••••••• •••·••··•·•• 
3 ....... ············· 
4 ••••••• •••·•··•••••• 
7} Result of treatment 
[ ] Better/discharge [ ] Worse/refer 
[ ] Other.......············ 
Note: Adapted from d~arrhoeal survey form of Commun~cable D~sease Control 
Department, Ministry of public Health, Thailand, 1994 
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For.m of rating scale for estimating effectiveness of drugs 
used in acute diarrhoea 
Drug 
-ORS 
-5% DIs 1000 cc. 
-Anti-emetic 
-Antispasmodic 
-Paracetamol 
-Cimetidine(200 Mg) 
-Kaopectin(Syr.) 
-Imodium 
-Antiflatulent 
-Vitamin 
-Lexinor(200 Mg.) 
-Cotrimoxazole 
-Gentamicin(Inj.) 
-Tetracycline(250 Mg) 
-Metronidazole 
-Ampicillin(250 Mg) 
-Doxycycline 
-Amoxycillin(250 Mg) 
High 
Effective 
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Moderate 
Effective 
Low 
Effective 
Not 
Effective 
tv 
tv 
OJ 
Form No.B 
Name of Hospital 
[1] Rama-suksawat 
Seq Vom- Dia-
# ting rrh. 
Evaluation form for acute appendicitis patient 
[2] Ram-Intra [3]Wicharn-Yut [4]Wipawadi-Rangsit 
Abdo. Temp Abdo. Rect. CBC U/A Patho. Nurse Anes. Surge Time LOS 
Pain °C Palp Exam WBC Sect. Note Note Note A-Sx 
Form No.8 
Rating form for assessing quality care 
for appendicitis patients 
This form is for discussion with five surgeons to identify the 
importance rating of various factors. The result of this discussion 
will be used for assessing the quality of care of appendicitis 
patient. 
Please choose the best answers by marking X in the column chose 
1. History taking 
l. . l. Vomiting . • . . . . . . . . . . 
1.2 Diarrhoea. . . . . . . .. .. 
l..3 Abdominal pain ....... . 
2 Physical Exam 
2.l. Temperature ......... . 
2.2 Abdominal palpation. .. . 
2.3 Rectal Examine .. 
3 Laboratory investigation 
3.l. CBC Examine .•.. 
3.2 Urine analysis ........ . 
3.3 Pathological section. . .. . 
4 Medical record 
4.l. Complete nurse note ..... . 
4.2 Anaesthetic note ....... . 
4.3 Surgical note ........ . 
5 Out-come variable 
S.l. Time between admission & surgery 
5.2 Length of stay •........ 
6 Other variables(please note) 
6 .. 1 ............................................................ .. 
6 .. 2 ............................................................ .. 
6 .. 3 ............................................................ .. 
6 .. 4 ............................................................ .. 
6 .. 5 ............................................................ .. 
6 .. 6 ............................................................ .. 
less important more important 
l. 2 3 4 5 
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Form No.8 
Questionnaire to evaluate outcome 
of medical care of appendicitis patient 
This is a questionnaire to ask appendicitis patients who were admitted 
in hospital between July-October 1995. 
Name of patient 
-----------------------------------------------
Age years, Sex [ ] Male [ ] Female 
Home address 
---------------------------------------------
Tel No. 
-----------------
1.How long was it before you felt healthy after discharge from that 
hospital? days 
2.How long was it before you went back to work after discharge from 
that hospital? days 
3.What do you think about the medical care of the hospital in this 
matter? 
3.1 Very good, the illness is cured. 
3.2 Not good, the illness is not cured. I had to seek care 
from other hospital/clinic. 
3.3 I don't know. 
3.4 Other(details) ________________________________ _ 
4.Did you still have any of the following symptoms one month after 
discharge? (choose the appropriate answers by marking X in [ ]) 
4.1 Fever 
4.2 Frequency of micturition 
4.3 Wound infection:pain,redness, 
swelling,discharge,abscess 
4.4 Cough with sputum 
4.5 Anorexia and/or vomiting 
4.6 Abdominal pain 
YES 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
NO 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
4.7 MucouS bloody diarrhoea/dysentery [] [ ] 
CAN'T REMEMBER 
[ 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
] 
4 . 8 Hiccough [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Note: adapted from Scott, Peter R. (1977), An Al.d to CIl.nl.c:=a~ Surgery, 
Churchill Livingstone, Medical Division of Longman Group Ll.ml.ted, Hong 
Kong, 1977. 
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Annex 2 
Additional text referred in chapter 3 
- Guideline for substudy 2: the knowledge and attitude of the MEDSEC 
facility's managers 
The collected data, from form nO.2 in annex I, were analyzed and discussed 
in terms of 
-the advantages and disadvantages of the payment system for the 
providers 
-price charged, and whether a lower price is charged to social 
insurance beneficiaries than other consumers 
-the extent of risk bearing of providers by comparing profit and 
loss between providers within the network; this would indicate 
whether the payment system of the network was fair to providers 
-the referral system in terms of number of patients referred/month, 
and the stage of sickness at which the patients are referred. 
- Group discussion guideline: 
i. What did you usually do when you were sick? 
ii. What is your rationale for choose of facility for medical care? 
iii. If you are going to receive care from hospitals or 
clinics: 
iv. 
what would you expect them to provide you in terms of 
medical and non-medical care? 
- what would you expect provided at the reception point? 
- what would you expect nurses to give you? 
- what would you expect doctors to give you? 
- what would you expect other staff to give you? 
What do you understand by quality of care? List examples of 
indicators to measure quality of care. 
v. What do you understand by satisfaction? List example of 
indicators for measuring patient satisfaction with health services. 
vi. What do you understand by interpersonal aspects of health care? 
List example of them. 
Indicators in questionnaire for measuring inpatient satisfaction of 
MEDSEC and Nopparat network 
- General characteristic of patient: age, sex, educational status, 
marital status, address, perception of hospital reception at 
outpatient and inpatient section. 
Treatment and care: treatment received before, hospital 
regulation, well informed before receiving care, consideration of 
patient need, feeling of embarrassment, privacy, response to call 
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for assistant, treatment response to pain suffering, and level of 
satisfaction with some personnel groups (doctor, nurse, X-ray and 
laboratory technician, cleaner, and others) . 
- Information and communication: doctor, nurse, and other staff (for 
example: physio-therapists,x-ray staff) proper answers to patient 
and relative questionsj patient's relative adequately informed. 
- Ward environment and facility: ward temperature, patient bed, 
cleanliness, patient food, disturbed while sleeping, inconvenience 
with hospital regulation (time to wake up, time to turn on the 
light, time to visit), service for keeping personal belongings. 
- Discharge and outcome: proper time for discharge, explanation of 
how to help yourself to get better at horne, clear explanation about 
medicine to take horne, written notice given for follow-up 
appointment, perception of better health at discharge time. 
- Gold standard treatment of diseases by Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
of Thailand (In Thai) 
In 1991, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of Thailand with the 
support of World Health Organization organized 10 specialist committees for 
setting up gold standard treatment (for Thailand) of 10 diseases: 
tuberculosis, HPT, sexual transmitted disease, arthritis, intestinal 
disease, viral hepatitis, URI, parasitic and protozoa disease, UTD, and 
infectious and noninfectious diarrhoea. Finally 9 gold standard treatments 
of 9 diseases except UTD have been completed. Any particular gold standard 
treatment is usually classified into sections: introduction, incidence and 
definition, sign/symptom and diagnosis, and treatment. 
_ General indicators for diarrhoea tracer analysis 
_ History of patient: patient's age; onset and admission time; 
number of diarrhoeaj fever; abdominal pain; abdominal cramp; 
nauseajvomiting, stool feature: watery, mucus, bloodyj range of stay 
in the hospital 
- Physical examination 
respiratory rate 
temperature, blood pressure, heart rate, 
_ Laboratory testing: stool examination, stool culture 
_ Diagnosis Definite diagnosis of diarrhoeal disease 
_ Treatment: Oral Rehydrated Sugar (ORS) , intra-venous fluid (IV), 
antibiotic, Other drugs 
_ Result of treatment: better, discharge; worst, refer; other 
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Annex 3 
Additional tables referred in chapter 4 
Table 3A.1. Average charge (Baht/visit) of outpatients of MEDSEC by 
subnetworks in 1992-1994 
Sub-network 1.992 1993 1994 
------------------------------------------
RIG 
EBG 
RSG 
Bangbon* 
CBG** 
132.87 
211.69 
159.58 
231.82 
157.00 
163.14 
194.84 
163.43 
180.84 
175.82 
178.52 
136.95 
141.97 
1.40.70 
------------------------------------------
Total 172.33 171.43 157.07 
========================================== 
Note: * withdrew from MEDSEC in 1994 
** fewer providers in subnetwork in 1992 
Table 3A.2 Charge rate (Baht/worker) and average charge/day (Baht) of 
inpatients of MEDSEC by subnetwork in 1992-1994 
Charge rate(Baht!worker) 
Sub-network 1992 1993 1994* 
Average charge!day(Baht) 
1992 1993 1994* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
RIG 52.00 68.61 52.99 247.61 381.21 360.57 
EBG 28.1.9 100.89 135.41 156.58 504.39 461.28 
RSG 113.49 172.03 148.13 515.84 716.82 658.40 
Bangbon** 258.15 185.33 1122.71 712.93 
CBG*** 0.00 187.35 58.95 0.00 1248.98 357.20 
Total 79.97 126.11 88.05 410.98 627.40 458.20 
====================================================================== 
Note: * Data from January-August 1994 
** withdrew from MEDSEC in 1994 
*** fewer providers in subnetwork in 1992 
Table 3A.3 Utilization rate/worker/year of outpatients of MEDSEC network 
by subnetwork, 1992-1994 
Sub-network 1992 1993 1994 
RIG 1.24 1.78 2.15 
EBG 1.25 1.88 2.08 
RSG 1.29 1.44 1.63 
Bangbon* 1.92 1.99 
CBG** 0.002 1.40 0.94 
------------------------------------------
Total 1..24 1.65 1.69 
========================================== 
Note: * withdrew from MEDSEC in 1994 
** fewer providers in subnetwork in 1992 
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Table 3A.4 Utilization rate (/100 workers) and average LOS (day)/worker 
of inpatient of MEDSEC small hospitals by subnetwork, 1992-1994 
Sub-network Utilization rate(%)/year Average length of stay(day)/worker 
1992 1993 1994* 1992 1993 1994* 
RIG 1.39 2.72 2.80 0.21 0.18 0.22 
EBG 0.60 3.68 3.77 0.18 0.20 0.29 
RSG 1.95 4.97 4.07 0.22 0.24 0.15 
Bangbon** l3.92 7.40 0.23 0.26 
CBG*** 0.00 7.57 2.79 0.00 0.15 0.25 
Total 2.36 4.40 3.22 0.19 0.20 0.23 
=========================================================================== 
Note: * Data from January-August 1994 
** withdrew from MEDSEC in 1994 
*** fewer providers in subnetwork in 1992 
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Annex 4 
Additional tables referred in chapter 5 
Table 4A.1 Distribution of sample by company 
Company Number !!-
o 
-----------------------------------------------------------
1. Sahafarm 
2. Yat-Ming 
3. Almond 
4. Eden 
102 
213 
294 
435 
9.8 
20.4 
28.2 
41.7 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Total 1,044 100.0 
=========================================================== 
Table 4A.2 Characteristics of the insured 
Characteristic Number Mean S.D Maximum Minimum 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Age (Year) 
Income/month (Bath) 
Work Hour/day (hour) 
1,014 
1,018 
986 
28.1 
5,041.4 
59.2 
5.3 
2,473.1 
13.8 
58 
42,000 
94 
16 
2,300 
20 
===================================================================== 
Table 4A.3 Marital Status 
Marital status Number !!-o 
------------------------------------------------------------
Single 496 47.5 
Married 493 47.2 
Separated 27 2.6 
Widow 15 1.4 
Divorced 13 1.2 
Total 1,044 100.0 
============================================================ 
Table 4A.4 Educational Status 
Status Number % 
----------------------------------------------------------------
- Primary School 395 37 . 9 
- Secondary school 490 47.0 
- vocational Education 79 7.6 
- Certification Education 41 3.9 
- Bachelor degree and 38 3.6 
higher ________________________________________________ _ 
-----;~~~i------- 1,043 100.0 
================================================================== 
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Table 4A.s Working periods in a day 
Period Number 
=~~~-~i~~----------------;;~----------------------
69.5 
-Night time 5 0.5 
-Alternative day 313 30.0 
and night 
---------------------------------------------------
Total l,043 lOO.O 
=================================================== 
Table 4A.6 Characteristics of responsible jobs 
Characteristic Number % 
--------------------------------------------------------
Administration 
Secretary 
Producer by machine 
Producer by manual 
Other 
8 
3 
l86 
752 
95 
0.8 
0.3 
l7.8 
72.0 
9.l 
--------------------------------------------------------
Total l,044 lOO.O 
======================================================== 
Table 4A.7 Balance of income 
Balance 
- Enough with saving 
Enough but no saving 
- Not enough but no 
debt 
- Not enough with debt 
Total 
Number 
78 
519 
26l 
l82 
l,040 
% 
7.5 
49.9 
25.l 
l7.5 
lOO.O 
======================================================= 
Table 4A.8 Receipt of Social Security card 
Receive Number % 
---------------------------------------------------
- Yes 
- No 
l,03l 
8 
99.2 
0.8 
---------------------------------------------------
Total l,039 lOO.O 
=================================================== 
Table 4A.9 Professions who provide care in the company 
Profession Number 
-------------------------------------
- Nurse 
- Medical doctor 
- Nurse and lor doctor 
593 
6 
430 
lO 
3 
- Other 
- Do not Know 
---------------------
----------------
Total l,042 
% 
--------------------
56.9 
0.6 
4l.3 
l.O 
0.3 
--------------------
lOO.O 
========================================================= 
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Table 4A.10 Mean of payment (Baht) for sickness and reimbursement of the insured during last month 
Episode Pay 
(S. D) Total pay** 
Reimburse* 
(S. D) (S. D) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
- First episode (N=483) 
- Second episode (N=243) 
- Third episode (N=159) 
111.0 (494.1) 
48.7 (126.1) 
37.5 (121.5) 
12.5 (98.2) 
4.8 (28.4) 
4.6 (4l.7) 
98.0 (486.5) 
43.8 (120.3) 
32.9 (114.5) 
======================================================================== 
Note: * reimbursement by themselves from SSO in case of emergency 
if they did not seek care from their main contractor 
** total pay = pay - reimbursement (every episode) 
Table 4A.11 knowledge of the insured concerning social insurance (N=1,036) 
knowledge about Know(%) Don't know(%) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Name of main contractor 
Working hour of MEDSEC facilities 
Uncovered diseases and conditions 
Presenting SS card when receive care 
Free of charge emergency care 
Reimbursement fee from emergency care 
Benefits under Social Security Act 
64.6 
66.1 
45.3 
87.5 
29.3 
77.8 
24.4 
33.4 
33.9 
54.7 
12.5 
70.7 
22.2 
75.6 
======================================================================= 
Table 4A.12 The reasons why the insured don't seek care from MEDSEC 
Reason 
First 
episode(%) 
(N=328) 
Second Third 
episode(%) episode(%) 
(N=129) (N=64) 
Total 
( %) 
(N=521) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- Emergency sickness 11.6 14.7 23.4 13.8 
- Don't satisfy with 49.4 44.2 39.1 46.9 
MEDSEC facilities 
- Difficulty to access 24.1 28.7 26.6 25.5 
- Other 14.9 12.4 10.9 13.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
====================================================================== 
Table 4A.13 Satisfaction (%) of the insured of MEDSEC with variables (3 
point scale, N=708) 
Variable Satisfied 
(%) 
Fairly 
Satisfied(%) 
-------------------------------------------------
-Accessibility 
-Waiting time 
-Perception on medical 
quality 
-Reception 
-Friendliness of 
personnel 
-Cleanliness 
34.3 42.1 
39.9 37.8 
38.5 43.3 
40.0 44.9 
40.9 41.5 
60.6 32.1 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
------------
23.6 
22.5 
18.2 
15.1 
17.6 
7.2 
============================================================= 
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Table 4A.14 Satisfaction (%) of the' , h J.nsured with services b . WJ.t MEDSEC and public facilitJ.'es (3 y experlence point scale, N=708) 
Variables Satisfied 
on MEDSEC 
The 
Same 
Satisfied on 
Public 
--------------------------- ---------------------------
-Accessibility 
-Waiting time 
-Perception on 
medical quality 
-Reception 
-Friendliness of 
personnel 
-Cleanliness 
39.9 
49.7 
44.0 
46.8 
43.7 
42.6 
32.1 28.0 
31.0 19.2 
33.7 22.3 
33.5 19.8 
36.5 19.8 
40.5 16.8 
========================================================= 
Table 4A.1S Description of variables used in logistic regression models 
Variables Description Value 
;i~~;-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALM Almond firm 0 no, 1 = yes 
EDEN Eden firm 0 no, 1 yes 
SAH Sahafarm firm 0 = no, 1 yes 
Yatming* Yat-Ming firm 0 no, 1 yes 
Socioeconomic 
AGE Age 
MSTATM Marital status, married 
Actual value in 
o = others, 1 
years 
married 
single MSTATS* Marital status, single 
NJOB Responsible job 
PEDUCAT Primary education 
o others, 1 = 
o = others, 1 = 
o others, 1 
manual producer 
primary education 
SEDUCAT Secondary education 
SEX 
TINCOME 
WHOUR 
Knowledge 
KCARD 
KCOVER 
KDIS 
KEMERG 
KHOUR 
KMAIN 
KPAY 
Sex 
Income/month 
Working hour/day 
Knowledge about 
security card 
Knowledge about 
security benefit 
Knowledge about 
uncovered 
Knowledge about 
service 
about 
social 
social 
diseases 
emergency 
opening Knowledge 
hour of MEDSEC facilities 
Knowledge about name of 
their main contractor 
Knowledge about reimbursement 
of medical fee for emergency care 
Satisfaction 
cleanliness CLEAN Satisfied with 
FRIEND Satisfied with friendliness 
NEAR Satisfied with accessibility 
QUAL Satisfied with medical treatment 
RECEPT Satisfied with general reception time 
o others, 
1 secondary education 
o = female, 1 
Actual number 
Actual number 
= male 
in Baht 
in hour 
0 = don't know, 1 know 
0 don't know, 1 know 
0 = don't know, 1 = know 
0 don't know, 1 know 
0 = don't know, 1 = know 
0 = don't know, 1 know 
0 = don't know, 1 = know 
0 = don't satisfied, 1 
0 = don't satisfied, 1 = 
0 = don't satisfied, 1 = 
0 = don't satisfied, 1 = 
0 don't satisfied, 1 
0 = don't satisfied, 1 = 
satisfied 
satisfied 
satisfied 
satisfied 
satisfied 
satisfied 
WAIT Satisfied with waiting 
================================================================================= 
* Variables excluded from models Note: 
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Annex 5 
Additional tables referred in chapter 6 
Table SA. I. I Structural items included in the general administration 
cluster by the network (%). 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-value 
- Post graduate study(Nl=61,N2=31) 
-Director 
-Deputy Director 1 
-Deputy Director 2 
Yes 
Yes 
- Facility operational plan 
(Nl=61,N2=31) 
Yes 
Yes 
65.6 
70.0 
100.0 
21.3 
- OP data collection(Nl=61,N2=31) 
-Patient diagnosis 
-Patient mortality 
-Patient complication 
-Financial data 
-Personnel data 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
41.0 
19.7 
29.5 
- IP data collection(Nl=14,N2=6) Yes 
75.4 
63.9 
-In-patient age Yes 
-Admitted diagnosis Yes 
42.6 
45.9 
31.1 
45.9 
31.1 
-Discharge diagnosis 
-Admitted date 
Yes 
Yes 
-Discharge date Yes 
- Piped-water supply(Nl=61,N2=31 
Never shortage 90.2 
Shortage sometime 9.8 
- Emergency electricity sources(Nl=61,N2=31) 
Generator 6.6 
Battery 54.1 
Other 6.6 
No emergency system 32.8 
- Garbage collecting system(Nl=61,N2=31) 
In 1 bag 34.4 
In separate bag 59.0 
In 1 container 0.0 
Other method 6.6 
- Autoclave service in facility(Nl=61,N2=31) 
No, autoclave 24.6 
Yes, working, never tested 19.7 
Yes, working, tested weekly 23.0 
Yes,working,tested every 2-3 weeks 1.6 
Yes, test monthly 31.1 
- Frequency of reporting system(Nl=61,N2=31) 
Weekly 3.3 
Monthly 36.1 
By 3 months 1.6 
Yearly 1.6 
Sometimes 18.0 
Never reported 39.3 
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80.0 
87.5 
50.0 
19.4 
48.4 
19.4 
19.4 
61.3 
48.4 
64.5 
67.7 
32.3 
67.7 
29.0 
90.3 
10.7 
9.7 
19.4 
6.5 
64.5 
32.3 
51. 6 
6.5 
9.7 
58.1 
16.1 
16.1 
3.2 
6.5 
16.1 
25.8 
0.0 
3.2 
6.5 
48.4 
0.24* 
0.58** 
0.43** 
1.00* 
0.65* 
1.00* 
0.43* 
0.24* 
0.23* 
0.08* 
0.08* 
1.00* 
0.08* 
1.00* 
1.00* 
0.01* 
0.22* 
0.01* 
0.14* 
Table SA.l.2 Mean of structural items included in the general 
administration cluster by network 
Variable 
-No of administrative meeting/year 
-Personnel trained/year{%) 
-No of computer (Set) 
MEDSEC 
(N=61) 
6.1(9.1) 
7.9(17.8) 
0.9(1.9) 
Nopparat 
(N=31 ) 
4.8(9.6) 
6.0(13.8) 
1.5(6.4) 
P-value* 
0.54 
0.61 
0.52 
======================================================================= 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail), ( - - -) = ( SD . ) 
Table SA.l.3 Mean number of personnel working in the OP service, between 
facilities with ~lOO beds of the 2 networks 
variable MEDSEC(N=4) Nopparat(N=l) 
--------------------------------------------------
1.Personnel(No), 8-16.30 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 4.5(3.3) 
- Register Nurse 2.3(2.2) 
- Technical Nurse 2.0(1.2) 
2.Personnel(No}, 16.30-21.30 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 4.8(3.0) 
- Register Nurse 3.0(2.0) 
- Technical Nurse 2.0(1.2) 
3.Personnel(No}, 21.30-6.00 hour. 
- Medical Dr. 1.3(1.0) 
- Register Nurse 0.8(0.5) 
- Technical Nurse 0.8(0.5) 
4.Medical specialist 
- Medicine 
- General Surgery 
- Plastic Surgery 
- Orthopaedics 
- Paediatrics 
- OB-GYN 
7.5(4.9) 
4.0(3.5) 
1.3(1.0) 
2.3(1.3) 
4.3(2.9) 
5.0(2.8) 
26.0 
7.0 
6.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
5.0 
15.0 
2.0 
10.0 
11.0 
2.0 
5.0 
6.0 
10.0 
Table SA. 1.4 Proportion (%) of specialty clinics in clinics between MEDSEC 
(N=47) and Nopparat (N=2S) networks 
Clinics MEDSEC Nopparat P-value 
-------------------------------------------------;~~;:---
I. General medicine 42.6 32.~ 1.00** 
2. Cardio-vascular 6.4 4'0 1.00** 
3. General surgery 14.9 12'0 0.41** 
4. Plastic surgery 12.8 4'0 0.66** 
5. Eye 10.6 ~'o 0.09** 
6. ENT 12.8 4'0 0.35** 
7. Dental clinic 0.0 12'0 0.30* 
8. Skin 25.5 12'0 0.22* 
9. Paediatrics 27.7 . 5 12 0 0.69** 10 .0rthopaedics 8. . 12 0 0.03* 
1.1. 0B-GYN 40.4· 4 0 0.35** 1.2.Haematology 0.0 . 0.16** 
13.psychiatry 10.6 _____ ~~~ __ ============= 
;~~;7=:=~~i:;~:;;==~;;~=:i~~=~:~;;~-~;;;~~~ion (2 tail). 
** Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
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Table SA.l.S Proportion (%) of specialty clinics in facilities with 10-30 
beds between MEDSEC (N=10) and Nopparat (N=5) networks 
Clinics MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
--------------------------------------
-------------------1. General medicine 
2. Cardio-vascular 
3. General surgery 
4. Plastic surgery 
S. Eye 
6. Skin 
7. Paediatrics 
8. Orthopaedics 
9. OB-GYN 
60.0 
0.0 
30.0 
50.0 
10.0 
20.0 
40.0 
60.0 
60.0 
100.0 
40.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
40.0 
80.0 
60.0 
80.0 
0.23 
0.10 
0.51 
0.10 
1.00 
0.56 
0.28 
1.00 
0.60 
Table SA.l.6 Proportion (%) of specialty clinics in facilities with ~100 
beds between MEDSEC (N=4) and Nopparat (N=l) networks 
Clinics MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
--------------------------------------------------------
I. General medicine 25.0 100.0 0.40 
2. Cardio-vascular 75.0 0.0 0.40 
3. Neuro-medicine 25.0 0.0 1. 00 
4. Endocrine 25.0 0.0 1. 00 
S. General surgery 75.0 100.0 1.00 
7. Eye 25.0 100.0 0.40 
8. ENT 75.0 100.0 1.00 
9. Skin 75.0 0.0 0.40 
10. Paediatrics 0.0 100.0 0.20 
11.0rthopaedics 50.0 100.0 1.00 
12.0B-GYN 25.0 100.0 0.40 
13.Haematology 25.0 0.0 1.00 
======================================================== 
Note: * Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
Table 5A.1.7 Mean of characteristics of OP structure for clinics between 
MEDSEC (N=47) and Nopparat (N=25) networks. 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0P visit/day(No) 
2.0P visit at peak hour/day(No) 
3.0P room (No) 
4.GP.examination room (No) 
5.Specialist examination room(No) 
6.Physical examination bed(No) 
7.DR-patient Desk(No) 
8.0tolaryngoscope(No) 
9.0phthalmoscope(No) 
10 . Ambulance (No) 
11. Years after redecorate/build 
12.Toilet(No) 
76.4(45.8) 
43.4(40.1) 
2.3(0.7) 
1.6(0.6) 
0.7(0.8) 
2.2(0.8) 
2.1(1.4) 
1.1(0.7) 
1.1(0.7) 
0.9(0.3) 
2.2(1.6) 
1.9(1.4) 
54.8(36.2) 0.05 
35.7(19.5) 0.44 
1.7(0.8) 0.01 
1.2(1.0) 0.07 
0.5(0.8) 0.36 
1.7(0.7) 0.01 
1.6(1.0) 0.12 
1.0(0.5) 0.26 
1.0(0.5) 0.51 
0.1(0.2) 0.48 
2.2(1.6) 0.98 
1.6(1.0) 0.47 
====================================================================== 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail) 
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Table SA.1.8 Mean of characteristics of OP structure for hospitals with 
10-30 beds between MEDSEC (N=10) and Nopparat (N=5) networks (%). 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0P visit/day(No) 
2.0P visit at peak hour/day(No) 
3.0P room (No) 
4.GP.examination room(No) 
5.Specialist examination room(No) 
6.Physical examination bed(No} 
7.DR-patient Desk(No) 
8.0tolaryngoscope(No} 
9.0phthalmoscope(No} 
10.Ambulance(No} 
11.Years after redecorate/build 
12.Toilet(No} 
114.0(39.8) 
40.0(15.8} 
3.9(1.0) 
2.5(0.5) 
1.4(1.0) 
3.5(1.1) 
3.5(1.1) 
1.9(1.2) 
1.9(1.2) 
1.2(0.6) 
1.8(1.1) 
2.6(1.4) 
152.0(100.3) 0.30 
133.3(61.1) 0.00 
4.0(1.4) 0.88 
2.4(0.5) 0.74 
1.6(0.9) 0.71 
3.0(0.0) ** 
3.6(1.3) 0.88 
1.6(0.9) 0.63 
1.8(0.8) 0.87 
0.8(0.8) 0.32 
1.0(0.0) ** 
2.3(0.5) 0.63 
======================================================================= 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail) 
** No variance for comparison 
Table SA.1.9 Mean of characteristics of OP structure for hospitals with 
~100 beds between MEDSEC (N=4) and Nopparat (N=l) networks. 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat 
--------------------------------------------------------
1.0P visit/day(No) 290.0(147.4) 
2.0P room(No) 
3.GP.examination room(No} 
4.Specialist examination room(No) 
5.Physical examination bed (No) 
6.DR-patient Desk(No) 
7.0tolaryngoscope(No) 
8.0phthalmoscope(No) 
9.Arnbulance(No) 
10.Years after redecorate/build 
11.Toilet(No) 
6.0(5.4) 
1.8(1.0) 
4.3(4.7) 
5.3(3.9) 
6.0(5.4) 
1.0(0.0) 
1.5(1.0) 
1.3(1.3) 
1.3(0.5) 
4.5(4.4) 
900.0 
26.0 
3.0 
23.0 
8.0 
8.0 
2.0 
2.0 
3.0 
1.0 
2.0 
======================================================== 
Note: -No variance of Nopparat network for significant test 
Table SA.1.10 Characteristics of OP structure for clinics between MEDSEC 
(N=47) and Nopparat (N=25) networks (%). 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
-Period of higher OP visit, 7-17 hour 21.3 52.0 0.02* 
17-22 hour 78.7 48.0 
-Refrigerator Yes 100.0 96.0 0.35** 
-Complete emergency set Yes 10.6 4.0 0.66** 
~~~:~=:==~~i:;~;;:=~:;~=:i~~=~:~:~;=~~;;:~~i~~=(;=~:i~)~============ 
** Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
Table SA.l.11 Characteristics of OP structure for hosp!tals with 10-30 
beds between MEDSEC (N=10) and Nopparat (N=5) networks (0). 
variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
=~~~i~d-~f-hi~h~~-;~-~i~i~~---;=~;--h~~~---~~~~-----~~~~~------~~;;---
17-22 hour 40.0 0.0 
Yes 100.0 80.0 0.33 
-Refrigerator Yes 0 56 set 20.0 40.0 . =~~~~==::=:::~~:~~:=================================================== 
N;t~~-~ Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
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Table SA.l.12 Characteristics of OP structure for hospitals with ~100 beds 
between MEDSEC (N=4) and Nopparat (N=l) networks (%). 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
--------------------------
----------------
-----------
-Period of higher OP visit, 7 17 h 2 -----------------
- our 5.0 100.0 0.40 
-Refrigerator 
17-22 hour 75.0 0.0 
-Complete emergency set 
Yes 100.0 100.0 ** 
Yes 50.0 100.0 1.00 
~~~:~===;i;h:;=:~~~~=~;~~=(;=~~ii)======::=~~~~~~=~~~;~~;============= 
Table SA.1.13 Characteristics of laboratory section for hospitals with 
~100 beds by network (%) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
(N=4) (N=l) 
-------------------------- ---------------------------------------------
- Laboratory section owned, 
By facility itself 
By other institute 
- Time consumed to report simple test 
Within hour 
Same day 
- Technical laboratory quality inspecting 
Done by facility itself 
Done by external group 
- Emergency service 
No emergency service 
Done by facility itself 24 hour 
75.0 
25.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
25.0 
75.0 
100.0 
0.0 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
0.0 
100.0 
1. 00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
======================================================================= 
Note: * Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
Table SA.l.14 Characteristics of structure of x-ray cluster for hospitals 
with 10-30 beds of MEDSEC (N=10) and Nopparat (N=5) networks (%) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
- Have fluoroscope Yes 20.0 20.0 1.00 
- Have ultrasound Yes 20.0 40.0 0.56 
- Emergency x-ray No emergency service 20.0 40.0 0.36 
service Result by 2 hour 50.0 60.0 
other 30.0 0.0 
- X-ray room standard qualified 100.0 100.0 ** 
==================================================================== 
Note: * Fisher exact test (2 tail), ** Cannot compute 
Table SA.l.1S Characteristics of structure of x-ray cluster for hospitals 
with ~100 beds by network (%) 
variable MEDSEC (N=4) 
Nopparat P-value 
(N=l) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
- Have fluoroscope 
- Have ultrasound 
- Emergency x-ray No 
service 
Yes 
Yes 
emergency service 
Result by 2 hour 
other 
standard qualified 
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25.0 
75.0 
25.0 
0.0 
75.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
0.0 
100.0 
0.0 
100.0 
0.40** 
1.00** 
0.08* 
*** 
Table 5A.1.16 Mean of characteristics of structure of facilities of 
operating and labour service cluster between MEDSEC (N=14) and Nopparat 
(N=6) networks. 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat P-value* 
-------------------------------------------------------------
-Operating room (No) 
-Labour room (No) 
1.4{0.6) 
0.9{0.5) 
1.7{2.7) 
2.0{3.5) 
0.69 
0.26 
============================================================= 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail) 
Table SA. 1. 17 Characteristics of structure of operating and labour service 
cluster between MEDSEC (N=14) and Nopparat (N=6) networks (%) 
Variable MEDSEC Nopparat p-value 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
- Complete set of 
OR instrument 
- Complete set of 
LR instrument 
- Complete set of 
OR emergency set 
- Having post OR 
- Having oxygen and suction 
in post OR 
- Having EKG monitor in 
post OR 
- Having sphygmomanometer 1 
set/bed in post OR 
Complete 
Complete 
Complete 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
- Having complete emergency set 
in post OR 
Yes 
- Having boyles machine 
in post OR 
Yes 
61.4 
78.6 
78.6 
57.1 
71.4 
42.9 
42.9 
50.0 
14.3 
50.0 
66.6 
16.7 
16.7 
66.7 
0.0 
33.3 
33.3 
16.7 
0.61* 
0.61* 
0.02** 
0.16** 
1.00** 
0.11** 
1.00** 
0.64** 
1.00** 
;~~~7=:==~~i:;~:;~=~~;~=:i~~=;:~~~;=~~;;~~~i~~=(;=~:ii)============ 
** Fisher exact test (2 tail) 
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Table SA.l.18 Mean of characteristics of structure of facilities of 
inpatient service cluster between networks. 
Variable MEDSEC 
(N=14) 
Nopparat 
(N=6) 
P-value* 
----------------------------------
-----------------------------------1.Space between bed (cm) 
2.In first ward 
- Bed (No.) 
- Non-single bed room (bed) 
- Single bed room (No.) 
- Screen (No.) 
- Nurse station (No.) 
- Single bed room/bed(%} 
- Screen/bed (%) 
- B.P./bed (%) 
- Emergency set/bed (%) 
- EKG/bed (%) 
- DC Defibrillator/bed(%} 
- Hand washing station/bed(%) 
- Toilet/bed (%) 
3.In second ward 
- Bed (No.) 
- Non-single bed room(bed} 
- Single bed room (No.) 
- Screen (No.) 
- Nurse station (No.) 
- Single bed room/bed(%) 
- Screen/bed (%) 
- B.P./bed (%) 
- Emergency set/bed (%) 
- EKG/bed (%) 
- DC Defibrillator/bed(%) 
- Hand washing station/bed(%) 
- Toilet/bed (%) 
100.0(4.4) 
14.9(13.2) 
9.0(10.3) 
5.9{10.4) 
6.4(10.6) 
1.0{0.7) 
43.7(44.9) 
38.8{48.1) 
19.8(15.2) 
11.1(9.4) 
4.3{8.9) 
1.7(5.4) 
36.0(31.1) 
38.6(30.2) 
12.1(15.2) 
7.5(10.5) 
4.6(10.7) 
5.9(10.8) 
0.4(0.5) 
42.8(43.8) 
35.0(42.4) 
19.8(12.2) 
15.0(12.6) 
1.1(2.5) 
1.1(2.5) 
27.6(25.2) 
40.3(34.1) 
93.0(2.1) 
16.7(15.6) 
7.3(9.6) 
9.3(13.1) 
9.3(11.8) 
0.8(0.8) 
45.0(44.3) 
65.0(44.3) 
18.8(8.3) 
5.6(4.6) 
4.0(5.9) 
4.0(5.9) 
30.1(12.9) 
26.1(12.4) 
10.2(17.1) 
1.3(2.8) 
8.8(17.6) 
1.2(2.9) 
0.5(0.5) 
63.3(55.1) 
33.3(57.7) 
3.0(5.2) 
8.9(6.1) 
0.0(0.0) 
0.0(0.0) 
12.3(11.5) 
14.1(14.3) 
0.74 
0.79 
0.74 
0.53 
0.58 
0.63 
0.96 
0.35 
0.90 
0.29 
0.95 
0.47 
0.72 
0.44 
0.80 
0.18 
0.52 
0.31 
0.57 
0.50 
0.96 
0.04 
0.44 
** 
** 
0.34 
0.23 
===================================================================== 
Note: * T-test pooled variance estimated (2 tail) 
** No variance for comparison 
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Table SA.l.19 Summary of structural evaluation between MEDSEC and Nopparat networks by type of facilities. 
Facility 
Clinics 
Hospitals 
with 10-30 
beds 
Hospitals 
with ~100 
beds* 
all 
facilities 
MEDSEC had better structure 
-more mean numbers of personnel during 16.30-21.30 and 
21.30-6.00 hour, and of OB-GYN doctor 
-higher mean numbers of OP room and physical examination 
bed 
-more frequent number having urine analysis, urea and 
electrolyte, and malaria slide test 
-higher proportion of having emergency X-ray service 
-higher mean number of X-ray personnel, X-ray machine, and 
age of X-ray_ machine set 
-higher mean number of general surgery, plastic surgery, 
orthopaedics specialist doctors 
-lower age of X-ray machines 
-greater mean number of personnel during 16.30-21.30 hour 
and toilets 
-lower age of X-ray machines 
-higher proportion having emergency electricity sources 
and autoclave service in facilities 
-higher proportion having complete emergency set in OR 
-higher mean of percentage of beds with BP of the second 
ward 
Nopparat had better structure 
-higher proportion of facilities reporting 
simple tests within hour 
-higher proportion having pharmacist and 
drug stock system 
-higher proportion having emergency 
laboratory service section 
-all higher mean numbers of personnel and 
specialist doctors except personnel during 
16.30-21.30 hour 
-higher mean numbers of OP rooms, GP and 
specialist examination rooms, physical 
examination beds, Dr-patient desks, 
otolaryngoscope, ophthalmoscope, 
ambulance, and years after 
redecorate/build of OP 
-higher proportion having emergency X-ray 
service 
-higher mean numbers of X-ray personnel, 
day of X-ray personnel trained, and X-ray 
machine set 
-higher proportion having pharmacist and 
having expired date labelled on package 
-scored better for IP information 
variables** 
Note: * Cannot compute statistical Ql~ference since only 1 hospital in Nopparat network 
** Generally higher although no statistically significant difference 
Table SA.2.1 Proportion (%) of patients satisfied with general care by MEDSEC facility 
Level of 
satisfaction 
Parkket Rama-
Suksawat 
N=28 N=S7 
Wicharn-
Yut 
N=S6 
Ram-
Intra 
N=69 
P-value 
* 
Wipawadi-
Rangsit 
N=61 
----------------------------------------------------------------------1. Outpatient 
Good 96.4 100.0 98.2 100.0 96.7 Fair 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 3.3 Bad 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Inpatient 
0.10 
2. 
Good 96.4 98.2 96.4 98.6 98.4 Fair 3.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.6 Bad 0.0 0.0 3.6 1.4 0.0 
0.43 
====================================================================== 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
Table SA.2.2 Inpatients' perception about medical care by MEDSEC hospital (%) 
Variables Parkket 
N=28 
Rama-
Suksawat 
N=57 
Wicharn-
Yut 
N=56 
Ram- Wipawadi- P-value 
Intra Rangsit * 
N=69 N=61 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Explain regulation/ Yes 
available facilities 
-Explain before Yes 
providing treatment 
-Considering patient Yes 
need 
-Made embarrassed Yes 
-Respect patient Yes 
privacy 
-Respond for 
assistance 
Immediate,<10 Min 
Quick,10-15 Min 
Slow, >15 Min 
-Satisfy to 
pain released 
-General satisfy 
with treatment 
Yes 
Yes 
57.1 
64.3 
82.1 
10.7 
57.1 
95.5 
4.5 
0.0 
95.5 
89.3 
80.7 
80.7 
84.2 
12.3 
82.5 
85.0 
15.0 
0.0 
98.0 
91.2 
66.1 
83.9 
87.5 
1.8 
80.4 
79.5 
17.9 
2.6 
100.0 
96.4 
69.6 
82.6 
81.2 
7.2 
81. 2 
86.4 
13.6 
0.0 
94.5 
97.1 
72.1 
83.6 
82.0 
3.3 
80.3 
78.4 
18.9 
2.7 
94.2 
96.7 
0.21 
0.22 
0.90 
0.14 
0.07 
0.68 
0.48 
0.32 
~~~;==:==~~i:;~~;;=~;;~=:i~~=;~~;~;=~~;;;~~i~~=(;=~~i~)==================== 
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Table SA.2.3 Inpatients' satisfaction with personnel by MEDSEC hospital (%) 
Personnel Level of Parkket Rama- Wicharn- Ram- Wipawadi P-value 
group satisfaction Suksawat Yut Intra Rangsit * N=28 N=57 N=56 N=69 N=61 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Medical High 57.1 57.9 50.0 50.7 60.7 0.97 
doctor Moderate 32.1 31. 6 35.7 37.7 29.5 
Low 10.7 10.5 14.3 11.6 9.8 
-Nurse High 53.6 57.9 55.4 52.2 44.3 0.83 
Moderate 35.7 24.6 30.4 34.8 37.7 
Low 10.7 17.5 14.3 13.0 18.0 
-X-ray and High 53.6 45.6 37.5 24.6 34.4 0.18 
laboratory Moderate 46.4 52.6 58.9 69.6 60.7 
Low 0.0 1.8 3.6 5.8 4.9 
-Cleaner High 28.6 15.8 32.1 17.4 21.3 0.08 
Moderate 63.3 52.6 37.5 46.5 45.9 
Low 7.1 31.6 30.4 36.2 32.8 
-Other group High 35.7 21.1 32.1 20.3 23.0 0.35 
Moderate 53.6 45.6 37.5 44.9 47.5 
Low 10.7 33.3 30.4 34.8 29.5 
=========================================================================== 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
High = excellent and very good satisfaction 
Moderate = good satisfaction 
Low = fair and bad satisfaction 
Table SA.2.4 Inpatients' perception about communication in medical care 
provided by MEDSEC hospital (%) 
Variables Parkket 
N=28 
Rama-
Suksawat 
N=57 
Wicharn-
Yut 
N=56 
Ram- Wipawadi- P-value 
Intra Rangsit * 
N=69 N=61 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Doctor and nurse explain 
before providing 
treatment, Satisfactory 92.9 
Unsatisfactory 7.1 
-Doctor's time to explain 
patient's question 
Satisfactory 89.3 
Unsatisfactory 10.7 
-Nurse's time to explain 
patient's question, 
Satisfactory 96.4 
Unsatisfactory 3.6 
-Interaction with X-ray 
and laboratory staff 
Satisfactory 85.7 
Unsatisfactory 14.3 
-Relative informed 
adequately, Satisfactory 100.0 
Unsatisfactory 0.0 
-Personnel's time to 
89.5 
10.5 
96.5 
3.5 
93.0 
7.0 
93.0 
7.0 
93.0 
7.0 
87.5 
12.5 
89.3 
10.7 
96.4 
3.6 
92.9 
7.1 
80.4 
19.6 
92.8 
7.2 
88.4 
11.6 
94.2 
5.8 
88.4 
11.6 
85.5 
14.5 
85.2 
14.8 
83.6 
16.4 
98.4 
1.6 
93.4 
6.6 
86.9 
13.1 
0.65 
0.27 
0.65 
0.64 
0.07 
explain relative'sf 78 6 75 4 78 6 78 3 91 8 0.17 t . Satis actory. . . . . 
ques 1on, Unsatisfactory 21.4 24.6 21.4 21.7 __ ~~~ ___________ _ 
;~~;==:==;~~:;~~:;;=~;;~=:~~~=;:~;~;=~~;;;~~~~~=(;=~:~l)====-----------------
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Table SA.2.S Inpatients' perception about environment and facilities by 
MEDSEC hospital (%) 
Variables Parkket 
N=28 
Rama-
Suksawat 
N=s7 
Wicharn-
Yut 
N=s6 
Ram-
Intra 
N=69 
Wipawadi- P-value 
Rangsit * 
N=61 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Room temperature 
-Patient bed 
-Cleanliness 
Good 
Fair 
Good 
Fair 
89.3 
10.7 
96.4 
3.6 
Clean enough 89.3 
Something not clean 10.7 
-Food Good 96.4 
Not good 3.6 
-Disturbance while 
sleeping/resting, Yes 7.1 
No, fine 92.9 
-Bothering of ward 
rule, No, fine 96.4 
Yes, some bothered 3.6 
-Place to keep valuable 
personal belonging, Yes 75.0 
No 25.0 
98.2 
l.8 
96.5 
3.5 
73.7 
26.3 
80.7 
19.3 
14.0 
86.0 
89.5 
10.5 
50.9 
49.1 
85.7 
14.3 
92.9 
7.1 
62.5 
37.5 
87.5 
12.5 
12.5 
87.5 
89.3 
10.7 
55.4 
44.6 
85.5 
14.5 
89.9 
10.1 
69.6 
30.4 
84.1 
15.9 
14.5 
85.5 
95.7 
4.3 
7l.0 
29.0 
80.3 
19.7 
82.0 
18.0 
65.6 
34.4 
9l. 8 
8.2 
13.1 
86.9 
95.1 
4.9 
62.3 
37.7 
0.06 
0.06 
0.12 
0.20 
0.90 
0.42 
0.08 
============================================================================= 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
Table SA.2.6 Inpatients' perception about discharge and outcome by MEDSEC 
hospital (%) 
Variables Parkket 
N=28 
Rama-
Suksawat 
N=57 
Wicharn-
Yut 
N=56 
Ram-
Intra 
N=69 
Wipawadi- P-value 
Rangsit * 
N=61 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.36 -Right 
time to discharge 
Yes 92.9 96.5 100.0 95.7 98.4 
-Explanation about taking 
drug at home 
Adequate 92.9 100.0 100.0 94.2 96.6 
Not adequate 7.1 0.0 0.0 5.8 3.4 
0.13 
-Explanation to help patient 
getting better at home 
Yes 85.7 94.7 96.4 92.8 96.9 0.22 
-Given written notice for 
follow up, Yes 75.0 82.5 78.6 8l.2 83.6 
No notice 2l.4 8.8 10.7 1l.6 8.2 
0.76 
No FU appointment 3.6 8.8 10.7 7.2 8.2 
-Perception of health at 
discharge, Better 89.3 9l.2 9l.1 91. 3 95.1 
Not sure 10.7 8.8 8.9 8.7 4.9 
0.88 
249 
~able 5A.2.7 Inpatients' satisfaction with general cares by sex of the 
~nsured of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks (%) 
Level of satisfaction Male 
(N=171) 
Female 
(N=228) 
P-value* 
-------------------------------------------------------
1. Outpatient Good 92.4 93.9 0.26 
Fair 6.4 6.1 
Bad 1.2 0.0 
2. Inpatient Good 90.1 93.0 0.22 
Fair 7.6 6.6 
Bad 2.3 0.4 
======================================================= 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
Table 5A.2.8 Inpatients' perception of medical care by sex of the insured 
of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks (%) 
Variable Male 
(N=l 71) 
Female 
(N=228) 
P-value* 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1.Explain regulation and Yes 57.3 66.7 0.07 
available facilities 
2.Explain before providing Yes 70.2 75.4 0.29 
care 
3.Patient need, considered Yes 73.7 79.4 0.22 
4.Made embarrassed Yes 9.4 7.5 0.62 
5.Respect patient privacy Yes 70.2 76.8 0.17 
6.Respond for assistance 
Immediate, <10 Min 70.0 78.1 0.24 
Quick,10-15 Min 20.0 16.4 
Slow, >15 Min 10.0 5.5 
7.Satisfy to pain released Yes 86.1 88.6 0.60 
a.General satisfaction with Yes 88.9 92.1 
medical treatment 
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Table SA. 2 .9 Inpatients' satisfaction with personnel by sex of the insured 
of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks (%) 
Personnel Level of Male Female P-value 
group satisfactory (N=171) (N=228) * 
---------------------------- --------
--------------------
-Medical High 43.3 51.8 0.21 
doctor Moderate 43.3 35.1 
Low 13.5 13.2 
-Nurse High 36.8 42.5 0.59 
Moderate 48.5 36.8 
Low 24.6 20.6 
-X-ray and High 25.7 36.8 0.06 
laboratory Moderate 62.0 53.5 
Low 12.3 9.6 
-Cleaner High 21.1 19.3 0.90 
Moderate 45.6 46.1 
Low 33.3 34.6 
-Other group High 19.3 18.4 0.32 
Moderate 52.6 46.5 
Low 28.1 35.1 
======================================================== 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
High = excellent and very good satisfaction 
Moderate = good satisfaction 
Low = fair and bad satisfaction 
Table SA.2.10 Inpatients' perception about communication in medical care 
provided by sex of the insured of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks (%) 
variable Male 
(N=171) 
Female P-value* 
(N=228 ) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Doctor and nurse explain 
before providing treatment 
-Doctor's time to explain 
patient's question 
-Nurse's time to explain 
patient's question, 
-Interaction with X-ray and 
laboratory staff 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
-Relative informed adequately 
-Personnel's time to explain 
relative's question 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory 
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81.9 
18.1 
87.1 
12.9 
90.1 
9.9 
82.5 
17.5 
78.9 
21.1 
71.3 
28.7 
83.8 
16.2 
80.7 
19.3 
88.6 
11.4 
84.2 
15.8 
81.6 
18.4 
81.6 
22.8 
0.72 
0.12 
0.76 
0.74 
0.60 
0.14 
Table SA.2.11 Inpatients' perception about e . f h . nV1ronment and facilities by 
sex 0 t e 1nsured of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks (%) 
Variable Male Female P-value* 
(N=171) (N=22B) 
--------------------------------
----------------
---------------------
-Room temperature Good 74.9 B2.9 0.09 
Fair 24.6 17.1 
Bad 0.6 0.0 
-Patient bed Good B3.6 B6.B 0.3B 
Fair 15.B 13.2 
Bad 0.6 0.0 
-Cleanliness Clean enough 63.7 61.B 0.7B 
Something not clean 36.3 3B.2 
-Food Good 77.B B2.9 0.25 
Not good 22.2 17.1 
-Disturbance while Yes IB.7 16.7 0.69 
sleeping/resting No, fine Bl.3 B3.3 
-Bothering of ward No, fine BB.9 B9.0 1.00 
rule Yes, some bothered 11.1 11. 0 
-Place to keep valuable Yes 40.9 36.B 0.47 
personal belongings No 59.1 63.2 
===================================================================== 
Note: * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
Table SA.2.12 Inpatients' perception about discharge and outcome by sex 
of the insured of MEDSEC and Nopparat networks (%) 
Variable Male 
(N=171) 
Female P-value* 
(N=22B) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Right time to discharge Yes 91.B 92.1 1.00 
2. Explanation about taking Adequate 94.7 93.9 O.BB 
drug at home Not adequate 5.3 6.1 
3. Explanation to help patient Yes B6.5 B6.4 1.00 
getting better at horne 
4. Given written notice for Yes B4.2 7B.l 0.26 
follow up No notice 10.5 13.2 
No FU appointment 5.3 B.B 
5. Perception of health at Better B7.1 B6.B 0.57 
discharge Not sure 12.3 11.4 
Worse 0.6 1.B 
======================================================================== 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tail) 
Table SA.2.13 Mean of patient's age between MEDSEC and Nopparat networks 
Network N S.D. Mean Min Max P-value* 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
0.55 266 
126 
B.O 
7.3 
2B.3 
27.B 
16.0 
17.0 
69.0 
56.0 MEDSEC Nopparat 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Note * T-test with pooled variance estimated 
===================================================================== 
Total 392 7.B 2B.2 16.0 69.0 
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Table SA.2.14 Marital status of patients by network (%) 
Marital status MEDSEC 
(N=271) 
Nopparat 
(N=128) 
P-value* 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Single 35.1 41.4 0.21 
Married 60.9 57.8 
Divorced 1.1 0.0 
Widow 1.B 0.0 
Separated 1.1 O.B 
================================================================ 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tailed) 
Table SA.2.1S Educational status of patient between MEDSEC and Nopparat 
networks (%) 
Educational status MEDSEC 
(N=271) 
Nopparat 
(N=128 ) 
P-value* 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Primary school 50.2 44.5 0.52 
Secondary school 32.5 32.8 
Vocational education 7.4 7.0 
Certificated education 5.5 8.6 
Bachelor degree 2.6 4.7 
Master or PhD 0.0 0.8 
Never learn 1.8 1.6 
================================================================= 
Note * Chi-square test with Yate's correction (2 tailed) 
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Table SA. 4.1 Estimate of effectiveness of drug 
diarrhoea patients 
treatments in acute 
Drug High Moderate Low Not 
Effective Effective Effective Effective 
-ORS . . . . X 
-5% Dis 1000 cc ..... __ ~X~ ____________________________ __ 
-Anti-emetic . . . X 
-Antispasmodic . . X 
-Paracetamol . X 
-Cimetidine(200 Mg). X 
-Kaopectin(Syr.) . . . . ______________________________ ~XL_ __ 
-Imodium . . . . . . . X 
-Anti flatulent . . . . . __________________________________________________ ~XL_ ____ 
-vitamin . . . . . X 
-Lexinor(200 Mg) x 
-Bactrim .. . . . _______________________ X~ __________ __ 
-Gentamicin (Inj) X 
-Tetracycline(250 Mg) .. ____________________________________ ~X~ _______________ ___ 
-Metronidazole . . . . X 
-Ampicillin(250 Mg) . X 
-Doxycycline . . . . . X 
-Amoxycillin(250 Mg) X 
Table 5A.4.2 Cost per unit of drugs used in diarrhoeal disease 
Drug unit Baht/unit Baht/day Baht/course 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
-ORS Pack 1.50 7.50 
-5% D/S 1000 cc. Pack 27.00 81.00 
-Anti-emetic Tab 0.35 1.40 
-Antispasmodic Tab 0.58 2.32 
-Paracetamol Tab 0.08 0.32 
-Cimetidine(200 Mg) Tab 0.50 2.50 
-Kaopectin (Syr.) 180 cc. 10.44 3.48 
-Imodium Cap 0.02 0.08 
-Antiflatulent Tab 0.76 3.04 
-Vitamin Tab 0.08 0.32 
-Metronidazole Tab 0.22 0.88 
-Lexinor(200 Mg.) Cap 2.45 9.80 9.80 
-Tetracycline (250 Mg) Cap 0.26 2.08 10.40 
-Doxycycline Cap 1.05 2.10 10.50 
-Cotrimoxazole Tab 0.38 1.52 
10.64 
-Amoxycillin(250 Mg) Cap 0.94 3.76 18.80 
-Ampicillin(250 Mg) Cap 0.86 6.88 34.40 
-Gentamicin(Inj.) 80 Mg. 3.75 11.25 56.20 
====================================================================== 
Note: source of drugs price is Ram-Inthra hospital 
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Table 5A.4. 3 
patients 
Score of variables for assessing quality care of appendicitis 
less important more important 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
1. History taking 
1.1 Vomiting (asked) 
· · · 
3 
1.2 Diarrhoea (asked) 2 
1.3 Abdominal pain (asked) 5 
2. Physical Exam 
2.1 Temperature (done) . 
· · · · 
2 
2.2 Abdominal palpation (done) . 5 
2.3 Rectal Examine (done) 3 
3. Laboratory investigation 
3.1 CBC Examine (done) . 
· · · 
4 
3.2 Urine analysis (done) 3 
3.3 Pathological section (done) 3 
4. Medical record 
4.1 Complete nurse note 
· · · 
2 
4.2 Anaesthetic note (done) . . 5 
4.3 Surgical note (done) . 
· 
5 
5 . Out come variable 
5.1 Time between admission & 
surgery 
- 1-2 hours 
· · · · 
5 
- 3-4 hours 
· · · · · · · 
4 
- 5-6 hours 
· · · 
3 
- 7-8 hours 
· · · 
2 
- 9-10 hours 
· · · 
1 
- 11-12 hours 
· · · · · · · 
0 
5.2 LOS 
- 1-4 days 
· · · · · 
5 
· · 
- 5-8 days 4 
· · · · 
- 9-12 days 
· · 
3 
· · 
- 13-16 days 
· · · · · · · 
2 
- 17-20 days 
· · · · · · 
1 
- 21-24 days 
· · · · 
0 
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